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KEY DEFINITIONS
Numerous definitions exist throughout international aviation authorities involving
air show performers and air bosses, which may confuse the reader (European Airshow
Council [EAC], 2020; Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2020a; United Kingdom
Civil Aviation Authority [UK CAA], 2022;). However, for this study, “air show
performers” will be defined as all pilots/operators flying any aircraft or Unmanned Air
System (UAS) who perform aerobatics–solo or formation, or dynamic maneuvering–solo
or formation, as per the FAA (2020a). Then, an “air boss” will be mentioned as the
person in charge of the flight operations at an aviation event, as per the FAA (2020a).
In addition, the following definitions will be referenced in the current paper under
CAP 403 (UK CAA, 2022):
Crowd line

The line delineating the closest edge of any area,
including car park(s), accessible to spectators
concerning the display area/display line.

Display line

A line defining the track along which displaying
aircraft may operate.

Flying display

Any flying activity deliberately performed for
the purpose of providing an exhibition or
entertainment at an advertised event open to the
public.

Flying control committee (FCC)

A group of suitably experienced persons
assembled to assist the FDD in the safety
management of a flying display.

xix

Flying display director (FDD)

The person responsible to the authorities for the
safe conduct of a flying display.

Show center or display datum

The display datum is the point upon which
individual displays are based and is normally the
center point of the crowd.

Spectator area

An area specifically designated for spectators by
the event organizer or FDD and approved by the
FDD for flying display safety purposes which
includes all areas to which spectators have
access during the flying display.

Minimum aerobatic height

The minimum height above which the aircraft
must be capable of complete recovery from an
aerobatic maneuver. This will be the most
restrictive of:
•

The minimum aerobatic height specified

in the Permission.
•

The minimum aerobatic height quoted on

the relevant pilot’s display authorization (in
relation to the aircraft category being flown); or
•

The minimum aerobatic height imposed

by the FDD.

xx

Minimum pyrotechnic release

The minimum height above the surface level

height (MPRH)

from which pyros may be ignited, released, or
emitting product such that any dross/embers are
completely burnt out when reaching surface
level.

xxi

ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation

Definition

ACE

Aerobatic Competency Evaluator

ANOVA

Analysis of Variance

ADM

Aeronautical Decision Making

AGFI

Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index

AVE

Average Variance Extracted

BADA

British Air Display Association

BC

Bias-Corrected Confidence

CAA

United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority

CFA

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

CFI

Comparative Fit Index

CFIT

Controlled Flight Into Terrain

CMIN

Minimum Discrepancy or Model Chi-Square

COVID-19

Coronavirus Disease 2019

CPA

Causal Path Analysis

CR

Critical Ratios

DA

Density Altitude

EAC

European Airshow Council

xxii

Abbreviation

Definition

EASA

European Union Aviation Safety Agency

ECS

Environmental Control System

FAA

Federal Aviation Authority, United States

FCC

Flying Control Committee

FIO

Flight Into Object

FIT

Flight Into Terrain

FOD

Foreign Object Debris / Damage

FPRS

Flight Risk Perception Scale

FRMS

Fatigue Risk Management Systems

GFI

Goodness-of-Fit Index

GIVD

G-Induced Vestibular Dysfunction

G-LOC

G-Induced Loss Of Consciousness

HA

Hazardous Attitudes

HRO

High-Reliability Organization

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

ICAS

International Council of Air Shows

IFI

Incremental Fit Index

IFR

Instrument Flight Rules

IMC

Instrument Meteorological Conditions

LOC

Loss Of Control

MAAS

Mindful Attention Awareness Scale

xxiii

Abbreviation

Definition

MAC

Midair Collision

MF

Mindfulness

MI

Modification Indices

ML

Maximum Likelihood Estimation

MLE

Maximum Likelihood Estimates

NFI

Normed Fit Index

PA

Path Analysis

PCFI

Parsimony Comparative Fit Index

PNFI

Parsimony Normed Fit Index

PTSD

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

RI

Risk Indicator

RMSEA

Root Means Square Error of Approximation

RP

Risk Perception

RSC

Resilient Safety Culture

RT

Risk Tolerance

SEM

Structural Equation Modelling

SME

Subject Matter Expert

SMS

Safety Management System

SPI

Safety Performance Indicator

SPSS

Statistical Package for Social Sciences

SVFR

Special Visual Flight Rules

TLI

Tucker Lewis Index

xxiv

Abbreviation

Definition

U/C

Under Carriage

VFR

Visual Flight Rules

VMC

Visual Meteorological Conditions
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ABSTRACT
A convergent mixed-methods approach with data triangulation was utilized to assess
the strength of relationships between operational risk factors, hazardous attitude, and
resilient safety culture when mediated by mindfulness in the international air show
community. An anonymous online survey of respondents’ perceptions, semistructured interviews of air show experts, focus-group on air show performers, field
observation at an air show, and a documentary analysis of air show safety event data
was used to collect data. The quantitative findings suggest a good fit of a hypothesized
structural model showing the relationships between study variables using structural
equation modeling (SEM). Mindfulness (MF) significantly mediates the predictive
relationship between hazardous attitudes (HA), risk perception (RP), risk tolerance
(RT), and resilient safety culture (RSC) with a high effect size. There was significant
predictive relationship between MF and RSC with medium effect size.
Demographically, married respondents had significantly lower mean scores on MF
compared to single and divorced while single respondents had higher mean scores on
RT than married or divorced. The qualitative findings indicate that the RSC of air
show performers has a negative correlation with RT and HA. The triangulation
suggests military air show background was strongly correlated with RSC, MF, and a
negative correlation to HA. This study provides a validated measurement model to
assess the relationships between the study variables and fills a gap in the literature
related to resilient safety culture in the airshow community. Theoretical and practical

xxix

implications of this study provide a framework for continuous improvement of safety
in the air show community.

xxx

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The Tiger Airshows performer Mark Nowosielski and Team Chambliss’
mechanic and pilot Steve Andelin’s fatal crashes on two continents on the same weekend
have brought into focus some of the critical operational and safety challenges rife in the
air show community (Tulis, 2020). These accidents highlight the fact that stringent safety
and performance standards are required of air show professionals (Papadakis, 2008). The
highly focused attentional qualities expected of these professionals that ensure minimal
distractions during such high-energy performances have to warrant empirical inquiry
(Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2005; Barker, 2020a; Defense Safety Authority,
2019). The need for optimized time-sensitive safety decisions while in the air show
performance sequence requires a high level of adaptability and mindfulness (Barker,
2020a; Fusco, 2018). Despite all these highlighted operational and safety challenges,
there seems to be a paucity of empirically researched studies that aims to unearth safety
cultural variables, safety risk parameters, and human-performance factors that are causal
or contributory to safety occurrences during air shows.
Barker (2003, 2020a), in a seminal analysis of the unique characteristics of air
show aviators, suggested that display pilots are nominally characterized by high levels of
flying experience, stringent standards, exceptional professionalism, and dexterity in
aircraft handling skills. Moreover, these pilots are typically selected after going through a
rigorous audit and assessment.
Yet, a major causal finding of air show accident investigation reports is that
human error and other contributory human performance factors were involved (Air
Accidents Investigation Branch [AAIB], 2017; Barker, 2020a; UK CAA, 2021;
1

Department of the Navy, 2016; United States Air Force [USAF], 1994, 2018).
These safety occurrences enumerated earlier have led various national regulators,
military organizations, and international air show associations to implement several rules
and regulations to reduce aerial events’ inherent hazards (Ministry of National Defence,
2021; National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2012; UK CAA, 2021, 2022;
United Kingdom Royal Air Force, 2010; USAF, 2021; Webster, 2007).
Safety culture is defined by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC, 2020) as “the core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment
by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure the
protection of people and the environment.” Both proactive and reactive initiatives, such
as training and regulatory oversight (Barker, 2020b), have improved the air show
industry’s safety records, enhanced risk awareness, and nurtured the existing safety
culture.
However, there is an inherent safety risk posed by humans’ hazards associated
with such high-energy aerobatic maneuvers at air shows (Barker, 2003). Ensuring a zeroaccident or incident air show industry may not be realistic, and the international air show
community should understand that errors will occur that could lead to safety occurrences
(Reason, 2016). Thus, the focus of inquiry may be on means to mitigate the risk posed by
these hazards to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable (Stolzer & Goglia, 2016).
Some of these measures could be developing and sustaining a resilient safety culture and
operational adaptability during the planning and execution of such high-tempo air shows
(Adjekum & Fernandez-Tous, 2020b; Akselsson et al., 2009; Hollnagel, 2014; Reason,
2016).
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According to Reason (1997), resilience is both a personal attitude and
organizational property; it is grounded on the concepts of mindfulness, proactive
reasoning, flexibility, and adaptability. The air show industry’s safety experts might need
to focus on aspects of resilience to prevent adversities from happening or becoming
worse or even to recover from an unexpected situation once it has happened (Reason,
2016).
One emerging aspect of resilience is focused on a resilient safety culture that
acknowledges adaptability as an essential feature of both crisis-prepared organizations
and individuals (Hollnagel et al., 2011; Nemeth & Hollnagel, 2016; Reason, 1997).
Rigorous flight training (Loudenslager, 2014), complemented by mindfulness training
(Meland et al., 2015, p. 48), could sharpen air show performers’ flying and mental skills
and eventually improve the industry’s overall resilience.
An assessment of the human behavioral attributes, safety risk perceptions, and
resilient techniques to vulnerabilities of other high-risk and extreme sporting performers
can unearth positive lessons beneficial to the air show community (Baretta et al., 2017;
Brymer, 2005; Brymer & Mackenzie, 2017; Filho et al., 2016; Smith & Smolianov, 2016;
Sparks, 2016; Stocker et al., 2017). By the rigorous performance standards and associated
high risk of activities, the air show community can be categorized in the same group as
high-wire acrobatic artists; Formula 1, MotoGP, and extreme cross-country drivers;
acrobatic skydivers; parachuting and base jumping; bungee jumping; rafting, and
mountain skiing to name a few. These activities require minimal margins of error, and
performers must perceive safety risks, manage distractions and deal effectively with
pressures to produce superlative outcomes before demanding spectators (Ross & Shapiro,
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2017).
Background of Study
Aerobatic displays are the hallmarks of air shows and provide entertainment and
educational values to the spectators while ensuring economic returns for organizers and
performers (Barker, 2020b). Some educational values are ground talk shows on aircraft
performances and capabilities (Cudahy, 2019; National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, 2021), while the economic values are revenue generated through
financial sponsorship from entities such as airlines, watchmaker companies, and aircraft
manufacturers (EAC, 2020).
Personnel involved in the organization and management of air shows have a
responsibility to demonstrate high levels of professionalism and performance standards,
and they must be accountable for maintaining the highest standards of personal and
professional conduct in order to provide integrity, safety, and passion to the air show
business (British Air Display Association, 2022; EAC, 2020; France Spectacle Aérien,
2022; International Council of Air Shows [ICAS], 2021). Meticulous planning for all
flying and ground activities is necessary (UK CAA, 2022; FAA, 2020a).
High-risk activities such as air shows must be conducted with careful thought
towards ensuring that the risks to the general public, spectators, and flying and nonflying
participants have been considered and that the activity is as safe as reasonably possible
(Air Combat Command, 2021a, 2021b; FAA, 2020a; UK CAA, 2021, 2022). Hence, the
impromptu, ad hoc, unrehearsed or unplanned must never be attempted (UK CAA, 2021,
2022).
According to Reason (2016), safety has two distinct aspects: One negative and
4

one positive, and even though it is mainly the former that claims attention, the latter is the
one that reflects an organization’s “health” regarding safety. The positive face of safety
relates to an attainable, realistic safety goal: The maximum intrinsic resistance to
operational hazards rather than zeroing accidents. The nature of positive safety is a single
view of safety that does not rely exclusively on infrequent episodes of the “unsafe.”
An accident-free air show relies on the training and experience of the participating
pilots, the aircraft’s airworthiness, and the planning and risk management of the event
(Barker, 2020b). Regulations, guidance, and oversight provide the framework for these
activities (AAIB, 2017). Nevertheless, to ensure a proactive safety culture, there should
be a drive for continuous improvements in safety and an assessment of the relationship
between safety risk perceptions and resilient safety culture among performers in the air
show community.
Previous studies have suggested that flight personnel’s perceptions of the inherent
safety culture can influence their safety behavior, and at-risk safety behaviors can serve
as precursors for accidents and other safety occurrences (Adjekum et al., 2015; Dillman
et al., 2010; Hunter, 2006a).
A vital element of a resilient safety culture in any organization is organizational
flexibility or adaptability to changing demands and potential vulnerabilities (Adjekum &
Fernandez-Tous, 2020b; Hollnagel, 2014; Hollnagel et al., 2011; Reason, 2016). Resilient
safety culture is also a defining property of high-reliability organizations such as aviation
(La Porte, 1996; Pariès et al., 2019). Yet, air show performers need to be equipped with
even more resiliency skills than other aviators to deal effectively with situations for

5

which there is no precedent and that neither rules nor standardization can cover or predict
(Dekker, 2014; Hollnagel et al., 2011).
Many mental skills required for performance excellence in sports, the performing
arts, and circus arts are essential for air show performers, such as resilience, commitment,
concentration, and confidence (Ross & Shapiro, 2017). Additionally, some mindfulnessbased interventions used to manage social anxiety and emotion control in elite athletes
(Birrer et al., 2012) and circus performers (Filho et al., 2016; Ross & Shapiro, 2017) are
critical for air show performers.
Looking specifically at the demanding low-level aerobatic flights, we see that the
presence of spectators can increase the pressure on air show performers (Papadakis,
2008). Studies in other fields of high-risk, high-performance activities, such as the circus
arts, have identified the presence of an audience as a cause of perceived pressure by the
performers (Filho et al., 2016). As part of mitigation efforts to ensure safe and optimal
performance outcomes during these high-risk activities, researchers such as Ross and
Shapiro (2017) and Sutcliffe, Vogus, and Dane (2016) suggested that attentional control
strategies, such as mindfulness, be used to mediate perceived task pressures and the
observed performance outcomes.
Mindfulness is defined as “paying attention in a particular way, on purpose, in the
present moment, and nonjudgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 4). Mindfulness can be
individual or collective (Reason, 2016); individual mindfulness can lead to systemic
resilience, while collective mindfulness needs organizational support to improve the
foresight and “error wisdom” (Reason, 2004a, p. ii28) of the air show performers.
It is not enough to provide one-off training programs to instill the necessary
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mental skills (Sutcliffe et al., 2016; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2009). Similar to technical
skills, cognitive skills need to be continually managed, practiced, and refreshed (Reason,
2016). As such, mindfulness training could complement the existing mental training for
individuals engaged in high-performance activities.
The reduction of unsafe maneuvers and sequences during air show performances
by display pilots has become a primary objective for air show organizers and safety
managers (EAC, 2020; FAA, 2020a; ICAS, 2021; UK CAA, 2022). The implementation
of effective safety initiatives such as safety management systems (SMS) has positively
affected the safety culture and enhanced the accident prevention strategies in several
aviation programs (Adjekum, 2014; Adjekum et al., 2015).
Despite the generic safety guidelines nominally required by regulators during air
shows, it is a common convention within the civilian air show community for high levels
of operational autonomy when it comes to the adoption of formalized initiatives, such as
SMS in operations (UK CAA, 2022). There are more inclinations to individualized safety
standards that complement the scope and complexity of each activity (Barker, 2020a).
A critical assessment of the relationships between perceptions of resilient safety
culture, safety risk parameters, and hazardous attitudes/ behaviors mediated by
mindfulness may provide insight and benefits of continuous improvements in safety and
optimized performances during air shows despite the seeming lack of formalized
initiatives, such as SMS.
Some of the safety risk parameters that would be assessed include safety risk
tolerance and safety risk perceptions for air show performers. Due to their concomitant
effects on decision-making during displays and safety outcomes such as accidents and
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incidents, it is expedient to measure and understand the effects on resilient safety culture
when mediated by mindfulness (Barker, 2020b; Teske & Adjekum, 2022).
Problem Statement
The problem addressed in this research is the lack of empirical studies to
determine how perceptions of safety risk parameters and hazardous attitudes/behaviors
can influence resilient safety culture within the international air show community when
mediated by mindfulness. There seems to be a gap in research, and there is a need for
such an evidence-based approach to provide findings that will be beneficial to this at-risk
community leading to continuous improvements in safety and optimized air show
performances.
Existing research on resilient safety culture in aviation has mostly focused on
commercial aircraft operations, flight training programs, and air traffic control
management (Adjekum & Fernandez-Tous, 2020b; Akselsson et al., 2009; Hollnagel,
2014, 2018; Reason, 2016). Specific studies on resilient safety culture in general aviation,
such as the air show sector, seem limited if not completely missing in the United States
and internationally. Also, extant literature suggests a paucity of studies that assess the
relationships between the effects of resilient safety culture and safety risk parameters,
such as risk perceptions and tolerance, and hazardous attitudes within the air show
community.
Risk assessment and management are critical components of a pilot’s decisionmaking process (Martinussen & Hunter, 2018). Numerous studies identified a negative
association between risk perceptions and higher risk-taking tendencies (Drinkwater &
Molesworth, 2010; Joseph & Reddy, 2013; You et al., 2013). Furthermore, inadequate
8

risk assessment can lead to poor decision-making, resulting in catastrophic aircraft
accidents (AAIB, 2017; Brugnara et al., 2022; Jensen & Benel, 1977; Kelly &
Efthymiou, 2021 ).
However, an extensive search of literature suggests the nonexistence of previous
or extant research that has explored the association between risk perception and risk
tolerance among air show performers. Thus, the current study provides an opportunity to
investigate the strength of the relationship between risk perception and risk tolerance, as
well as to explain the risk assessment and management processes of air show performers.
One of the numerous psychological constructs that have been studied as a
potential factor affecting decision-making and impacting the possibility of accident
involvement is hazardous attitudes (Martinussen & Hunter, 2018). Yet, display pilots
might act unsafely without any previous indications of hazardous attitudes due to the
latent factor of social facilitation bias (Papadakis, 2008). Thus, this paper delves into
whether there is an association between hazardous attitudes and risk perception and
tolerance among air show performers.
According to Reason (2016, p. 247), individual mindfulness is more important
than the technical skills required to achieve excellence in a task. Moreover, mindfulness
contributes to efficient decision-making (Gautam & Mathur, 2018) and has a negative
correlation with pilots’ anxiety (Li et al., 2020). Display pilots mentally prepare
themselves with visualization techniques and apply the “30-minute bubble” rule (Barker,
2020a) or the “sacred 60-minute” policy (Hollowell, 2012) before their performance.
Therefore, this study will examine other possible methods of mindfulness practiced by air
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show performers. Then, this study will explore the mediation role of mindfulness for risk
perception and tolerance and hazardous attitudes for resilient safety culture.
Several studies have discovered that experience, either in flying or other acts, has
a definite positive association with risk perception (Crundall et al., 2013; Ferraro et al.,
2015; Joseph & Reddy, 2013; Winter et al., 2019; You et al., 2013). Moreover, Gibson,
Michayluk, and Van de Venter (2013), and Hallahan, Faff, and McKenzie (2004)
concluded that age has an inverse relationship with risk tolerance, while Hallahan et al.
identified additional factors that significantly affect risk tolerance scores, such as marital
status. Additionally, Adjekum et al. (2015) revealed a significant relationship between
aviation collegiate students’ perception of safety issues and their educational level, while
Chionis and Karanikas (2018) concluded that aviation professionals holding a bachelor’s
degree or lower qualification compared to postgraduate professionals were more riskaverse.
Despite the findings of these researchers on how various demographic
characteristics of pilots influence their risk tolerance, Barker (2003), in an earlier analysis
of air show accident data, suggested that a paradox exists in air show performers’
demographic characteristics. Barker advocated that extensive flying experience and
demonstrable expertise in flying skills did not necessarily prove to be a safeguard that
leads to an uneventful flying display, as commonly accepted in general aviation.
Therefore, it may be expedient to assess and understand the relationships between the
variables stated earlier and demographic characteristics of air show performers, such as
total display experience, military or civilian experience, age, educational background, and
marital status.
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Purpose of Study
This convergent mixed-methods study with data triangulation intends to assess
and understand the relationships between resilient safety culture and safety risk
parameters when mediated by mindfulness in the international air show community.
Specifically, the purpose of the quantitative part of this study was to examine the
relationship between the attitudes of air show performers toward safety risk parameters
and resilient safety culture initiatives while mediating these factors with mindfulness.
The purpose of the qualitative part of the study was to explore air show
performers’ and air bosses’ perceptions of risks and hazards during air show
performances and their implications for resilient safety culture and gain an in-depth
understanding of the study variables while eliciting pragmatic recommendations for
policies and practices from these air show operators that will enhance a culture of high
resilience and safety.
Finally, the study provides a holistic overview of the state of safety in the
international air show community through the use of a data triangulation analysis which
entails the correlations between the various research methods to identify areas of
concurrences and differences (Creswell & Creswell, 2018) in the air show community.
The data triangulation approach consisted of documentary analysis, an air show event
observation, a quantitative survey instrument with items that will measure perceptions on
variables, and semi-structured and focus group interviews with SMEs in the international
air show community. It was contemplated that the triangulation approach would provide
vital information needed to develop a robust, resilient safety culture in the air show sector
of aviation.
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This research was envisaged to provide results to minimize adverse human
performance factors such as errors and optimize show performances. It was also
anticipated that the results would provide assessment strategies to develop policies and
practices necessary for continuous safety improvements during air shows. Moreover, the
results potentially would close a gap in the literature on safety in the air show community
and proffer pathways for future empirical studies on the air show community.
Research Questions
The quantitative part of the study addressed the following research questions:
1. What are the strengths of relationships between risk perception,
risk tolerance, hazardous attitudes, and resilient safety culture
when mediated by individual mindfulness among members of the
international air show community?
2. What are the differences in the study constructs on resilient safety
culture, risk factors, mindfulness, and hazardous attitudes in air
show performers based on demographic variables (air show flying
experience, military or civilian flying experience, age, educational
background, and marital status)?
The qualitative part of the study addressed the following research questions:
3. What forms of mindfulness strategies do air show performers
employ preflight?
4. How do air show performers perceive and tolerate risk preflight?
5. How do air show performers perceive and tolerate risk inflight?
6. What are the most common hazardous attitudes observed among
12

air show performers?
7. How does air show performers’ operational experience influence
their perception of resilient safety culture?
Statement of Hypotheses
A measurement model was proposed to illustrate graphically the interactions
between the study variables and how they are linearly related to each other. The model
also shows the hypothesized linear relationships between the study variables. The
proposed measurement model is depicted in Figure 1, combined with all the hypothesized
pathways.
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Figure 1
A Hypothetical Model of the Relationship Between Risk Perception, Risk Tolerance,
Hazardous Attitudes, Mindfulness, and Resilient Safety Culture

Risk Perception, Mindfulness, and Resilient Safety Culture
Hunter (2002, p. 21) suggested that attempts to change a pilot’s risk tolerance
should be preceded by risk recognition training. This study hypothesized that mindfulness
could enhance the air show community’s safety promotional efforts regarding risk
identification.
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This study explored the relationships between the air show community’s
perceived risk, mindfulness, and resilient safety culture. The related hypotheses proposed
are as follows:
H1. Risk perception is related to the air show community’s risk tolerance.
H2. Risk perception is related to the air show community’s mindfulness.
H3. Risk perception is related to the air show community’s resilient safety culture.
H4. Risk perception is related to the air show community’s resilient safety culture
when mediated by mindfulness.
Risk Tolerance, Mindfulness, and Resilient Safety Culture
Based on the extant literature (Meland et al., 2015), this study predicted that
measuring the effects of mindfulness training in elite individuals working in highperformance environments — with the air show sector having such characteristics —
would demonstrate a stronger resilient safety culture and tolerate lower levels of risk.
Additionally, it was hypothesized that mindfulness would enhance the resilient safety
culture for the members of the air show community and improve their risk tolerance.
This study explored the relationships between the air show community’s risk
tolerance, mindfulness, and resilient safety culture. The related hypotheses proposed are
the following:
H5. Air show community’s risk tolerance is related to their mindfulness.
H6. Air show community’s mindfulness mediates the relationship between their
risk tolerance and resilient safety culture.
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Hazardous Attitudes, Mindfulness, Risk Perception, Risk Tolerance, and Resilient
Safety Culture
The extant literature suggests that hazardous attitudes contribute to poor pilot
decision-making (Hunter, 2005; Ji et al., 2011). As mentioned above, FAA (2016, pp. 2–
5) lists five hazardous attitudes that can restrict a pilot’s sound judgment: Antiauthority,
impulsivity, invulnerability, machismo, and resignation. With the proper antidote, these
attitudes can be effectively counterbalanced. This study hypothesized that mindfulness
could be just such an antidote to air show performers’ hazardous attitudes and enhance
the air show community’s resilient safety culture.
In this study, the relationships between the air show community’s perceived
hazardous attitudes, mindfulness, risk tolerance, risk perception, and resilient safety
culture were explored. The related hypotheses proposed are as follows:
H7. Air show performers’ hazardous attitudes are related to the air show
community’s mindfulness.
H8. Air show performers’ hazardous attitudes are related to the air show
community’s resilient safety culture.
H9. Air show performers’ hazardous attitudes are related to the air show
community’s resilient safety culture when mediated by mindfulness.
H10. Air show performers’ hazardous attitudes are related to the air show
community’s risk tolerance.
H11. Air show performers’ hazardous attitudes are related to the air show
community’s risk perception.
H12. Mindfulness is related to the air show community’s resilient safety culture.
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The hypothesized structural equation modeling-path analysis (SEM-PA) model
of all the study variables and their interrelationships are depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2
SEM-PA of the Hypothesized Measurement Model of the Relationship Between RP, RT,
HA, MF, and RSC
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Convergent Mixed-Methods Design
According to Creswell and Creswell (2018, p. 17), a mixed-methods approach
provides a pragmatic worldview, allowing a more comprehensive understanding of a
research problem using qualitative and quantitative methods, where the strengths of one
can counterbalance the inherent flaws of the other alone. Therefore, a convergent mixedmethods design with triangulation was used to analyze quantitative, qualitative, and
documentary/artifactual data. These three databases were compared and cross-validated
to determine areas of convergence, divergence, or combinations in the findings.
Subsequently, in the discussion and recommendation section, the data findings were
integrated and thoroughly analyzed.
Rationale for Method
The above method was selected for this study to allow a holistic understanding of
the research problems and questions. Due to multiple aspects of human factors involved
in air show performers’ performance, combining qualitative and quantitative
methodologies were considered as necessary and appropriate. Mixed-methods allowed an
integrated and holistic approach to crosscheck and highlight any differences between the
quantitative evidence and the qualitative data. Moreover, the qualitative data collected
from the air show SMEs provided valuable insight into the existing safety culture of the
international air show community.
This approach had numerous advantages that were appropriate to the objective of
this study. Collecting both qualitative and quantitative data online was cost-effective and
helped the researcher to overcome challenges that were inherent due to the health
measures and travel restrictions introduced globally as a result of the COVID-19
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pandemic.
Limitations of the Convergent Mixed-Methods Design
Significant time, resources, and effort were required to conduct a study using this
approach with both quantitative and qualitative methods. It was a logistical challenge to
assemble all the respondents for the focus group meeting, even though an online portal
was used due to scheduling issues, which was finally conducted following an EAC safety
workshop that all respondents attended. The management of research data and necessary
analyses of data required to make evidence-based recommendations from findings
required additional time and consultations with respondents (member-checking) on the
part of the researcher.
Quantitative Research
The quantitative aspect of this research involved a survey instrument administered
to air show performers and air bosses, which sought to answer the quantitative questions
related to the relationships between the attitudes of air show performers (or display pilots)
toward risk perception (RP), risk tolerance (RT), hazardous attitudes (HA), and resilient
safety culture (RSC) initiatives while mediating these factors with mindfulness (MF). 28
survey items representing the five constructs for the quantitative section of this study,
including eight demographics items, were adopted from the validated and reliable survey
instruments presented in Table 1.
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Table 1
Variables, Number of Scale Items on the Survey, and Instrument Sources
Variable name

Number of
scale items

Instrument sources

Hazardous attitudes (HA)

4

Hazard Attitude Scale
(Ji et al., 2011)

Resilient safety culture (RSC)

4

Resilient Safety Culture
(Adjekum & Fernandez-Tous, 2020b)

Risk tolerance (RT)

4

Risk Tolerance
(Ji et al., 2011)

Risk perception (RP)

4

Flight Risk Perception Scale
(Winter et al., 2019)

Mindfulness (MF)

4

Mindful Attention Awareness Scale
(Brown & Ryan, 2003)

Slight modifications were made to the selected items to accommodate the air
show performers’ unique demography, such as experience in flying low-level aerobatics
in front of people. Beta testing of the modified survey instrument was completed through
a pilot study, using a selected sample of 5 display pilots in the air show sector. Several
questions were generic, according to pilots, and did not refer to any specific aircraft type,
such as a helicopter, fast jet, vintage trainer, or aerobatic propeller. The researcher
considered the comment during the survey instrument design process and elected to
maintain the integrity of the validated instruments in order to maintain a generic approach
to the aircraft type and focus on the pilot’s overall perception of the measured scales.
Another remark was made about the instrument’s usage of the English language. Pilots
noted that having a survey focused exclusively on the worldwide air show community
and available in a single language could limit participants’ comprehension of the survey
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items. Yet, it was assumed that all the respondents had a good comprehension of the
English language. The Qualtrics survey tool had a feature to translate the survey into
various languages, and that option was activated to help respondents and minimize biases
due to language barriers. The final survey instrument is outlined in Appendix B.
Qualitative Research
The qualitative portion of the research commenced with an observation at a
European air show. The researcher examined operational elements that contributed to risk
and hazards for air show performers and air bosses while shifting position from observer
to air boss and vice versa (Creswell & Creswell, 2018, p. 189). The observation was held
at the event’s primary operating locations, including the main briefing room, the aircraft
parking areas, the control tower, and the crisis and disaster control center, allowing the
researcher to witness various aspects of inherent risks and hazards.
A purposive sample of subject matter experts (SMEs) from the air show
community participated in semi-structured interviews to share their expert opinions on
existing air show performers’ hazardous attitudes, risk perception and tolerance,
mindfulness strategies, and the overall perception of resilient safety culture in the air
show community.
A sample of air show performers volunteered to take part in a focus group session
during the preseason convention of the European Air Show Council, which provided a
general understanding of cross-sectional viewpoints on safety-related risk factors,
mindfulness practices, and resilient safety culture in the air show community.
The final phase of the research entailed a documentary analysis of international
air show regulations and air show statistical data, which was conducted to provide the
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evidentiary context in the triangulation of the findings from the observations, interviews,
focus group session, and an anonymous online survey. The documents analyzed included
numerous international air show rules and regulations – both from civilian and military
organizations - and newsletters from ICAS and EAC.
Research Assumptions and Limitations
The qualitative and quantitative data were collected in a challenging period for the
air show industry. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, most air events were canceled or
postponed for at least one display season. As such, most of the air show performers—
especially the nonmilitary—have only been flying practice sessions to maintain their low
altitude display currency.
This lack of active participation in air shows during the study period could have
adversely affected respondents’ perceptions of study variables. Nevertheless, this
perspective adds significant value to the study due to the uniqueness of the time in which
the study was conducted and may provide insight into how research variables can be
influenced by global health and socioeconomic factors.
As part of a more diversified cross-sectional study, efforts were made to include
participants from a broader spectrum of display pilots and air bosses based on gender,
aircraft type, military/nonmilitary, and geographical location, to name a few. Display
pilots and air bosses from all five continents were contacted, and they participated in
semi-structured interviews and responded to the anonymous online survey. That provided
a more globalized perspective to findings from the data and resulted in recommendations
reflective of a diverse and inclusive community.
Additionally, the concepts of safety culture, resilient safety culture, risk
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perception, risk tolerance, and mindfulness are substantially subjective (Adjekum &
Fernandez-Tous, 2020b; Akselsson et al., 2009; Harris, 2011; Hunter, 2002; Ji et al.,
2011; Teske & Adjekum, 2022) and eliciting responses from such a diverse sample
provided a practical approach to minimize biases from sociocultural and operational
differences that could influence findings.
The surveys and interviews were conducted in the English language, and it was
assumed that all the respondents had a good comprehension of the English language. The
Qualtrics survey tool had a feature to translate the survey into various languages, and that
option was activated to help respondents and minimize biases due to language barriers.
Also, during an interview session, to minimize any potential language barrier, a facilitator
who spoke English and Spanish fluently assisted the researcher in interpreting questions
posed to the interviewee and responses provided by the interviewee.
Explicit causal inferences may not be justified in cross-sectional studies such as
an anonymous online survey of respondents’ perceptions (Creswell & Creswell, 2018);
however, the use of structural equation models (SEM), confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA), and path analyses (PA) determined the strengths of relationships between the
study variables and explained the proportions of variances in the endogenous variable
that can be explained by the effects of exogenous variables. Another empirical limitation
of cross-sectional studies is that they limit the observations at one specific point in time
and preclude a reflection of the observed group’s long-term perceptions (Maxwell, 2012).
Scope of Research and Exclusive Criteria
This study focused only on the aspects of the existing resilient safety culture, risk
perception and tolerance, potential hazardous attitudes, and the air show performers’
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mindfulness strategies. Other safety-related issues were beyond the scope of this
research. Moreover, the conditions evaluated were hypothesized as representative and
relative to the constructs under examination. The collection of quantitative data was
purposefully limited to 8 weeks during the 2021 display season.
Moreover, the anonymous online survey portion of the study was limited to air
show performers and air bosses. Ground support associates and staff such as maintainers
and logistics personnel were not sent an invite with the anonymous survey link. The
rationale was to focus on personnel actively involved in the flight operations portion of
air shows. Further details of the research participants in this study are provided in
Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews the literature related to the study, including safety
resilience, risk perception and tolerance, hazardous attitudes of pilots, the effects of
mindfulness on human performance, and existing air show-related safety issues. The
theoretical construct presented in Figure 2 depicts the studied relationships between
safety resilience, hazardous pilot attitudes, risk perception, risk tolerance, and
mindfulness. To date, these relationships in the air show sector have not been explored
in the existing literature. The mediating role of mindfulness and other endogenous
variables, such as the impact of risk perception on safety resilience, are of particular
interest in constructing a model for evaluating the existing resilient safety culture for
air show performers and flying display directors.
Theoretical Foundation
Resilience
Resilience is a capacity with numerous models and definitions. Hollnagel, Pariès,
Woods, and Wreathall (2011, p. xxxvi) defines resilience as “the intrinsic ability to adjust
its functioning before, during, or following changes and disturbances so that it can sustain
required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions” while according to
Kouzes and Posner (2017, p. 158), resilience is “the ability to recover quickly from
setbacks and continue to pursue a vision of the future.
Moreover, Richardson (2002, p. 313) defines resilience as “growth or adaptation
through disruption rather than just to recover or bounce.” Likewise, Lengnick-Hall et al.
(2011) argue that resilience can be viewed in two ways. In the first, it is viewed as a
capacity for recovery; in the second, it is viewed as a capacity for thriving in the face of
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unexpected challenges and change. Finally, according to Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003),
resilience is the ability to recover stronger and more resourceful from adversity. All the
above demonstrate that resilience can be a positive response in the face of adversity.
Significance of Resilience
No matter large or small crises, harsh conditions can arise at any time. How a
person responds is decided by their capacity for resilience when facing a challenge.
Resilient people show emotional stability, flexibility, and adaptability to changes while
using practical stress management methods. They are able to function efficiently under
pressure and solve problems with confidence and calmness (American Psychological
Association [APA], 2012).
In the findings of a study conducted by the University of North Dakota on helping
airport and air carrier employees cope with traumatic events, it was suggested that
physical resiliency is an essential attribute for airport employees who have experienced
human-caused catastrophic events or natural disasters (National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine, 2009). Another study examined the relationship between
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, sleep problems, resilience, and
neurocognitive functioning of firefighters and suggested that PTSD symptoms of
firefighters were related to low resilience (Han et al., 2021). Yet, mindfulness training
(Denkova et al., 2020), as well as the use of virtual simulations of distressing situations
(Francis et al., 2018), could be an effective way to bolster resilience in firefighters.
Then in a socio-technical system, resilience is a multidisciplinary strategy that
focuses on the ability of a system to reform and adapt sustainably in order to achieve
desired outputs and constant growth (Serfontein & Govender, 2021). For example, the
26

United States air transportation network, between March and August 2020, remained
robust and resilient despite dramatic reductions in flight and passenger volumes due to
the COVID-19 pandemic (Bauranov et al., 2021). Additionally, resilience demonstrated
by the leadership in an aviation organization may be critical during times of upheaval,
such as the COVID-19 pandemic, in order to enhance the safety culture and assure
continuing accident-free flight operations (Byrnes et al., 2022). By contrast, Gössling
(2020) argued that commercial aviation has historically demonstrated poor resilience in
the economic aspect of operations and considered the COVID-19 pandemic as an
opportunity to reassess the global aviation system’s fundamentals.
Developing, Sustaining, and Enhancing Resilience
Individual Resilience.
The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 2001) suggests
that positive and negative emotions have complementary and distinct adaptive functions
and physiological effects. Positive emotions have been revealed to broaden thoughts and
actions, while negative emotions are related to behavioral tendencies that narrow them.
Therefore, maintaining a positive attitude is a critical factor in creating, sustaining, and
reinforcing an individual’s resilience.
Conner’s (1993) resilience model comprises five essential characteristics:
Positivity, focus, flexibility, organization, and being proactive. These five essential
characteristics of a resilient person also shed light on how to become more resilient.
Conner argues that people can view life as an opportunity to stay positive, have a clear
vision of their goals to remain focused, be flexible when responding to uncertainty, use
structured approaches to ambiguity, and be proactive with change rather than resisting it.
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Mowbray (2011) suggested that the aim of strengthening resilience is to build
individual capacity in personal attributes. His approach to enhancing resilience is a model
with seven elements: Vision, self-determination, interaction, relationships, problemsolving, organization, and self-confidence. Overall, Mowbray’s suggested model focuses
on being optimistic while facing difficulties, maintaining good relationships with family
and friends, and enhancing self-confidence.
A study by Ungar et al. (2007) reported seven unique pathways to resilience
across diverse cultures: The availability of material resources such as education,
employment, food, shelter, and clothing; access to supportive relationships within an
individual’s family and community; experiences of helping self and others; knowledge
and attachment to one’s culture and values; the development of a sense of purpose; a
feeling of cohesion socially and spiritually with others; and experiences of social equity
and justice.
The APA (2012) also described ten ways to build resilience. It is implied that
people need to develop and maintain healthy relationships with close family members,
friends, or others; avoid seeing events that are stressful as intolerable problems; accept
situations and conditions that cannot be changed; develop realistic objectives and move
toward achieving them; take decisive actions in adverse circumstances and look towards
rediscovering oneself after a battle with loss.
Other ways mentioned by the APA (2012) are developing self-confidence in one’s
ability to find solutions to problems; looking at the bigger picture when dealing with a
problematic situation; being hopeful that the good things one wants will happen in life;
taking proper care of one’s feelings and needs; and searching for other methods to
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reinforce resilience and enhance higher psychological wellbeing, such as mindfulnessbased stress reduction training as proposed by Nyklíček and Kuijpers (2008).
Furthermore, different types of meditation are effective in enhancing resilience in
stressful conditions. According to Brennan (2005), reduced anxiety and depression,
reduced irritability and moodiness, improved cognitive ability and memory, increased
satisfaction, and improved emotional health are just a few of the psychological benefits of
meditation. Additionally, Brown and Ryan (2003) revealed that improvements in
mindfulness were associated with a decline in mood disturbance and stress in cancer
patients.
In their book “The Resilience Factor,” Reivich and Shatte (2003) argued that
resilience is the single most crucial factor in determining whether an employee is
satisfied, successful, and happy. The authors share seven techniques to enhance resilience
skills, and they claim that through practice, one can become more resilient, more
optimistic, more productive, and, in the end, happier in their personal and professional
life. All in all, Reivich and Shate suggested that building resilience could curtail stress
and lessen the risks of depression and mental illness.
Organizational Resilience.
For an organization to prosper, its resilience strategy must incorporate both a
holistic perspective and traditional strategies (Bell, 2020). Additionally, in highly volatile
and uncertain times, organizations must develop a resilience capacity that enables them to
function effectively with unexpected events, recover from crises, and even facilitate
success in the future. This resilience capacity is represented by three successive stages of
resilience: Anticipation, coping, and adaptation. According to Weick and Sutcliffe (2001,
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2009), high-reliability organizations (HROs) that consistently outperform expectations in
any circumstance never take anything for granted; instead, they are ready to manage the
unexpected. In this attempt, a decision support system could be a tool to enhance an
organization’s resilience (van de Walle & Turoff, 2008).
Hollnagel (2010) claimed that to become resilient, a firm needs balance and the
ability to respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn. These are all abilities that are likely to
affect faster responses, resulting in a decrease in incidents. However, developing these
abilities requires underlying attributes such as knowledge, competence, resources, and
time.
Based on the type of organization, different approaches to developing, sustaining,
and enhancing organizational resilience could be identified. In a health care setting,
processes could be identified through which in situ simulation can act as a source to
develop integrated accounts of high-reliability organizing and resilience engineering
(Macrae & Draycott, 2019). Then, a port resilience framework could ensure its
operational continuity (Vanlaer et al., 2021), while in a pharmaceutical organization, it
was identified that pharmacists with strong short-term resilience are more effective (Jin &
Tang, 2021). Additionally, organizational resilience has been researched in elite sports
organizations and has been related to an organization’s dynamic potential to effectively
adapt to changing circumstances (Fasey et al., 2021). Nevertheless, the concept of
resilience has made little progress in the oil and gas industry in terms of comprehending
the dynamics of adaptive processes (Bento et al., 2021).
Moreover, according to Kirkman, Stoverink, Mistry, and Rosen (2019), building a
resilient team is the foremost part of creating a healthy and productive working
30

environment. A team’s resilience is just as important as an individual’s resilience, yet the
study’s authors discovered that resilient teams have four characteristics—and they are
different from those of resilient people. These teams believe that they can collectively
complete tasks effectively, and they share a common mental model of teamwork—such
as seen in the example is the seamless coordination of the crew of U.S. Airways Flight
1549 in 2009 (NTSB, 2009).
As per Kirkman et al. (2019), the other two characteristics of resilient teams are
the ability to improvise in the face of adversity, as demonstrated by the Apollo 13
mission operations team’s ingenious response (Granath, 2017), and the ability to trust one
another. Resilience can be learned and developed by anyone on the team because it
comprises learning how to think and act differently. By developing these four
characteristics, team leaders can improve their team’s resiliency.
Comcare of Australia (Comcare, 2008) recognized that a balanced working
environment that fosters wellness and fitness is critical to maintaining resilience. Leaders
who promote resilience in their teams should understand the importance of supporting
their employees during times of change; they must realize that even a group with high
morale can have difficulty dealing with increased work demands for an indefinite period
without sufficient recovery time; fatigue and burnout can become a challenging factor.
As a result, a resilient system should emphasize team members’ well-being.
Safety Resilience
According to Reason (1997), resilience is based on the principles of mindfulness,
constructive reasoning, flexibility, and adaptability and is both a personal and
organizational trait. The aviation industry is considered a high-reliability organization
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(HRO; Dekker & Woods, 2010; Reason, 2016), and as such, aviation leaders are
challenged daily to face situations that require high levels of organizational resilience.
Moreover, according to Adjekum and Fernandez-Tous (2020a), safety resilience provides
a margin against vulnerabilities ensuring that HROs operate under robust safety defenses.
Therefore, both proactive safety culture and safety resilience are essential in
implementing and improving effective SMS (Teske & Adjekum, 2022).
Reason (2016) used an intriguing metaphor to explain the nature of safety
resilience: The rubber-band model (see Figure 3). When a rubber band with a knot in the
middle is stretched to one side by a dangerous perturbation, then an equal, opposite, and
simultaneous amount of tension needs to be exerted on the exact opposite side so that the
knot will return to the original place (the safe operating zone).
Any delay in applying the correction will allow the knot to move out of the safety
zone. However, Weick (1987) argued that the system controller’s knowledge and
experience are critical in understanding and recognizing these alarming states. Moreover,
he stated that this knowledge and experience are more likely to be found in those
frequently exposed to unstable operating conditions.
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Figure 3
Three States of a Knotted Rubber Band (Reason, 2016, p. 280)
Compensatory Corrections

Safe Operating Zone

Dangerous Perturbations

Stable System

Perturbed System

Corrected System

At the organizational level, safety resilience may be used as a tool for safety
management, enabling an organization and its people to adapt safely to unforeseen
scenarios and conditions (Provan et al., 2020). Additionally, the safety II principles, as
advocated by Hollnagel (2018), which emphasize the importance of examining why
things do happen right in an organization, may aid safety managers in enhancing their
organization’s safety resilience potential (Dekker, 2020). Furthermore, safety resilience
engineering could establish methods for determining when organizational complacency is
a consequence of overconfidence in previous excellent results, as well as when intense
performance may nullify any safety concerns (Dekker & Woods, 2010).
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Safety Culture
The term “safety culture” has been widely applied in numerous industries and
organizations, including aviation, yet there is no consistent definition for safety culture in
the literature. Safety culture is described by the NRC(2020) as the core values and
behaviors that result from a mutual effort by leaders and individuals to prioritize safety
over competing interests to protect people and the environment, while as per the United
Kingdom Health and Safety Executive (2002), safety culture encompasses an
organization’s behavioral and situational aspects. Moreover, safety culture reflects a
group’s shared values, customs, assumptions, and outlooks related to safety and risk
(FAA, 2020b; Mearns & Flin, 2018; Yorio et al., 2019).
Extant research (Akselsson et al., 2009; Clarke, 2000; Glendon & Stanton, 2000;
Hollnagel, 2014; Merritt & Helmreich, 1996; Patankar et al., 2012) suggested that safety
culture is a subculture of other more significant cultures for an organization, similar to an
onion with many layers of skin (Hofstede et al., 2010). National culture or another
primary culture could be the outer layer while the employee is in the center. At times,
conflicting cultural values might exist (Liao, 2015); therefore, any safety culture model
should extend beyond the organization’s boundaries (Harris, 2011, p. 284).
Reason (1997) supported the idea that few concepts have been studied so much
and yet understood so little as the safety culture. If organization members are convinced
that they have an adequate level of safety culture, they are usually mistaken; for Reason,
safety culture involves continuous effort and is rarely achieved. Yet, a strong safety
culture can help improve the safety performance of an organization (Shirali et al., 2016).
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The UK CAA (2022) considered a positive safety culture as crucial to a safe
flying display community within the air show community. This culture is influenced by a
number of factors, including the behaviors of authorities, flying display directors, and
display authorization examiners; the adherence of display pilots to established standards;
and the encouragement of open and honest reporting of any incidents that may result in
the transmission of lessons learned. Moreover, as part of the approach of implementing
and integrating an SMS, the FAA (2020b) considers it necessary to foster a positive
safety culture throughout the organization, characterized amongst other attributes by
information sharing.
Building a safety culture is a process that needs gradual and collective efforts
from all parties in an organization (FAA, 2020b; Hollnagel, 2014). Reason (1997)
proposed the consistent application of practical measures while considering safety culture
a multifaceted entity consisting of the following interacting elements: A reporting culture,
a just culture, a flexible culture, and a learning culture. These elements interact to build
an informed culture, which is the basis for the term “safety culture.” Individuals at all
levels in an organization should recognize their safety responsibilities and must be
accountable for their actions to promote a safety culture (FAA, 2020b).
Nevertheless, Akselsson, Koornneef, Stewart, and Ward (2009) suggest that the
concept of safety culture requires more context in discussions to address some identified
limitations in scope. The reasons for this could be the apparent focus by some
organizations on singular aspects of such a multidimensional construct (an example is the
focus on just culture as representative of the entire safety culture dimension). Moreover,
organizations advocating for a strong safety culture might disregard the aspect of
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resilience due to a lack of management commitment or communication. Finally,
inconsistencies between what is stated or written and what is practiced might result in
gaps in an organization’s safety culture.
In addition to these suggested limitations, Shirali, Shekari, and Angali (2016)
suggested that there is minimal to no standardized approach to deriving qualitative
attributes or characteristics to describe the safety culture dimension. The existing
dimensions used to measure safety culture are based on concepts such as behavior,
values, assumptions, and norms while excluding any dynamic interactions among people,
technology, and administration.
Resilient Safety Culture
The concept of resilient safety culture has been suggested to provide better
context in the discussion on safety culture (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2009). Shirali et al.
(2016) defined resilient safety culture as a safety culture that focuses on resilience,
learning, continuous enhancements, and cost-effectiveness. According to Akselsson et al.
(2009), a safety resilience culture is no different in theory than a safety culture, and the
main difference lies in how it is practiced. Akselsson et al. (p. 4) also provided a more
thorough definition of resilience safety culture: “Resilience safety culture is an
organizational culture that fosters safe practices for improved safety in an ultra-safe
organization striving for cost-effective safety management by stressing the resilience
engineering, organizational learning, and continuous improvements.”
Thus, resilient safety culture has some characteristics that differentiate it from a
safety culture in an organization. According to Shirali, Motamedzade, Mohammadfam,
Ebrahimipour, and Moghimbeigi(2015), the attributes of resilient safety culture in an
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organization are situational adaptability, institutional learning, continuous improvements,
and cost-effectiveness in operations. Moreover, resilient safety culture is based on three
types of capabilities: Psychological/cognitive, behavioral, and managerial/contextual
(Pillay et al., 2010).
Akselsson et al. (2009) stated that an organization with a resilient safety culture
has the following characteristics: It has a safety culture that emphasizes the need for a
learning culture backed by a just culture; it strives for resilience, developing and using
forward feed control to keep processes within safe limits; it strives for efficiency in safety
management and the integration of safety and core business performance; and, it is
mindful. Additionally, a culture of reliability may function in concert with certain
fundamental organizational traits, allowing mindfulness, a distinguishing attribute of
HROs, to thrive and grow (Cantu et al., 2020).
The enhancement of a strong safety culture with a proactive resilient safety
culture can help not only to improve the safety performance of an organization but also to
recover from an upset (Shirali et al., 2016). Even when incidents do occur, a resilient
safety culture can enable an organization to adapt, successfully recover, and operate
effectively within the margins of safety (Hollnagel, 2014).
The concept of resilient safety culture in the aviation industry has been the focus
of several studies (Adjekum & Fernandez-Tous, 2020b; Akselsson et al., 2009; Heese et
al., 2014; Hollnagel, 2014; Hollnagel et al., 2011; Reason, 2016, Teske & Adjekum,
2022). In general, these studies advocate for a resilient safety culture as essential in
improving an organizational safety culture that fosters safe practices.
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The concept of resilient safety culture has also been proposed in other industries,
such as the health care and petrochemical industries. Resilient health care systems are
continually adapting to changing circumstances (Sujan et al., 2019), and the safe delivery
of health care is fundamentally derived from cultivating individual and organizational
safety resilient cultures (Smith & Arfanis, 2013). In their study, Shirali et al. (2016)
concluded that adopting opportunities in safety culture and resilience engineering can
drive improvements in petrochemical safety performance.
Hazardous Attitudes
One of the numerous psychological constructs that have been studied as a
potential factor affecting decision-making and impacting the possibility of accident
involvement is hazardous attitudes (Martinussen & Hunter, 2018). Regulatory guidance
from the FAA suggests five critical attitudes that can lead to hazardous events: Macho,
Antiauthority, Invulnerability, Impulsivity, and Resignation (FAA, 2016). Hazardous
attitudes need to be identified without delay, managed, and corrected immediately to
mitigate any flight hazard risk.
The FAA guidance provides a set of antidotes to mitigate the adverse effects of
the five hazardous attitudes identified among pilots: A macho attitude can be mitigated
with a “taking chances is foolish” approach; an antiauthority attitude needs a “follow the
rules—they are usually right” method of correction; invulnerability requires an “it could
happen to me” approach; while, impulsivity needs the pilot to slow down and “not [act]
so fast. Think first”; and, finally, pilots who have a resigned attitude should be supported
with an approach that says, “I am not helpless. I can make a difference” (FAA, 2016, pp.
2–5). Figure 4 shows the hazardous attitudes and their corresponding antidotes.
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Figure 4
Hazardous Attitudes and Corresponding Antidotes (FAA, 2016, p. 2–5)

Hazardous Attitude • Antidotes
Macho
Antiauthority

• Taking chances is foolish.
• Follow the rules. They are usually right.

Invulnerability

• It could happen to me.

Impulsivity

• Not so fast. Think first.

Resignation

• I'm not helpless. I can make a difference.

Several factors could affect a pilot’s safety behavior, hence influencing the safety
performance of an aviation organization. A sense of calling, which can be construed as
the intrinsic feeling by employees in an organization that their work is the most
significant aspect of life, could have a positive effect on pilot safety behavior (Xu et al.,
2022). Also, personality traits such as agreeableness, neuroticism, extraversion, and
openness to experience have been identified as consistent predictors of safety behavior
(Doerr, 2020).
Furthermore, risk tolerance and risk perception may influence pilot safety
behavior; as risk perception improves, the detrimental effects of risk tolerance on safety
operating behavior could gradually diminish (Ji et al., 2011). Additionally, internal locus
of control - the degree to which individuals believe that they have influence over the
results of their actions (Rotter, 1954) - was identified as having a direct effect on a pilot’s
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safety behavior (You et al., 2013). Also, mindfulness was suggested as a method to
optimize airline pilots’ safety behavior, whereas flight experience was indicated as a
means to enhance mindfulness’s effect on pilots’ safety behavior (Ji et al., 2018).
Nevertheless, personality theories have limitations that a researcher should
consider. According to Harris (2011, p. 106), western European and North American
cultures dominate commercial aviation, affecting these theories’ perspectives. Specific
cross-cultural differences should be anticipated between Chinese dimensions of
personality, for example, and those encountered in the Western scientific literature.
Hofstede (1984, 2001) suggested that concepts like power distance cannot sufficiently
explain Chinese authoritarianism.
An unsafe attitude can lead to unsafe behavior that can hinder display pilot
performance. Barker (2020a, p. 622) defined a rogue display pilot as “an unprincipled
pilot living apart from the display community and having destructive tendencies.”
According to Barker, rogue pilots are characterized by placing their ego above all: They
push the boundaries and limits with aggression and arrogance in their ignorance—which
could be attributed to the Dunning-Kruger effect (Dunning, 2011)—and they risk not
only their lives but also the lives of other pilots, and the air show spectators.
The B-52 accident at Fairchild Air Base in 1994 has been identified as an example
of a rogue aviator incident (Barker, 2003, 2020a; Diehl, 2002; Kern, 1995; Thompson,
1995; USAF, 1994). Therefore, to prevent or minimize such egocentric attitudes and,
consequently, the rogue attitude, it is critical that the air bosses demonstrate effective
leadership during the planning and execution phase of the air show (Barker, 2020a; Chen
& Chen, 2014; Schopf et al., 2021). Roger Beazley, former flying display director of the
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Farnborough International Airshow, suggested a leadership approach that air bosses
could take to identify and mitigate any egocentric attitudes by the air show performers
when he argued (Barker, 2020a, p.50) that an aircrew safety briefing “works wonders in
clearing the air and starting the new day fresh,” by ensuring “an open and free debate, in
private, on previous days problems involving all participants.”
Display pilots might act unsafely without any previous indications of hazardous
attitudes due to the latent factor of social facilitation bias (Papadakis, 2008). According to
Jarvis (2009), the effect of the social facilitation bias might be so strong that it prevents a
display pilot from realizing a hazardous situation when it is developing. Barker (2020a)
suggested that the significant disparity in accidents during actual air shows and practice
can be attributed to the pressure induced by the existence of spectators, among other
causes.
Risk Assessment
One of the core components of a pilot’s decision-making process is risk
assessment and management (Martinussen & Hunter, 2018). Inadequate risk assessment
can lead to poor decision-making, ending in fatal aviation accidents (AAIB, 2017;
Brugnara et al., 2022; Jensen & Benel, 1977; Kelly & Efthymiou, 2021 ). Based on the
findings of a study assessing pilots’ risk perceptions, O’Hare (1990) concluded that an
unreasonable estimation of the risks involved could be a factor in pilots’ decision to press
on into deteriorating weather.
Risk Perception
According to Sjoberg, Moen, and Rundmo (2004, p. 8), “risk perception is the
subjective assessment of the probability of a specified type of accident happening and
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how concerned we are with the consequences.” Hunter (2002) had earlier described risk
perception as the awareness of the risk inherent in a situation, implying that risk
perception could be influenced by the type of situation and the characteristics of the pilot
involved. Martinussen and Hunter (2018) considered risk perception a cognitive activity
that involves an accurate assessment of internal and external states.
Several studies have discovered that experience has a definite positive association
with risk perception. Young drivers have more distorted perceptions of driving hazards
than older drivers, according to a range of research (Rhodes & Pivik, 2011; Tränkle et al.,
1990; White et al., 2011). Hunter (2002, 2006b) studied risk perception and tolerance
extensively and produced scales to measure their correlation with pilot involvement in
hazardous aviation events. Hunter concluded that risk perception, compared to risk
tolerance, was a more important predictor of hazardous aviation events.
Joseph and Reddy (2013), in a study conducted among Indian army helicopter
pilots, found that lower risk perceptions were associated with higher risk-taking
tendencies and higher risk attitude scores. Similar results were identified in another study
conducted in Australia (Drinkwater & Molesworth, 2010), where a significant negative
correlation in terms of risk perception and risk acceptance by pilots who elected to fly a
risky flight scenario was found. In a study of Chinese airline pilots, You, Ji, and Han
(2013) found that high levels of risk perception and an internal locus of control increase
the likelihood of a pilot engaging in safety-oriented activities, including enhanced
situation awareness and efficient decision-making.
Industries other than aviation have also considered the importance of risk
perception to safety. Şimşekoğlu, Nordfjærn, Hezaveh, Mamdoohi, and Rundmo (2013)
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suggested that poor risk perception and high-risk tolerance are associated with car driver
accidents. HROs in fields such as petrochemicals (Kao et al., 2008) and off-shore
petroleum (Cairns et al., 2008) have recognized the significance of risk perception as a
factor in safe operations.
Risk Tolerance
Hunter (2002) suggested that risk perception and risk tolerance are two related but
often confused constructs. Risk tolerance, according to Hunter, is “the amount of risk that
an individual is willing to accept in the pursuit of some goal” (2002, p. 3). Risk tolerance
is influenced by a person’s general risk aversion as well as the personal value attached to
the goal of a given situation (Martinussen & Hunter, 2018). Specific goals are more
important than others while flying, and the more important the goal, the more risk an
individual is willing to take.
The concept of risk tolerance also exists in aviation and the finance industry.
Numerous studies on financial risk tolerance highlight the relationship between risk and
reward that individuals may be seeking (. In their studies, Gibson et al. (2013) and
Hallahan et al. (2004) suggest that age has an inverse relationship with risk tolerance.
Hallahan et al. further suggest that marital status, number of dependents, income, and
total wealth had a significant relationship with an individual’s risk tolerance scores.
Several studies have recognized a strong correlation between risk tolerance and
hazardous behaviors, driving breaches, and injuries at the workplace (Arnett et al., 1997;
Christian et al., 2009; Paul & Maiti, 2007). In contrast to the above studies, Hunter
(2002) suggests no significant relationship between risk tolerance and hazardous aviation
events.
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Mindfulness
The extant literature contains a plethora of studies on the concept of mindfulness
(Baltzell & Akhtar, 2014; Birrer et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2007; Cole et al., 2015;
Gethin, 2011; Holas & Jankowski, 2013; Kabat-Zinn, 1994; Katz et al., 1956; Krieger,
2005; Li et al., 2020; Nilsson & Kazemi, 2016; Sawyer et al., 2022; Shonin & van
Gordon, 2015; Stocker et al., 2017), yet, its exact definition remains vague. In an
extensive study, Nilsson and Kazemi (2016) identified 33 definitions of mindfulness and
five core elements: Attention/awareness, external events, ethical mindedness, cultivation,
and present-centeredness.
One of the most cited historical definitions of mindfulness is Kabat-Zin’s (1994,
p. 4): “Paying attention in a particular way: On purpose, in the present moment, and
nonjudgmentally.” Wallace (2006, p. 59) expanded on the concept of mindfulness by
explaining that it is a state in which distraction and forgetfulness do not exist.
Additionally, Brown, Ryan, and Creswell (2007, p. 212) defined mindfulness as “a
receptive attention to and awareness of present events and experience.”
While the concept of mindfulness is based on Asian spiritual/philosophical
frameworks, it has almost nothing to do with religion (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). According to
Kabat-Zin, mindfulness should not conflict with one’s culture, traditions, or beliefs;
instead, it can fill gaps in the process of one’s self-development.
Individual Mindfulness
Mindfulness can be individual and collective (Reason, 2016, Chapter 13).
Individual mindfulness leads to systemic resilience, and collective mindfulness needs
organizational support to improve the pilots’ foresight and error wisdom. According to
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Reason, an individual’s mental preparedness or mindfulness is more important than the
technical skills required to achieve excellence in a task.
Experts in the domains of aviation psychology have begun to recognize the
potential benefits of mindfulness. It has been suggested that mindfulness could improve
the levels of safety performance by supporting pilots in managing job-related anxiety and
feelings of burnout more effectively (Li et al., 2020). Then, mindfulness was suggested as
a method to optimize airline pilots‘ safety behavior (Ji et al., 2018). Yet, individual
mindfulness may be compromised when aircraft operators are confronted with
uncommon and severe incidents, primarily as a result of safer modern technology (Oliver
et al., 2019).
Organizational Mindfulness
Weick and Sutcliffe (1999) established a mindfulness theory based on their
research of organizations with a strong safety record despite their complex organizational
systems. “Mindful organizing” focuses on high-reliability organizations (HROs), like
nuclear power plants and air traffic control systems. HROs follow certain mindful
organizing processes to make sure they can address issues efficiently and effectively
while they recover during unexpected circumstances. (Sutcliffe et al., 2016; Vogus, 2011;
Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2012; Weick & Putnam, 2006).
Critical additional dimensions for mindful organizing were reported to be
accountability and coordination between groups (Callari et al., 2019). In the aerospace
industry, Teske and Adjekum (2022) identified a strong relationship between mindful
organizing and SMS among aerospace organizations. Ray, Baker, and Plowman (2011)
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reported that organizational mindfulness could enable business colleges to organize in a
way that reduces weaknesses by becoming more situationally aware.
Mindfulness Training
The effective practice of mindfulness, although seemingly simple, requires
commitment, effort, and discipline (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). Automaticity, habitual
unawareness (Kabat-Zinn, 1994), and chronic distractibility (Wallace, 2006) are the main
obstacles to being mindful while still paying attention. Meditation practice (Kabat-Zinn,
1994) and mindfulness training (Ricard et al., 2014) are potential methods for moderating
attention.
Mindfulness training is believed to exert positive effects in numerous areas of
human performance. Holzel et al. (2011) reported that mindfulness training affects
attention regulation, body awareness, emotion regulation, and change in perspective.
Denkova et al. (2020) suggested that firefighters might benefit from short-form
mindfulness training in bolstering their psychological resilience. Moreover, Brown et al.
(2007) concluded in their study that mindfulness has positive outcomes in several
important life domains, including mental health, physical health, behavioral regulation,
and interpersonal relationships.
Mindfulness training can also regulate one’s ego (Cole et al., 2015; Katz et al.,
1956; Shonin & van Gordon, 2015; Stocker et al., 2017; Verney, 2009), manage and
reduce stress levels (Chiesa & Serretti, 2009; Russ, 2015), and efficiently intervene in
anxiety (Hofmann et al., 2010; Li et al., 2020).
Blackburn and Epel’s (2018) Nobel award-winning research concluded that
meditation practice has proven to have an astonishing ability to safeguard our telomeres.
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According to the research, chronic stress, depression, and pessimistic thinking all work
together to shorten telomeres and shorten life spans. However, this corrosive effect is
shut down through mindfulness and meditation, effectively extending human longevity.
In the military, the U.S. Army developed Mindfulness-based Mind Fitness
Training (MMFT, or M-fit) that assists those with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD;
Russ, 2015; Seppälä et al., 2014). Brintz et al.(2019) found promising results in managing
chronic pain and psychosocial issues for men and women in the military after a
mindfulness-based intervention.
Evidence from research demonstrates that mindfulness training could also benefit
high-performance populations. The mental skills related to failure, pressure, performance
anxiety, social anxiety, and emotion control in elite athletes (Birrer et al., 2012) and
circus performers (Filho et al., 2016; Ross & Shapiro, 2017), as well as their overall
performance, can also be enhanced by mindfulness-based intervention.
Reason (2016) argued that providing one-off training programs is insufficient to
instill the necessary mental skills in pilots. Similar to technical skills, cognitive skills
need to be continually managed, practiced, and refreshed. Mindfulness training could
complement existing mental training for high-performance populations (Baltzell &
Akhtar, 2014; Stocker et al., 2017). Meland et al. (2015) conducted a high-performance
combat aviation population study and concluded that mindfulness training is a feasible
and acceptable enhancement to current mental training.
Similarly, Gautam and Mathur (2018) suggested that mindful decision-makers are
prone to efficient decision-making due to their openness to feedback and being less prone
to misapprehending situations. A study conducted on Chinese airline pilots by Li, Chen,
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Xin, and Ji (2020) concluded that mindfulness negatively correlates to civil pilots’
anxiety.
Mindfulness-based training has various approaches, but all share the primary goal
of enhancing self-awareness. Kabat-Zinn (1994) suggested three basic exercises during
mindfulness-based training: Yoga, body scan, and sitting meditation. Ross and Shapiro
(2017) noted that circus performers’ mental preparation includes breathing techniques
and imagery. Display pilots mentally prepare themselves with visualization techniques
(e.g., chair flights, group talking rehearsals, walk-the-talk) and apply the “bubble rule” 30
min before their performance (Barker, 2003, 2020a).
The end state of mindfulness is an optimal state of experience—the flow.
Csikszentmihalyi (2008) defined flow as the experience of an entirely immersed
individual in the activity they are engaged in. The psychological state of flow, developed
by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, is a state of mind that anyone can use in life: Mountain
climbers use flow to shut out their nerves about the possibility that they could be injured
during their climb. Artists frequently use flow in their everyday lives to help them
disconnect from the objective of finishing the piece and focus solely on the process of
creating art (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008).
Air Show-Related Literature
A search of extant literature suggests that the air show industry has a paucity of
empirically-based literature. Typically, regulations and other directives that guide
operational activities in the air show industry are provided by national aviation regulatory
agencies such as the Federal Aviation Authority in the USA, EU Aviation Safety Agency,
UK Civil Aviation Authority, and South African Civil Aviation Authority. These
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regulators also ensure strict compliance with directives and standards. However, other
institutions, such as the International Council of Air Shows (ICAS), the European
Airshow Council (EAC), and the British Air Display Association (BADA), support the
above agencies with their knowledge, expertise, and industry-best standards that may be
more stringent than regulatory requirements.
The historical paucity in the literature related to air show safety and the lack of
data analysis on air show safety statistics led to the seminal work of Barker (2003), which
provided a good overview of safety in the air show industry. Barker (2020a) provided an
update to his work by analyzing a total of randomly selected 1,364 air show accidents and
incidents between 1908 and 2018, covering all applicable categories of air show
accidents. The material is derived from investigation accident reports filed by air forces,
the NTSB, and the UK AAIB, as well as newspaper articles, television newscasts, online
conversations, and eyewitness stories.
Air show accidents or incidents analyzed by Barker included “any accident or
incident in an air show, either during practice or during the actual exhibition that lessons
can be learned” (2020a, p.67). Air races and aerobatic competitions were also included in
the accidents and incidents analyzed.
In Barker’s (2020a) analyses of the air show accidents and using the 3M accident
taxonomy (FAA, 2001; International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO], 1993) huMan, Machine, and Medium - it was suggested that 69 % of the accidents were caused
by human factors followed by 24% caused by machine/equipment malfunctions, and
finally 7% due to the medium or environment in which the operations were being carried
out (see Appendix K, Figure 76).
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According to Barker (2003, 2020a), the main human contribution to air show
accidents and incidents was related to errors, either decision, skill-based, or perceptual
(FAA, 2001; Reason, 1990), with the result being a flight-into-terrain (FIT), midair
collisions (MAC), and loss-of-control (LOC).
Machine-related air show accidents and incidents comprised mainly mechanical
engine failures and structural failures, mainly of the wing’s load-bearing component
(Barker, 2020a). The medium-related air show accidents and incidents included
environmental factors such as bird strikes, wind gusts, wake vortex, and clouds, resulting
in FIT, MAC, or LOC (Barker, 2020a, p.75).
An air show accident or incident is suggested to be more likely to occur during an
actual air show than a practice (Barker 2003, 2020a; Papadakis, 2008). Both social
facilitation (Zajonc, 1965) and plan continuation bias (Reason, 1990) of air show
performers may contribute to this phenomenon (Barker, 2020a; Papadakis, 2008).
Furthermore, aerobatic maneuvers could pose a significant contributory role in air
show accidents or incidents (Barker, 2020a, p. 79; Webster, 2007). The aileron roll and
the loop were identified as the maneuvers with the highest role in air show accidents or
incidents, mainly resulting in LOC or FIT. Also, the ICAS (2018) confirmed that a
substantial hazard to air show pilots was maneuvering close to the ground and
acknowledged the contribution of safety distances from the crowd, as well as operational
restrictions directing aircraft energy away from the spectators, has been an effective
mitigation method to protecting the public in the event of an air show accident.
In addition, Ballard and Osorio (2015) suggested that aerobatic flight increases
the risk of air show-related fatal crashes. Also, de Voogt and van Doorn (2009) reported
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that aerobatic flight is the most significant risk factor for fatal injury in U.S. general
aviation accidents, mainly due to not maintaining sufficient altitude.
In a safety survey conducted by the ICAS (2008), the following question was
examined: “Who is responsible for air show safety?” The results were mixed. The
majority of performers (80 percent) felt that individual performers were most responsible
for preserving safety at air shows. Producers and event organizers were split between the
waiver holder, performers, and the air boss. Performers tend to think of air-show safety in
terms of aircraft accidents, either during flight or on the ground. Their focus is on flying
the aircraft and flying their routine, as it should be.
Given that focus, it is not surprising that four out of five air show performers are
most responsible for air show safety. While it is true that performers are most responsible
for safely operating their aircraft, a review of the accidents from the last 10 years tells a
different story (ICAS, 2008). The findings from the ICAS review suggested that about
eighty percent of the accidents were caused by human factor-related elements. Some of
the human factor elements are errors, loss of situational awareness, fatigue, stress, poor
decision-making, and feelings of being rushed with primers well beyond the actual flying
of an aircraft.
The findings imply that, while the performer bears the primary responsibility for
safely operating his or her aircraft, everyone from the event organizer to the hotel clerk to
the fuel truck operator is accountable for creating the conditions necessary for it to occur.
These interesting findings bring into focus the question of who is ultimately responsible
for air show safety and who bears accountability when there are safety events. The
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review recommended a shared responsibility for safety at air shows by all stakeholders
and, ultimately, the event organizers being accountable for air show safety.
The UK CAA (2018) published the Health and Safety Laboratory’s final report
exploring human factors in air displays, which the UK CAA commissioned. More
specifically, the error paths that lead to flying display accidents were examined, including
the potential for negative transfer of behaviors between aircraft. The processes related to
the assurance of the competence of air display pilots were a recurring contributory factor
highlighted in accident reports (AAIB, 2017; Military Aviation Authority [MAA], 2012;
NTSB, 2012; USAF, 2018). These included training, supervision, practical experience,
and assessment.
Human factors play a crucial role not only in single-ship air show performances
but also in formation-flying displays (Rozenberg et al., 2016). Formation aerobatic flying
consists of a group of aircraft flying and maneuvering in close proximity (UK CAA,
2022). Moreover, in formation-flying experience, piloting skills and cooperation among
the group members are crucial for the team’s overall safety performance (Rozenberg et
al., 2013).
There seems to be a paradox in terms of air show performers flying experience
and safe execution of the task (Barker, 2020b). In contrast to general aviation, where a
pilot’s experience can be the precursor for the safe execution of a flight, flying
experience has not proven to be a safeguard that necessarily leads to an uneventful flying
display. There seems to be a paucity of data-driven studies on the cognitive processes of
experienced display pilots that leads to poor decisions or courses of action resulting in
fatal outcomes (Barker, 2020b). However, Barker (2020a) suggests that the superior
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judgment and flying skills of a pilot during an air display may not always be guaranteed.
That may be due to the physiological demands and information processing limitations on
the pilot while flying at high Gs, high roll rates, and extremely high closure rates (Barker,
2020a).
A factor that has been identified as a “door to disaster” (Barker, 2003, p. 212), if
not channeled appropriately, is the power to impress peers and spectators (Papadakis,
2008). There has been no empirically-based study to assess the cognitive skills and extent
of the decline in the decision-making process of air show pilots. However, best practices
suggest minimal room for distractions and emotions (Barker, 2020a). Emotions such as
grief (Plutchik, 2001), disgust (Plutchik, 2001), anger (Parrott, 2001), and sadness
(Parrott, 2001; Plutchik, 2001; Weiner & Graham, 1984) must be held under control due
to the extremely dynamic environment and the high energy levels associated with
maneuvering an aircraft at low altitude. Mindfulness is a form of mental or cognitive
training tool suggested to help mitigate the emotions discussed, and mindful practices
have become an industry-best norm (Meland et al., 2015).
In a biography, Robert “Bob” Hoover (2014), a legendary U.S. pilot, argues that
air show pilots need qualities similar to test pilots, such as alertness, precision, and
intuitive skills. Hoover also considers the ability to focus on precise and well-planned
routines, effective energy management, and finesse in flying as skills that are unique to
air show pilots. Hoover, however, reiterates that the low-altitude environment that air
show pilots operate in leaves little room for error (2014, p. 258). Hoover also suggests
that the slightest error in judgment cannot be tolerated (2014, p. 288), highlighting that
unexpected, unplanned, and random events - unrelated to the pilot - might happen during
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an air show that could lead to an accident. After such an accident, investigators may
wrongly blame the pilot, possibly due to hindsight bias (Dekker, 2004).
Aerobatic flying could cause physiological effects of G acceleration, mainly as
pertain to inflight G-induced loss of consciousness (G-LOC) by the pilot (Convertino,
1998; Kirkham et al., 1982; Rickards & Newman, 2005; Sekiguchi et al., 1986; Tu et al.,
2020; Yilmaz et al., 1999). G-LOC has been identified as a contributing factor in a
number of fatal accidents involving pilots performing aerobatic maneuvers (AAIB, 2017;
MAA, 2012; NTSB, 2012; USAF, 2018). Moreover, changes from positive to negative
Gs and vice versa, known as the push-pull effect, are suggested to reduce tolerance to
positive Gs, forcing the pilots to initiate an anti-G straining maneuver at lower levels than
usual (Mikuliszyn et al., 2005).
Another G-induced human condition related to air show performers and
competition aerobatic pilots is known as G-induced vestibular dysfunction (GIVD;
Muller, 2002). According to Muller (2002), GIVD usually occurs during high negative G
maneuvers (less than negative four Gs), yet it can also occur when a pilot is subjected to a
high positive G-load following a negative G-load (push-pull effect). GIVD is consistent
with vertigo and makes pilots, after landing and walking from their aircraft, experience
an extremely unstable gait with nausea symptoms without vomiting, which they call the
“wobblies.” Even a healthy vestibular system could be negatively affected within the
aerobatic environment and some vestibular disorders, such as the GIVD, become
exaggerated or impaired during aviation activities (Demir & Aydin, 2021).
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY
Research Design-Concurrent Triangulation Mixed-Methods Approach
The current study utilized a concurrent, cross-sectional, triangulation mixedmethods design in which the researcher integrated quantitative and qualitative data to
provide a comprehensive analysis of the research problem, as per Creswell and Creswell
(2018). The researcher collected both forms of data from September 2021 to February
2022, analyzed them separately, and then integrated the findings to determine areas of
concurrences and divergences.
The quantitative data consisted of an anonymous online survey, while the
qualitative data were derived from semi-structured interviews with subject matter experts
in the air show industry, a focus group session with a sample of air show pilots, and insitu observation of an air show event by the researcher. The final portion of the
qualitative data analysis was a documentary analysis of air show safety events data. All
the findings from the data sources were triangulated and discussed.
The current study expanded on Adjekum and Fernandez-Tous’ (2020b) work that
assessed the relationship between organizational management factors and resilient safety
culture in a collegiate aviation program with SMS. The researcher in this current study
tested and validated measurement models using some of the variables in the previous
study and included some new ones, such as risk perceptions and hazardous attitudes. This
study used a distinct research population from the international air show community. A
data triangulation approach enabled a comprehensive discussion of the findings from the
various research methodologies used in this research.
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Specifically, the quantitative data were used to assess the relationship between the
attitudes of air show performers and air bosses toward safety risk parameters and resilient
safety culture initiatives while mediating these factors with mindfulness, as measured by
awareness of mindful attention. The qualitative data explored air show performers’
hazardous attitudes, risk perception and tolerance, mindfulness strategies, and the overall
perception of resilient safety culture in the air show community. Finally, triangulation of
the findings from both data sources were compared to factual data derived from a
documentary analysis.
Data Collection Procedures
Qualitative Data
Qualitative data are obtained scientifically and reliably when proper techniques
are used (Harrell & Bradley, 2009). Therefore, the accuracy, validity, and reliability of
study results would benefit from better data collection techniques. As a result, the
qualitative data for this study were collected from semi-structured interviews and focus
group, as well as an air show event observation. Finally, as part of the data triangulation,
a comprehensive documentary analysis was performed.
Air Show Site Observation
The qualitative portion of the research commenced with an observation at an air
show in southeast Europe. The researcher examined operational elements that contributed
to risk and hazards for air show performers and air bosses while shifting position from
observer to air boss and vice versa (Creswell & Creswell, 2018, p. 189). The observation
was held at the event’s primary operating locations, including the main briefing room, all
aircraft parking areas, the control tower, and the crisis and disaster control center,
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allowing the researcher to see various aspects of inherent risks and hazards.
The air show site observation was an opportunity to examine and comprehend the
correlations between the previously mentioned variables by using a comprehensive data
triangulation strategy (Creswell & Creswell, 2018) in the air show community. The
observation also allowed the researcher to understand the research environment, which
was helpful when extracting salient codes and themes from the interviews and focus
group.
Finally, observation was chosen as a valuable approach for exploring issues that
air show performers and air bosses may be uncomfortable discussing (Creswell &
Creswell, 2018, p. 188). Thus, this type of data collection was deemed helpful in closing
a gap in the relevant information needed for empirical inquiries and could provide a
direct approach to identify perceived risks by air show performers and air bosses during
an actual air show.
Semi-Structured Interviews and Focus Group
Semi-structured interviews with twelve air show performers and air bosses (n =
12) were conducted in one-on-one online sessions, lasting from 39 min to 2 hr and 21
min (see Table 2). Then, during the 2022 display preseason period, a focus group with
eight air show performers (n = 8) took place. Appendix D contains the interview
protocols for the semi-structured interviews and the focus group.
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Table 2
Semi-Structured Interviews Duration and Respondents‘ Demographics
Respondent

Background

Experience
(years)

Interview duration
(hr: min)

1

Civilian

6

1:17

2

Military

8

1:40

3

Military

4

1:44

4

Civilian

39

2:21

5

Civilian

6

0:57

6

Civilian

21

2:06

7

Civilian

18

1:55

8

Military

5

0:39

9

Civilian

38

1:34

10

Civilian

8

1:55

11

Civilian

21

2:09

12

Military

47

0:56

Note. Participants spent on average 1 hr 39 min during the semi-structured interview
sessions.
Scope of Semi-Structured Interview Sessions. A selected group of SMEs from
the international air show sector participated in the semi-structured interview process to
provide their perspectives on the existing air show performers’ hazardous attitudes, risk
perception and tolerance, mindfulness strategies, and the overall perception of resilient
safety culture in the air show community.
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Scope of Focus Group Session. A selected group of air show performers
participated in the focus group interview process to provide their perspectives on the
existing air show performers’ hazardous attitudes, risk perception and tolerance,
mindfulness strategies, and the overall perception of resilient safety culture in the air
show community.
Population and Sample
The semi-structured interviews and focus group were conducted with a selection
of SMEs and experienced performers from the international air show community.
Data Recording Procedures
The respondents who agreed to take part in the study received an invitation with a
link to participate in the interview via the Zoom teleconferencing platform. Each
participant also received a copy of the interview plan before the interview to review the
questions ahead of time. Participants were also given consent forms for electronic
signature before the interviews. During the interview sessions, empirically sound
interview protocols were devised and applied (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Maxwell,
2012). The Zoom teleconferencing platform has audio recording capability, which was
used, and the video component was not enabled for participants to ensure more privacy
during the sessions.
Only the audio components were recorded, and the audio data files were stored on
the researchers’ password-protected storage devices. The audio data files were
transcribed using the Otter.ai software. After the transcription, a Microsoft Word output
of each session was sent to respective respondents for cross-checking and validation as
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part of trustworthiness before using it for further analysis. The audio data files were then
deleted, and the verified transcripts were used for subsequent thematic analyses.
Documentary Analysis
As part of the overall research objective of data triangulation, a comprehensive
documentary analysis was performed, as suggested by Maxwell (2012). On top of the
documents analyzed in the literature review chapter, the material analyzed included
numerous international air show rules and regulations, both from civilian and military
organizations, presentations, and newsletters from the ICAS and the EAC (see Table 3).
To ensure a broad search for air show-related documents, numerous search tools
were utilized, including Google Scholar, Scopus, and the search feature of the UND
Chester Fritz Library. The researcher chose the following keywords individually or
combined: “air show,” “accident,” “incident,” “display pilot,” “air show performer,”
“risk,” “hazardous attitude,” “safety culture,” and “resilient safety culture.” The inclusion
criteria searched for research published in peer-reviewed journals within the last 20 years
(2002 to 2022) in the English language. Nonetheless, the majority of the air show-related
material was discovered in ICAS and EAC members-only resource areas, which are not
accessible to the general public.
The identified documents were stored in the researcher’s personal online library
and screened using Excel software (see Figure 5). The information was then themed, and
key phrases underlined to ensure relevance.
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Table 3
Documentary Analysis, List of Documents Analyzed
Document

Source

CAP 1724, Flying display standards document, Edition
2, February 2020

UK CAA

Airshow separation distances, July 1993

Cranfield Aviation Safety
Center

CAR Part VI Standard 623

Transport Canada

STANAG 3533 FS (edition 6) - Flying and static
displays, 3 February 2003, NSA(AIR)1216-FS/3533

North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO)

JAA administrative & guidance material, Section one:
General, Part 3: Temporary guidance leaflets
(01.02.97): Leaflet no 5: The organization and conduct
of flying displays

Joint Aviation
Administration (JAA)

EGAST: Safety at flying displays and events, a guide
for pilots

European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA)

F-16 Single-ship demonstration flights, February 2010

Hellenic Air Force

F-16 Demo team - Support manual, February 2010

Hellenic Air Force

T-6A Single-ship demonstration flights, March 2006

Hellenic Air Force

2021 Support manual, Air demonstration squadron
Thunderbirds

United States Air Force

Display flying notes, August 2007

Defense Aviation Safety
Centre, Royal Air Force

FAA Order 8900.1 Volume 3, Chapter 6, Section 1

FAA

FAA Order 8900.1 Volume 5, Chapter 9, Section 1

FAA

FAA Order 8900.1 Volume 6, Chapter 11, Section 10

FAA

FAA Order 8900.1 Volume 6, Chapter 11, Section 11

FAA

ICAS ACE manual; Aerobatic Competency Evaluation
(ACE) program (January 1, 2019, Revision 9)

ICAS

ICAS Air Boss Recognition Program (ABRP) manual

ICAS

Putting accident/incident analysis to work for our air
show family

ICAS
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Table 3 (Continued)
Document

Source

Voices of experience: Air show veterans on flying lowlevel aerobatics

ICAS, Performer safety

Volume 52, Number 3, Third Quarter, 2021

ICAS, Air shows journal

Volume 3, Number 3, June 29, 2010: Photo passes

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Volume 3, Number 5, August 17, 2010: Practice makes ICAS, Operations bulletin
safety
Volume 3, Number 7, September 17, 2010: Get
ICAS, Operations bulletin
comfortable with knock it off
Volume 4, Number 3, April 5, 2011: Offering
constructive criticism
Volume 4, Number 8, June 27, 2011: Corner markers
and you

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Volume 4, Number 9, July 19, 2011: An additional
smoke oil cutoff alternative; Lessons learned so far in
2011: hope for the best, but prepare for the worst; Who
is on your team?
Volume 4, Number 11, September 7, 2011:
Safeguarding the sacred 30 minutes
Volume 5, Number 1, March 15, 2012: Making best
use of preseason downtime; mechanicals plague 2009
season
Volume 5, Number 3, April 10, 2012: Preliminary
NTSB report on Pardue crash

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Volume 5, Number 5, May 10, 2012

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Volume 5, Number 6, May 23, 2012: Fly the flaw;
smoke oil cutoff
Volume 5, Number 11, October 1, 2012: Sacred sixty
minutes: An update from the field
Volume 6, Number 3, May 16, 2013: Clarification on
night shows and 8900.1
Volume 7, Number 2, March 27, 2014: Get set…;
Knocking off the rust

ICAS, Operations bulletin

62

ICAS, Operations bulletin

ICAS, Operations bulletin
ICAS, Operations bulletin
ICAS, Operations bulletin

ICAS, Operations bulletin
ICAS, Operations bulletin
ICAS, Operations bulletin

Table 3 (Continued)
Document

Source

Volume 9, Number 1, March 18, 2016: Emergency
extraction information; Decide right now that safety is
your priority this year; Oil the machine; ICAS
publishes performer documents
Volume 9, Number 6, October 28, 2016

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Get comfortable with knock-it-off

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Practice makes safety

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Density altitude, part one

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Density altitude, part two

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Density altitude, part three: Gyroscopics

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Potpourri of pilot/performer punditry, part one

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Risk management at air shows

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Best practices for event organizers: Static display
aircraft
Best practices for event organizers: Operations

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Best practices for event organizers: CFR

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Amanda switch

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Who is responsible?

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Rules you can live with

ICAS, Operations bulletin

ICAS, Operations bulletin

ICAS, Operations bulletin

Airshow accident/incident reviews: 2005, 2006, 2007,
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015,
2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019

Des Barker, EAC

The zero-height waiver, Presentation, 2008

Des Barker, EAC

Fast jet air displays in Europe and the USA –
Contrasting experiences, 7 March 2009

RNLAF F-16 Demo Team,
EAC

Fast jet display flying, Presentation, 2010

UK RAF Typhoon Demo
Team, EAC

The challenge of introducing a new aerobatic
aeroplane, Presentation

Royal Jordanian Falcons,
EAC

Review of the 2015 Shoreham Airshow Air Display,
Risk Assessment, February 2016, MSU/2016/04
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Health and Safety
Laboratory (HSL)

Table 3 (Continued)
Document

Source

Review of the risk assessment sections of CAP 403, 20
June 2016, MSU/2016/13

Health and Safety
Laboratory (HSL)

Aircraft accident human factors report, Hawker Hunter Royal Air Force Centre of
G-BXFI, Shoreham airshow, 22 August 2015
Aviation Medicine
Display order 2021

Athens Flying Week
International Airshow

Crisis management plan 2021

Athens Flying Week
International Airshow

Introduction to aerobatic judging, Student handout

International Aerobatic
Club (IAC)

Behavioral markers of surgical excellence

(Carthey et al., 2003)

64

Figure 5
Documentary Analysis, Example of Theming Process
Author
Article

ICAS
Volume 9, Number 6,
October 28, 2016
Safety Reporting
Culture
Constructive criticism

Theme
Phrases

Expressions

Peer-reviewed
community

Link

https://airshows.aero/
GetDoc/3646

ICAS
Volume 4, Number
11, September 7, 2011
Mindfulness
Pilots learn early in
their flight training to
compartmentalize.

Minimize the
distractions and give
performers the
opportunity to focus
on the task at hand:
safely entertaining
the air show
audience.

ICAS
Fly ins and
airshows
Air Show
Experience
In short, airshows
and fly-ins are
exciting, supercharged aviation
experiences.

https://myemail.co
nstantcontact.com/
CALLBACK-497-June-2021---FlyIns-andAirshows.html?soi
d=1101073741327
&aid=wgQW0O0
XRC4

ICAS
Volume 7, Number 2,
March 27, 2014
Risk Assessment
As legendary
Canadian
Survivorman Les
Stroud teaches,
survival begins with
assessing three zones
around oneself to
have a greater
understanding of
one’s capabilities,
thereby increasing
the odds for
success.

https://airshows.aero/
GetDoc/3244

Following the preliminary documentary analysis, an assessment of factual air
show data (Barker, 2020a) was conducted. Appendix K includes a comprehensive
depiction of the analyzed factual air show data.
Ethical and Bias Considerations
Ethical concerns considered while administering the online interviews were
related to the risk of exposing respondents’ opinions to third parties (Creswell &
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Creswell, 2018). Therefore, all recognized safeguards were applied to protect the
interviewees’ rights: No personal information was shared in the study, no personal
information was stored during the data analysis of the interviews, Zoom was not allowed
to store the recordings of the interviews, the researcher saved in a safe and secure storage
space all the recorded interview and focus group sessions, and the final decision
regarding participating in the study rested with the interviewee.
Due to constraints such as language barriers, cultural differences, or distance
communication that prevents the informant from communicating body language to the
researcher, qualitative research can result in misunderstandings, miscommunication, and
misconceptions of constructs (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Since the concept of resilient
safety culture might be unfamiliar to the air show community, every attempt was made to
prevent bias in the interviewees. Therefore, to enhance interviewees’ awareness, a
definition for the construct of resilient safety culture was included in the invitation email,
and further details were provided during the introduction phase of the semi-structured
interviews and focus group.
Lastly, researcher bias might affect the collection of the study’s data. Therefore,
to control the researcher-induced bias, the survey instruments were given to SMEs for
review, comments, and suggestions. Moreover, the researcher maintained their credibility
and objectivity by consistently administering the same questions in the same way during
all interview sessions (Harrell & Bradley, 2009; Maxwell, 2012).
As suggested by Maxwell (2012), the researcher took some time breaks to stand
off the actual operations to prepare reflective notes on the observed behaviors, risks
identified, and other safety-related issues (see Appendix J, Figure 70). In addition, during
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the observation phase of the study, a member of the air traffic control team provided their
objective feedback on the detected risks and hazards during the days of the air show (see
Appendix J, Figure 71), similar to the researcher’s identified risks and hazards. Also,
despite all these efforts, it may be impossible to eliminate all biases in qualitative
inquiries in which a researcher is an active entity, and the researcher’s theories, beliefs,
and conceptual lens can always have an impact (Maxwell, 2012, p. 124). It was assumed
that the researcher’s professional ethics and integrity and the stringent oversight of a
research advisory committee should suffice in ensuring the validity of the data collected
(Maxwell, 2012).
Quantitative Data
The research protocols were authorized by the University of North Dakota’s
Institutional Review Board (see Appendix A), and a convenient and purposive in nature
sampling method was employed to send an anonymous online survey link through email,
social media messages on WhatsApp, Viber, or direct messages on LinkedIn to available
air show performers and air bosses. The online survey, administered through Qualtrics,
was used to collect the quantitative data for the research.
Survey participation was entirely voluntary, and the participants had 8 weeks to
respond to the survey items. The aim of the study, objectives, and contact details for the
researchers were included in the online consent statement approved by IRB, as well as a
digital consent option, which enabled users to consent to or decline to participate in the
survey. A Microsoft Word copy of the quantitative survey items can be found in
Appendix B.
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Population
Air events occur globally but are most predominant in the USA, Canada, EU
countries, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Singapore, China,
Australia, and Russia (Barker, 2020a). Therefore, every effort was made to ensure that
the population of this study included air show performers and air bosses from all over the
world.
For this study, the researcher assumed demonstration teams to be considered as
single air show performing entities, sharing the same safety culture, risk perceptions, and
mindfulness strategies (Barker, 2020a). Due to the detrimental effects of the COVID-19
pandemic, it was reported in the EAC (2022b) annual convention that several civilian air
show performers have stopped being actively involved in the air show community, and
that had an adverse effect on recruiting participants still actively engaged in air show
activities.
Based on the above-mentioned information and considering the data provided by
the ICAS (personal communication, 2022), an approximate number of known active air
show performer entities – as of the date of this study‘s data collection – reached a total of
460 (see Table 4).
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Table 4
Active Air Show Performer Entities
Region

N

Percentages

North America

283

61.6%

Europe

100

21.8%

Africa

25

5.4%

Australia

20

4.4%

South America

15

3.3%

Japan

5

1.1%

Middle East

5

1.1%

Southeast Asia

5

1.1%

China

1

0.1%

India

1

0.1%

Total

460

100%

The number of current air bosses across the world was not specified in the
available sources. However, information provided by the EAC (personal communication,
2022a) and the ICAS (personal communication, 2022) estimated the current active air
bosses in Europe and North America to be 100 and 153, respectively. Consequently, the
estimated population of active international air show performer entities and air bosses at
the time of conducting the current study was 713 (see Table 5).

69

Table 5
Estimated Population of Active Air Show Performer Entities and Air Bosses
Role

N

Percentages

Active air show performer entity

460

64.5%

Air boss

253

35.5%

Total

713

100%

Sample Size Determination and Power Analysis
Based on the assumptions and limitations discussed in the previous paragraphs, a
sample from the total population was drawn for this study, and they voluntarily
participated in the online survey, focus group session, and semi-structured interviews.
However, this research will look for a sample size of more than 200 participants, based
on Kline’s (2016) SEM recommendations for meaningful effects and appropriate fit of
the measurement model.
Even though a larger sample could provide more accuracy in the inferences made
(Taherdoost, 2020), recruiting almost every air show performer as a participant in this
study within the context of the limitations listed earlier was impractical and resourceintensive. Moreover, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, significant travel restrictions did
not allow the researcher to travel and personally visit other respondents, either for an
interview or for the survey administration.
For the quantitative research portion of this study, a power analysis was also
conducted to determine the minimum sample size that will produce a significant effect
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when assessing the relationships between the variables of risk perception and tolerance,
hazardous behaviors, mindfulness, and resilient safety culture. The G*Power analysis
software was used (Kang, 2021) to determine a total sample size of 80 participants,
considering a chi-square for the goodness-of-fit test (see Appendix E).
Research Participants
The participants in the survey were mainly air show performers with a variety of
air show flying experience: Active and retired; solo display pilots and demo team
members; fast jets, piston-engine aircraft, helicopters, or gliders; with military or civilian
aerobatic backgrounds.
Additionally, air bosses participated in the survey with a variety of display
directing experience: Active and retired; with or without display flying experience; with a
civilian background. Participants represented a variety of nations, which included the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, and were contacted through the EAC,
the ICAS, and the France Spectacle Aérien.
Instrumentation – Survey Design
A quantitative survey instrument was designed to examine the strength of
relationships between the constructs of risk perception (RP), risk tolerance (RT),
hazardous attitudes (HA), and resilient safety culture (RSC) while mediating these
constructs with mindfulness (MF) among air show performers.
Survey Instruments Used to Collect Data. Preliminary items about air show
performers’ risk perception and tolerance, hazardous attitudes, mindfulness, and resilient
safety culture were culled from existing validated scales, and some items were modified
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to create the online survey used in this study. The validated survey instruments utilized
are shown in Table 6.
Table 6
Variables and Instrument Sources
Variable name

Instrument sources

Hazardous attitudes (HA)

Hazardous Attitude Scale (Ji et al., 2011)

Resilient safety culture (RSC)

Resilient Safety Culture (Adjekum &
Fernandez-Tous, 2020b)

Risk tolerance (RT)

Risk Tolerance (Ji et al., 2011)

Risk perception (RP)

Flight Risk Perception Scale (Winter et al. 2019)

Mindfulness (MF)

Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (Brown &
Ryan, 2003)

To investigate the air show performers’ risk perception and tolerance for risk, this
study sought to identify the human behavior factors that contribute to an erroneous
perception of risk, as Hunter (2002, p.21) indicated. Additionally, Meland et al. (2015)
recommended a continuation for implementing and measuring the effects of mindfulness
training (MT) in elite individuals working in high-performance environments – and the
air show sector has such characteristics (Barker, 2020a).
In terms of specificity of demography, this study builds upon recommendations
from previous studies on the association of experience - either in flying or other acts with risk perception and tolerance (Barker, 2003; Crundall et al., 2013; Ferraro et al.,
2015; Joseph & Reddy, 2013; Winter et al., 2019; You et al., 2013), age with risk
tolerance (Gibson et al., 2013; Hallahan et al., 2004), marital status with risk tolerance
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(Hallahan et al., 2004), and educational level with risk perception (Adjekum et al., 2015;
Chionis & Karanikas, 2018).
Validity of Scores Using the Instrument. Selected items from the five validated
instruments were used, with slight modifications, to accommodate the air show
community’s unique demography. Pilot testing of the composite survey instrument was
then conducted through a pilot study, using a selected sample of five air show performers,
who provided technical verbiage modification suggestions to ensure the final survey
instrument was more global in terms of international air show operations. The final
survey instrument is outlined in Appendix B.
Reliability of Scores on the Instrument. The instrument utilized in the current
research has been derived by a slight modification of the existing instruments to fit the
wording and the construct measured within the air show community. By combining these
five instruments in the study, the original validity and reliability may not hold for the new
instrument; therefore, the researcher thought it necessary to conduct corroborative
validity and reliability analysis as part of this research.
Content of Instrument. Twenty-eight survey items were derived from the above
instruments representing the five constructs and the demographic data for the quantitative
section of this study, which sought to answer the research questions (see Appendix B and
C). It should be noted that depending on the item measured in the survey, different types
of scales were utilized: The instrument items that measured the five constructs used
Likert-type scales, while the demographic items used categorical scales. An example of
an item in each construct is depicted in Table 6 and Table 7.
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Figure 6
Example of Answered Instrument Items: HA, RSC, and RT
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Figure 7
Example of Answered Instrument Items: RP and MF

Pilot Testing. Pilot testing was conducted before the final instrument was
distributed to the sample of air show performers to establish the code validity of scores
on the current instrument and provide an initial evaluation of the internal consistency of
the items, as well as to improve questions before the final distribution, as per Creswell
and Creswell (2018). Five air show performers tested the instrument, and their feedback
was incorporated into the final instrument revisions, who provided technical verbiage
modification suggestions to ensure the final survey instrument is more global in terms of
international air show operations. Also, a suggestion was provided to translate the survey
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into languages other than English to help respondents and minimize biases due to
language barriers. Therefore, the Qualtrics survey tool’s feature for translating the survey
into various languages was activated. Furthermore, during the instrument’s pilot testing,
the time required to complete the survey was measured so that the survey would be
structured to ensure expedited feedback and reduce response drop-offs.
Administering the Survey. Personal emails were sent to ICAS and EAC
members, as well as other international air show performers and air bosses, to take part in
the survey. In addition, the study was publicized on the EAC website, inviting volunteer
air show performers and air bosses to take part in the survey. Additionally, social media
messages on WhatsApp, Viber, or direct messages on LinkedIn were used to disseminate
the anonymous survey link to some of the respondents. A 4-phase administration process
was implemented to assure a high response rate, as suggested by Creswell and Creswell
(2018, p.155).
First, an email/private message with a brief advance notification letter was sent to
all members of the sample; then, a second email/message contained the actual email
survey link, which was disseminated around a week following the advance notice email.
A week after the initial questionnaire, a third email/message was sent to all members of
the sample. The fourth and final email/message was sent 3 weeks after the second
email/message to all nonrespondents. The survey was conducted over 8 weeks using the
Qualtrics software registered with the University of North Dakota. The estimated number
of invitations sent was approximately 900.
Variables in the Study. Five variables were measured in the current study: RP,
RT, HA, and RSC initiatives, while mediating these factors with MF. RSC was the
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dependent variable, with the other four variables, i.e., RP, RT, HA, and MF, being the
independent variables.
Ethical and Bias Considerations
During the online survey administration, all recognized ethical considerations
were taken into account, as per Creswell and Creswell (2018). Nonetheless, the risks
associated with disclosing respondents’ personal information in the event of a cyberattack
were deemed the most serious. Therefore, the following safeguards were applied to
protect the respondents‘ privacy and confidentiality of data: No personally identifiable
information was elicited in the anonymous online survey, and the Qualtrics survey
software did not save the IP address or geolocator information of respondents. The survey
was strictly voluntary, and the final decision regarding the completion of the survey
rested with the respondent.
To avoid the possibility of social desirability bias during the survey
administration, an anonymous link to the survey was generated, which was embedded in
an invitational email to all respondents (Ried et al., 2021). The mode of administration
also avoided physical contact of the researcher with a respondent, which could potentially
introduce biases and privacy intrusion (Grimm, 2010). It was also acknowledged that
misunderstanding and construct misconceptions might emerge as a result of the survey
research approach (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Therefore, respondents were informed in
the invitation email to contact the researcher for any clarification or questions about the
survey.
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Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs
The variables that were employed in the measurement model and assessed the
constructs in this study are thoroughly discussed below. Scale items were measured using
a 5-point Likert scale unless otherwise stated for some constructs where a different point
Likert-like scale was used. After the data had been collected, the internal consistency of
the items in the form of composite reliability and Cronbach Alpha were calculated for
each factor. As a criterion for acceptable reliability, a minimum alpha value of 0.70 (α =
0.70) was utilized (Field, 2018).
Table 7 shows the cross-reference of the variables and specific survey items.
Also, Appendix C outlines the survey instrument codebook.

Table 7
Variables and Items on the Survey
Type of variable

Variable name

Item number on
survey

(Demographics)

(Demographics)

1-8

Independent

Hazardous attitudes (HA)

9-12

Dependent

Resilient safety culture (RSC)

13-16

Independent

Risk tolerance (RT)

17-20

Independent

Risk perception (RP)

21-24

Independent/ mediator

Mindfulness (MF)

25-28
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Resilient Safety Culture
The first scale to be assessed is the result of prior work by Adjekum and
Fernandez-Tous (2020b). The purpose of this study was to validate an instrument that
investigated the association between resilient safety culture and organizational
management parameters in a collegiate aviation program with SMS (Adjekum &
Fernandez-Tous, 2020b). The survey instrument consisted of 40 items, and all items were
answered on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree).
Some of the questions were paraphrased from their original form to fit the
community of air show performers better. For example, except for military display teams,
civilian air show performers are not obligated to follow a specific organizational
structure; instead, they frequently use an autonomic organizational model (Barker,
2020b). The term “Air Show Performer,” for example, has been used to allude to the
“Top Leadership.”
In addition, Adjekum and Fernandez-Tous (2020b), using structural equation
model (SEM) and causal path analysis (CPA), assessed the conceptual models and
suggested that all four management factors, i.e., Principles, Policy, Procedures, Practices,
had a significant predictive relationship with resilient safety culture. Therefore, for this
study, four items with a high factor loading were chosen to represent the survey
instrument, which could also meet the needs of air show performers (Pri3, Pol5, Pra5R,
and Pro4). Furthermore, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) will be used to validate
consistency.
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Risk Perception
Winter, Truong, and Keebler (2019) produced a new 13-item scale based on
Hunter’s scale (2006b) that will be used in the current study for the pilot’s selfassessment of risk perception. Winter et al. reported good psychometric values of the
goodness-of-fit index (GFI), adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI), comparative fit
index (CFI), normed fit index (NFI), normed chi-square (χ2), and root means square error
of approximation (RMSEA). As a result, for this study, four items with a high factor
loading were chosen to represent the scale, which could also meet the needs of air show
performers (RP9, RP10, RP11, and RP13). The responses were given on a scale of 1
(Low Risk) to 9 (High Risk). Certain scale items were amended in the current study to
reflect the differences encountered when flying in air displays, such as applying a “90degree angle of bank” rather than a “45-degree angle of bank.” A CFA will be conducted
to analyze the validity and reliability of the constructs.
Risk Tolerance
The risk tolerance scale to be assessed in the present study is the result of prior
work by Ji, You, Lan, and Yang (2011), who further expanded Hunter’s (2002) and
Pauley et al.’s (2008) research on risk tolerance. Their suggested scale consists of sixteen
items in the form of a sentence describing an event or situation, including aircraft system
failure risk tolerance (three items), crew operation risk tolerance (six items), and flight
weather risk tolerance (seven items; Ji et al., 2011). The risk tolerance scale assessed the
participants’ level of acceptance of the behavior presented, with six options provided:
Definitely no approval (1) to approval (6) to rate the likelihood that they would
personally be willing to accept the flight.
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A mean score of all items provides an overall risk tolerance score. Higher ratings
suggested that the respondent was willing to take on more risk.
Four items with a high factor loading were chosen for this study to represent the
scale, which could also meet the needs of air show performers (RT3, RT7, RT10, and
RT15). Some of the questions were paraphrased from their original form in the current
study, or specific phrases were deleted to fit the air show performers’ community better.
For example, since air show performers hand-fly the aircraft during air displays (Barker,
2003), terms referring to “the autopilot” have been omitted. Furthermore, a CFA was
conducted to analyze the validity and reliability of the constructs.
Hazardous Attitudes
In this study, the 24-item hazardous attitudes scale developed by Ji, You, Lan, and
Yang (2011) was utilized to measure air show performers’ hazardous attitudes. This scale
was a revision of Hunter’s Hazardous Attitude Scale (Hunter, 2005), which examined the
factors (antiauthority, macho, invulnerability, impulsivity, and resignation) linked to
pilots being involved in accidents. However, Ji et al.’s (2011) scale extracted six factors,
including self-confidence (six items), impulsive (five items), worry/anxiety (four items),
macho (three items), antiauthority (three items), and resignation (four items). All the
items were answered on a 5-point Likert response scale ranging from 5 (strongly agree)
to 1 (strongly disagree).
A mean score on each of the hazardous attitudes was constructed based on the
items measuring the factored attitude. Therefore, a high score on a factor indicated a
negative attitude towards aviation safety, meaning low preferences for safety behavior in
aviation.
81

For this study, four items with a high factor loading were chosen to represent the
scale, which could also meet the needs of air show performers (HA1, HA5, HA16, and
HA17). Additionally, in the present study, some of the questions were rephrased to meet
the needs of air show performers better. For instance, phrases associated with “night”
have been substituted with “poor visibility conditions” since the majority of air shows are
permitted in the daytime (UK CAA, 2022). A CFA will be conducted to analyze the
validity and reliability of the constructs.
Mindfulness
The Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) was utilized to measure the
enhanced self-awareness of air show performers (Brown & Ryan, 2003). The MAAS is a
15-item scale that shows strong psychometric properties and has been validated with
college, community, and cancer patient samples (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Brown et al.,
2007). MAAS rates how frequently respondents had the experience described in each
statement on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (almost always) to 6 (almost never),
with higher scores indicating greater mindfulness.
To score the scale, a mean of the fifteen items must be calculated. Higher MAAS
scores indicate higher degrees of dispositional mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003).
Consequently, high-score respondents are more “in-tune” with and capable of altering
their emotional states, and they are more likely to meet basic psychological requirements.
For this study, four items with a high factor loading were chosen to represent the
MAAS, which could also meet the needs of air show performers (MF7, MF8, MF10, and
MF14). Furthermore, in the present study, some of the questions were paraphrased from
their original form to fit the requirements of air show performers better. For example,
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phrases pertaining to “drive” were replaced with “fly” to emphasize the current study’s
focus on the flying-related mindfulness practices of air show performers. Lastly, a CFA
will be conducted to analyze the validity and reliability of the constructs.
Data Visualization Procedures
To visualize the data collected, data values were converted in a systematic and
logical way into visual elements that made up the final chart (Wilke, 2019). In the current
study, the types of data visualizations utilized were pie charts, bar charts, and correlation
heatmaps based on accurately conveying the data to the reader. Proportions of data were
visualized as pie charts, or side-by-side bars, as suggested by Wilke.
Joint displays, such as a correlation heatmap, may be an effective way to conduct
a thorough and transparent synthesis of qualitative and quantitative data and generate
acceptable and relevant inferences in mixed-methods studies (Younas et al., 2021). In the
current study, two correlation heatmaps were utilized to jointly display the
comprehensive association of the research variables that were derived after the
quantitative and qualitative data had been triangulated into a mixed data set.
Heatmaps are visualizations that allow the reader to capture trends in the data
swiftly; nevertheless, a heatmap’s limitation is that it is abstract in nature (Wilke, 2019).
While correlation heatmaps highlight significant patterns in the data, they can obscure the
underlying data points, which might lead to inaccurate conclusions. Nevertheless, for the
purpose of this study, a trade-off between presenting significant patterns and displaying
raw data was made by employing correlation heatmaps as a visualization tool.
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CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSES, RESULTS, AND DISCUSSIONS
Quantitative Data
Demographic Information
After eight weeks, the survey was closed, receiving one hundred and fifty-nine (n
= 159) responses. Nevertheless, one hundred and forty-five (n = 145) were considered for
analysis, which completed the survey past the consent page. Six (n = 6) responses were
deleted due to not consenting to the survey and did not provide adequate data for
analysis; eight (n = 8) were deleted because they did not provide any answers after
consenting to participate in the survey. The online survey response rate was
approximately 30%, which is sufficient for most online surveys (Tse-Hua & Xitao,
2009).
Any missing data were substituted using a regression-based technique using a
single input. A regression-based imputation strategy replaces missing scores with a
predicted value using multiple regression on nonmissing scores on other variables (Kline,
2016, p. 58). However, according to Vriens & Melton (2002), as cited in Kline (2016), a
limitation of single-imputation approaches is that they frequently underestimate error
variance, especially when the proportion of missing observations is significant.
The following demographic groups are represented in the responses: (a) age (see
Table 8); (b) gender and country of origin (see Table 9); (c) marital status and
educational background (see Table 10); and (d) current role in the air show community,
air show flying experience, and aerobatics background (see Table 11). In addition to
Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the respondents originated
from the following seventeen countries: Belgium, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
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Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Italy, Jordan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Romania, South Africa, Sweden, and Switzerland.

Table 8
Frequency Table, Demographic Variable: Age
Demographic variable

N

Percentages

18 – 24

1

0.7%

25 – 34

9

6.2%

35 – 44

41

28.3%

45 – 54

34

23.4%

55 – 64

36

24.8%

65 or older

21

14.5%

Missing

3

2.1%

145

100%

Year group

Total

85

Table 9
Frequency Table, Demographic Variables: Gender and Country of Origin
Demographic variable

N

Percentages

Male

134

92.4%

Female

4

2.8%

Missing

7

4.8%

145

100%

Canada

7

4.8%

France

24

16.5%

United Kingdom

31

21.4%

United States

42

29.0%

Other

41

28.3%

145

100%

Gender

Total
Country of origin

Total

86

Table 10
Frequency Table, Demographic Variables: Marital Status and Educational Background
Demographic variable

N

Percentages

Single

13

9.0%

Married

113

77.8%

Widowed

1

0.7%

Divorced

7

4.8%

Separated

4

2.8%

Registered partnership

4

2.8%

Prefer not to answer

3

2.1%

145

100%

High school

47

32.4%

Bachelor’s degree

54

37.2%

Master’s degree

37

25.5%

PhD or higher

7

4.8%

145

100%

Marital status

Total
Educational
background

Total

87

Table 11
Frequency Table, Demographic Variables: Current Role in the Air Show Community,
Total Air Show Flying Experience, and Aerobatics Background
Demographic variable

N

Percentages

Air show performer

119

82.2%

Air boss

13

8.9%

Other

13

8.9%

145

100%

< 1 year

7

4.8%

1-3 years

17

11.6%

4-6 years

22

15.8%

7-10 years

16

11.0%

10+ years

83

56.8%

145

100%

Civilian

81

55.8%

Military

61

42.1%

None

3

2.1%

145

100%

Current role in the air
show community

Total
Total air show flying
experience

Total
Aerobatics background

Total
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Quantitative Data Analysis and Validation
Quantitative data were extracted from Qualtrics and analyzed using IBM SPSS
Statistics 28 and IBM SPSS Amos 28 Graphics. Unless otherwise noted, all analyses
were performed at the 0.05 alpha level (2-tailed). Given that the scales used in this study
had already been used in other studies, CFA was used to examine if scale items that
measured latent constructs, for example, RSC and RP, were consistent with the
researcher’s perception of that construct. Additionally, it was utilized to determine
whether the research data conformed to the hypothesized measurement models for the
relationships between study constructs/variables. The scale’s reliability was tested using
the composite reliability method, by Field’s (2018) recommendation, of a value of 0.70 or
greater for determining reliability.
Furthermore, the average variances extracted (AVE) approach was used to
determine convergent validity. When determining the existence of convergent validity,
Fornell and Larcker (1981) recommend a value greater than 0.50. The current study’s
researcher evaluated discriminant validity by comparing the square root of each AVE to
the correlation coefficients for each variable. To compensate for the relatively small
sample, the bootstrapping method was utilized to transform the collected quantitative
data. Five thousand bootstrapping samples were used with bias-corrected confidence
intervals (CI) of 95%.
The goodness-of-fit indices and factor loadings were estimated using IBM SPSS
Amos 28 Graphics. The chi-squared (χ2) index, the root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA), the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis Index
(TLI), incremental fit index (IFI), and the normed fit index (NFI) were used to assess the
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fit of the 4-factor measurement model showing the relationships between scale items and
their latent construct.
The chi-square (χ2) test is frequently assessed; however, it is sample sizedependent (Vandenberg, 2006). According to Kline (2016), a significant chi-square test
with between 200 and 300 cases (n = 200-300) can indicate the presence of substantial
flaws that warrant rejecting the model. Given the present sample size of approximately
150 cases, chi-square data were analyzed comprehensively.
The RMSEA is another frequently used metric for evaluating model fit. Unlike
the chi-square, the RMSEA statistic is not sample size-dependent but rather can be
affected by model complexity (Brown, 2015). An RMSEA of less than 0.05 is desirable,
whereas values greater than 0.10 suggest problems with the model’s fitness (Kline,
2016).
Another often-used statistic fit index is the Bentler comparative fit index (CFI).
According to Kline (2016, p. 208), the CFI is an incremental fit index that assesses the
researcher’s model’s relative gain in fit over the baseline model. The CFI statistic can
range between 0 and 1.0, with a value greater than or equal to 0.95 indicating a
satisfactory fit (Kline, 2016).
The Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), a nonstandard fit index, is the next fit index to
consider. The TLI may have values beyond the range of 0–1.0; however, it is preferable
to have a value close to 1.0. (Brown, 2015). Similar to CFI, a TLI greater than 0.95
indicates a good model fit.
The final two statistics analyzed are the normed fit index (NFI) and the
incremental fit index (IFI). NFI and IFI values should be greater than 0.90; otherwise, it
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indicates the need for model enhancements (Bentler & Bonett, 1980). Combining
reported fit indices can benefit in determining the optimal model fit. According to Hu and
Bentler (2009), implementing TLI and CFI cutoff values of 0.95 in conjunction with an
RMSEA cutoff value close to 0.06 appears to result in lower Type II error rates at the
cost of Type I error rates that is acceptable.
A first-order CFA was conducted to assess the strength of relationships between
scale items and their latent constructs (RP, RT, HA, MF, and RSC). It was also carried
out to ascertain the correlations between these latent constructs and model fit. The initial
CFA model with all the factors and their items had a poor fit based on all the fit indices
(see Table 12).
A second competing CFA model was derived by using the recommendations from
the AMOS modification indices function to covary the error terms e3 & e4 (see Figure 9).
Another analysis was performed, and the results suggested improvements in the fit
indices. A third competing model was explored by covarying the error terms e3 & e4 and
e9 & e10 (see Figure 10). This improved the various fit indices.
It was also observed that some of the items had extremely low loadings, which
could affect item reliability and validity. Based on the recommendations from
modification indices and guided by theoretical considerations for parsimony, the items:
MF_1, RP_2, and RSC_3 were eliminated.
Another round of AMOS analysis was conducted that further improved all the fit
indices across the board and also the factor loadings of remaining items in the respective
factors. The resulting model III was adopted among the competing models. No further
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adjustments to the scale items were made, and Table 12 shows the goodness-of-fit indices
for all the competing models.

Table 12
Goodness-of-Fit Estimates, CFA Models
χ2

CMIN/DF

NFI

IFI

TLI

CFI

RMSEA

I

178.46***

1.64

.89

.95

.94

.95

.07

II a

161.91**

1.50

.90

.96

.95

.96

.06

III b

149.73**

1.50

.90

.97

.96

.97

.05

Model

Note. ** p < .005, *** p < .001
a

Covarying error terms e3 & e4

b

Covarying error terms e3 & e4, e9 & 10
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Figure 8
CFA Model I
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Figure 9
CFA Model II (Covariance Error Terms e3 and e4)
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Figure 10
CFA Model III (Covariance Error Terms 3 and 4; 9 and 10)
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After the CFA analysis, the remaining items for each factor were analyzed for
normality. The mean, median, standard deviation, normality tests (kurtosis and
skewness), and visual inspection of normal distribution curves were performed using
IBM SPSS Statistics 28 (see Table 13)
Table 13
High indications of kurtosis were observed for the RSC variable, which could be a
result of some extreme scores for items related to the resilient safety culture survey.
Interestingly, similar observations had been reported by Adjekum and Fernandez-Tous
(2020b). Because robust sampling techniques, such as bootstrapping with 5,000 samples
were being used, it was assumed that the high indications of kurtosis might not affect the
outcomes.
The internal consistency of scale items (reliability) in each construct was assessed
using the Cronbach alpha, which was calculated using the SPSS software. All items had
alpha values greater than the 0.70 threshold. Table 13 shows the descriptive statistics and
reliability values for scale items.
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Table 13
Descriptive Statistics and Composite Reliability for Study Variables
Variable
HA

RT

RP

MF

RSC

N

145

145

145

145

145

Mean

3.20

1.80

3.85

4.63

3.84

Median

3.67

1.67

4.00

5.25

4.33

Standard deviation

1.33

1.00

2.06

1.86

1.24

Skewness

-1.19

.39

-.23

-1.73

-2.09

Std. error of skewness

.20

.20

.20

.20

.20

Kurtosis

.58

.51

-.85

1.59

3.92

Std. error of kurtosis

.40

.40

.40

.40

.40

Composite reliability

.76

.70

.86

.96

.78

Number of items on scale

4a

4b

3c

3d

4e

a

HA items: HA_1, HA_2, HA_3, HA_4;

b

MF items: MF_2, MF_3, MF_4,

c

RP items: RP_1, RP_3, RP_4;

d

RT items: RT_1, RT_2, RT_3, RT_4,

e

RSC items: RSC_1, RSC_2, RSC_3, RSC_4.
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The AVE method was utilized to determine convergent validity, as suggested by
Fornell and Larcker (1981). The AVE method is used to determine the extent to which
the construct captures variance in comparison to the variance explained by error (Fornell
& Larcker, 1981). An Excel spreadsheet (see Figure 11) was used to calculate the AVE
and square root of AVE. Except for RT (0.35) and HA (0.42), all scales had values
greater than the 0.5 threshold.

Figure 11
Excel Spreadsheet for AVE Calculation

IV

LV

HA_1
HA_2
HA_3
HA_4
RT_1
RT_2
RT_3
RT_4
RP_1
RP_3
RP_4
MF_1
MF_2
MF_4
RSC_1
RSC_2
RSC_4

<--- HA
<--- HA
<--- HA
<--- HA
<--- RT
<--- RT
<--- RT
<--- RT
<--- RP
<--- RP
<--- RP
<--- MF
<--- MF
<--- MF
<--- RSC
<--- RSC
<--- RSC

Standardized
Loadings

Square of
std
loadings

0.7
0.78
0.66
0.37
0.57
0.61
0.58
0.61
0.86
0.83
0.56
0.98
0.88
0.96
0.92
0.75
0.68

0.49
0.6084
0.4356
0.1369
0.3249
0.3721
0.3364
0.3721
0.7396
0.6889
0.3136
0.9604
0.7744
0.9216
0.8464
0.5625
0.4624

Square root
of AVE
Discriminan
ant Value

Sum of
SSL

Number of
indicators

1.6709

4

0.417725 0.6463165

1.4055

4

0.351375 0.5927689

1.7421

3

2.6564

3

0.885467 0.9409924

1.8713

3

0.623767

AVE

0.5807

0.7620367

0.789789

It can be suggested that except for HA and RT, all the other constructs showed
acceptable convergent validity. The discriminant validity of each AVE was determined
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by comparing its square root to the correlation coefficients for each construct. If each
AVE’s square root is greater than the correlation coefficient, it is considered that
discriminant validity exists (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Therefore, discriminant validity
might be assumed based on the analysis (see Table 14).

Table 14
The Square Root of the AVE (Diagonal) and Correlations Between Constructs (OffDiagonal)
AVE

RSC

MF

RP

RT

RSC

0.62

0.79

MF

0.89

0.63

0.94

RP

0.58

0.48

0.50

0.76

RT

0.35

0.59

0.37

0.25

0.59

HA

0.42

0.64

0.53

0.35

0.44

HA

0.65

Quantitative Research Questions
The quantitative part of the study addressed the following research questions.
Research Question 1
What are the strengths of relationships between risk perception, risk tolerance,
hazardous attitudes, and resilient safety culture when mediated by individual mindfulness
among members of the international air show community?
Following the assessment of construct and discriminant validity, as well as the
reliability of scale items, the next phase involved assessing the goodness-of-fit for all
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measurement models. The SEM technique was employed to ascertain the strength of
correlations between the constructs’ measured variables. The following fit indices were
reported: χ2, NFI, IFI, and CFI. Due to the model complexity, the RMSEA fit indices for
all the competing models were above 0.10 and were not used to determine an acceptable
fit. Also, χ2 is sensitive to sample size, therefore, it was not considered relevant.
A preliminary assessment was conducted on the hypothesized fully-mediated
measurement model that depicted the variables’ relationships. The initial examination of
the fully mediated measurement model produced a satisfactory goodness-of-fit indices
across all fit indices. Figure 12 shows the initial fully-mediated measurement model. A
competing partially-mediated measurement model was explored based on
recommendations by the IBM SPSS Amos 28 Graphics modification indices function.
The pathway between RP and RSC was removed, and another round of analysis was
conducted. The resulting model didn’t show significant improvement in fit indices as
compared to the initial one, and Figure 13 shows the model and paths with regression
weights.
The third competing measurement model was derived from the second competing
model when the pathway between RT and MF was removed (see Figure 14) as suggested
by IBM SPSS Amos 28 Graphics modification indices function. Even though this model
had a better fit in terms of the χ2 index, the other indices were lower when compared to
model II.
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Figure 12
Model I – Fully Mediated Measurement Model Showing Paths for all Variables
(Selected)
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Figure 13
Model II – Partially Mediated Measurement Model (Path RP-RSC Removed)
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Figure 14
Model III – Partially Mediated Measurement Model (Paths RP-RSC and RT-MF
Removed)
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Overall, model I’s NFI, IFI, and CFI indices were higher than the two other
competing models. Based on theoretical considerations and testing of hypotheses
requirements, model I was finally selected for testing of hypotheses. Table 15 shows the
goodness-of-fit indices for all the competing measurement models.

Table 15
Goodness-of-Fit Estimates - Competing Measurement Models
χ2

CMIN/DF

NFI

IFI

CFI

9.07**

9.07

.94

.95

.95

IIa

11.96**

5.98

.93

.94

.94

IIIb

16.05***

5.35

.90

.92

.92

Model
I (selected)

Note. Structural equation modeling was used for the analysis.
a

In model II, the pathway between RP to RSC was removed.

b

In model III, pathways between RP to RSC and RT to MF were removed.

**p < .005. ***p < .001
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Then, the mediation effect of MF to RP, RT and HA to RSC was examined. A
bootstrapping method was performed, as suggested by Abu-Bhader and Jones (2021),
using SPSS Hayes (2017) Process Macro to examine if MF mediated the relationship
between RP and RSC, RT and RSC, and HA and RSC.
First, the results of the regression analysis show that RP was a significant
predictor of MF (b = .40, t = 5.27, p < .001). Next, while controlling for MF (mediator),
the results of the second regression analysis show that RP was a significant predictor of
RSC (b = .10, t = 2.25, p < .05).
The results of the indirect effect based on 5,000 bootstrap samples show a
significant indirect positive relationship between RP and RSC mediated by MF (a*b =
.22, Bootstrap CI95 = .12 and .31). The mediator, MF, amplified the effect on RSC and
accounted for approximately 50% of the total effect [PM = (.11) / (.22)]. Also, there was a
statistically significant direct effect between RP and RSC (b = .10, t = 2.25, p < .05).
Table 16 displays the results of the mediation analysis.
Then, the results of the regression analysis show that RT was a significant
predictor of MF (b = .47, t = 3.90, p < .001). The results of the indirect effect based on
5,000 bootstrap samples show a significant indirect positive relationship between RT and
RSC mediated by MF (a*b = .42, Bootstrap CI95 = .02 and .28).
The mediator, MF, amplified the effect on RSC and accounted for approximately
31% of the total effect [PM = (.13) / (.42)]. Also, there was a statistically significant direct
effect between RT and RSC (b = .28, t = 4.21, p < .001). Table 17 displays the results of
the mediation analysis.
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Furthermore, the results of the regression analysis show that HA was a significant
predictor of MF (b = .48, t = 4.87, p < .001). Next, while controlling for MF, the results
of the second regression analysis show that HA was a significant predictor of RSC (b =
.30, t = 5.32, p < .001). The results of the indirect effect based on 5,000 bootstrap
samples show a significant indirect positive relationship between HA and RSC mediated
by MF (a*b = .42, Bootstrap CI95 = .03 and .25).
The mediator, MF, amplified the effect on RSC and accounted for approximately
29% of the total effect [PM = (.12) / (.42)]. Also, there was a statistically significant direct
effect between HA and RSC (b = .30, t = 5.32, p < .001). Table 18 displays the results of
the mediation analysis.
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Table 16
Mediation Analysis (Hayes Method) – RP, MF, and RSC
Variable/ effect

95% CI

b

SE

t

p

RP→MF

.40

.73

5.27

< .001

.24

.53

RP→RSC

.10

.05

2.25

.026

.01

.19

RP→MF→RSC

.22

.05

4.59

< .001

.12

.31

Direct

.10

.05

2.25

.026

.01

.19

Indirect*

.11

.04

.04

.20

Total

.22

.05

.12

.31

Effects

4.59

< .001

* Based on 5,000 bootstrap samples
Table 17
Mediation Analysis (Hayes Method) – RT, MF, and RSC
Variable/ effect

95% CI

b

SE

t

p

RT→MF

.47

.12

3.90

< .001

.23

.71

RT→MF→RSC

.42

.07

5.75

< .001

.15

.42

Direct

.28

.67

4.21

< .001

.15

.42

Indirect*

.13

.07

.02

.28

Total

.42

.07

.15

.42

Effects

5.75

* Based on 5,000 bootstrap samples
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< .001

Table 18
Mediation Analysis (Hayes Method) – HA, MF, and RSC
Variable/ effect

95% CI

b

SE

t

p

HA→MF

.48

.10

4.87

< .001

.29

.68

HA→RSC

.30

.05

5.33

< .001

.19

.42

HA→MF→RSC

.42

.06

7.29

< .001

.31

.54

Direct

.30

.06

5.32

< .001

.19

.42

Indirect*

.12

.06

.03

.25

Total

.42

.06

.31

.54

Effects

7.29

* Based on 5,000 bootstrap samples
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< .001

Table 19 summarizes the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE), standard error
(SE), critical ratios (CR), p-values, standardized regression weights (β), correlation
coefficients (r), and assumptions for the final measurement model with the best
goodness-of-fit.
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Table 19
Estimates of Selected Measurement Model of the Relationship Between RT, RP, HA, MF, and RSC (Model I)
Interactions

Estimate

SE

CR

p

β

r

Direct
effect

Indirect
effect

Total
effect

Hypothesis testing
Supported

RT

↔

RP

5.45

2.04

2.68

.007

MF

RP

.29

.07

4.02

***

.30

.30

RSC

←
←

RP

.11

.05

4.59

.026

.11

.11

RSC

←

RT

.28

MF

←

RT

.24

.12

2.04

.042

.16

MF

←

HA

.31

.10

3.07

.002

RSC

←

HA

.30

.06

5.32

RSC

←

MF

.25

.04

RT

↔

HA

6.17

RP

↔

HA

7.66

.23
.30

Supported

.10

.22

Supported

.13

.42

Supported

.16

.16

Supported

.24

.24

.24

Supported

***

.37

.30

.42

Supported

5.65

***

.39

.39

.39

Supported

1.56

3.96

***

.35

Supported

2.43

3.15

.002

.27

Supported

*p < .05. **p < .001. ***p < .000.
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Hypothesis Testing
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of risk factors, hazardous
attitudes, and mindfulness on the resilient safety culture prevalent in the international air
show community, as measured by a hypothesized measurement model that had a good fit
and showed the strength of relationships between the variables RT, RP, HA, and RSC
with MF as a mediator.
The results from the SEM-PA were used to test the 12 hypotheses postulated in
the hypothesized model. Standardized regression coefficients were used to determine the
effect size and proportion of variances in the outcome variables that can be accounted for
by the predictor variables. The analyses were also expedient to determine the mediating
role of MF in the model.
Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis examined respondents’ perceptions of the
relationship between risk perception and air show community’s risk tolerance. The results
indicated that the relationship between RP and RT was statistically significant (r = .23,
SE = 2.04, CR = 2.68, p < .01) and supported the rejection of the null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. The hypothesis tested the respondents’ perceptions of the
relationship between risk perception and air show community’s mindfulness. The results
indicated that the relationship between RP and MF was statistically significant (β = .30,
SE = .07, CR = 4.01, p < .001) and supported the rejection of the null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. The hypothesis tested the respondents’ perceptions of the
relationship between risk perception and the air show community’s resilient safety
culture. The results indicated that the relationship between RP and RSC was statistically
significant (β = .11, SE = .05, CR = 4.59, p < .05) and supported the rejection of the null
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hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. The hypothesis tested the respondents’ perceptions of the
relationship between risk perception and the air show community’s resilient safety
culture when mediated by mindfulness. The results suggest that MF significantly
mediates the relationship between RP and RSC (β = .11, p < .05); therefore, the
hypothesis was supported within the study population.
Regarding the mediation, the standardized total (direct and indirect) effect of RP
on RSC was .22. This is attributed to both direct (unmediated) and indirect (mediated)
effects of RP on RSC; when RP increases by 1 standard deviation, RSC increases by 0.22
standard deviations.
Hypothesis 5. The hypothesis tested the respondents’ perceptions of the
relationship between the air show community’s risk tolerance and mindfulness. The
results indicated that the relationship between RT and MF was statistically significant (β
= .16, SE = .12, CR = 2.04, p < .05) and supported the rejection of the null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6. The hypothesis tested the respondents’ perceptions of the
relationship between risk tolerance and the air show community’s resilient safety culture
when mediated by mindfulness. The results suggest that MF significantly mediates the
relationship between RT and RSC (β = .42, p < .001); therefore, the hypothesis was
supported within the study population.
Regarding the mediation, the standardized total (direct and indirect) effect of RT
on RSC was .42. This is attributed to both direct (unmediated) and indirect (mediated)
effects of RT on RSC; when RT increases by 1 standard deviation, RSC increases by 0.42
standard deviations.
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Hypothesis 7. The hypothesis tested the respondents’ perceptions of the
relationship between air show performers’ hazardous attitudes and air show performers’
mindfulness. The results indicated that the relationship between HA and MF was
statistically significant (β = .24, SE = .10, CR = 3.07, p < .05) and supported the rejection
of the null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 8. The hypothesis tested the respondents’ perceptions of the
relationship between air show performers’ hazardous attitudes and the air show
community’s resilient safety culture. The results suggest that there was a statistically
significant relationship between HA and RSC (β = .30, SE = .06, CR = 5.36, p < .001).
The null hypothesis was rejected in favor of the alternate hypothesis, which was
supported within the study population.
Hypothesis 9. The hypothesis stated that mindfulness mediates the relationship
between air show performers’ hazardous attitudes and the air show community’s resilient
safety culture. The results suggest that MF significantly mediates the relationship
between HA and RSC (β = .12, p < .001); therefore, the hypothesis was supported within
the study population.
Regarding the mediation, the standardized total (direct and indirect) effect of HA
on RSC was .42. This is attributed to both direct (unmediated) and indirect (mediated)
effects of HA on RSC; when HA increases by 1 standard deviation, RSC increases by
0.42 standard deviations.
Hypothesis 10. The hypothesis tested the respondents’ perceptions of the
relationship between air show performers’ hazardous attitudes and the air show
community’s risk tolerance. The results indicated that the relationship between HA and
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RT was statistically significant (r = .35, SE = 1.56, CR. = 3.96, p < .001) and supported
the rejection of the null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 11. The hypothesis tested the respondents’ perceptions of the
relationship between air show performers’ hazardous attitudes and the air show
community’s risk perception. The results suggest that there was a statistically significant
relationship between HA and RP (β = .27, SE = 2.43, CR = 3.15, p < .01), rejecting the
null hypothesis and supporting the alternative hypothesis within the research population.
Hypothesis 12. The hypothesis tested the respondents’ perceptions of the
relationship between the air show community’s mindfulness and resilient safety culture.
The results indicated that the relationship between RSC and MF was statistically
significant (β = .39, SE = .04, CR. = 5.65, p < .001) and supported the rejection of the
null hypothesis.
Research Question 2
What are the differences in the study constructs on resilient safety culture, risk
factors, mindfulness, and hazardous attitudes in air show performers based on
demographic variables (air show flying experience, military or civilian flying experience,
age, educational background, and marital status)?
A one-way ANOVA between subjects was used to analyze differences in the
mean of perception scores for respondents on outcome variables depending on
demographical groupings. In addition, an evaluation of histograms revealed a normal
distribution. To ensure that the data had normal variances, the Levene test for
homogeneity was applied before any other tests. If normal variance assumptions cannot
be made, a robust ANOVA was utilized.
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The age group was the first demographic group to be evaluated. The results
indicated that there was no significant difference in mean scores for RP, RT, HA, and
RSC based on year-group (see Appendix F, Table 24). However, ANOVA revealed that
MF was significant, F (4, 103) = 3.48, p = .011. The 55 – 64-year group respondents
showed higher mean scores (M = 5.7, SD = .4) as compared to all the rest of the
respondent groups.
Marital status was also assessed to determine any varying perceptions on the
outcome variables. The results indicated that there was no significant difference in mean
scores for RP, HA, and RSC based on marital status (see Appendix F, Table 25).
However, ANOVA revealed that RT was significant, F (5, 102) = 2.32, p = .049, as well
as MF, F (5, 105) = 3.77, p = .004.
Tukey and Bonferroni’s posthoc analyses indicated that single-group
respondents had significantly higher mean RT scores (M = 1.8, SD = .9) than the other
respondent groups. This result suggested that single respondents had higher risk
tolerance than married, divorced, and those with registered partnerships.
Then, Tukey and Bonferroni’s posthoc analyses indicated that married-group
respondents had lower mean scores of MF (M = 5.4, SD = .5) as compared to all the rest
of the respondent groups. This result suggested that married respondents had lower
levels of mindfulness than single, divorced, and those with registered partnerships.
The third demographic group assessed was the educational background. The
results indicated that there was no significant difference in mean scores for RP, HA, and
RSC based on the educational background (see Appendix F, Table 26). However,
ANOVA revealed that RT was significant, F (3, 102) = 2.76, p = .046, as well as MF, F
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(3, 105) = 3.36, p = .022.
A Tukey and Bonferroni posthoc analysis indicated that the master’s degreegroup respondents had the lowest mean scores of RT (M = 2.0, SD = .7) as compared to
all the rest of the respondent groups. This result suggested that master’s degree
respondents had lower risk tolerance than high school, bachelor’s degrees, and those
with PhD or higher degrees.
Then, another Tukey and Bonferroni posthoc analysis indicated that high schoolgroup respondents had higher mean scores of MF (M = 5.6, SD = .4) as compared to all
the rest of the respondent groups. This result suggested that high school respondents had
higher levels of mindfulness than bachelor’s degrees, master’s, and those with PhD or
higher degrees.
A one-way ANOVA was used to assess whether there were any differences in
the mean of responses to RP, RT, HA, MF, or RSC between participants with and
without air show flying experience. Respondents were asked to indicate their air show
flying experience in years. There were no statistically significant differences based on
this demographic variable (see Appendix F, Table 27).
The last demographic group assessed was the aerobatics experience, either
civilian or military. The results indicated that there was no significant difference in
mean scores based on aerobatics experience (see Appendix F, Table 28).
Qualitative Data
Air Show Site Observation
First, the researcher conducted a field observation during the rehearsal and display
days at a southeastern European air show scheduled for the first weekend of September
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2021. While switching from observer to air boss and vice versa (Creswell & Creswell,
2018, p. 189), the researcher examined operational elements that contributed to risks and
hazards for air show performers and air bosses.
The observation was held at the event’s primary operational locations (see Figure
15), including the main briefing room (see Figure 16), the aircraft parking areas (see
Figure 17 and Figure 18), the control tower (see Figure 19 and Figure 20), and the crisis
and disaster control center, allowing the researcher to witness various aspects of inherent
risks and hazards.
The observation commenced at the aircrew safety briefing and ended after the
landing of the aircraft of the last air show performer. More specifically, the observation
on the rehearsal day lasted from 9 am until 8 pm, then on the first air show day from 11
am until 8 pm, and lastly on the second day of the air show from 9 am until 6 pm. It is
imperative that this observation took place in the natural environment of the air show
performers with little or no bias on their behavior and risk assessment process.
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Figure 15
Air Show Site, Airport Layout with Primary Observation Locations (Credit: Jeppesen)

Figure 16
Air Show Site, Main Briefing Room (Source: Author)
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Figure 17
Air Show Site, Example of Parking Area - East Static Display (Source: Author)

Figure 18
Air Show Site, Example of Parking Area - Apron C (Source: Author)
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The researcher conducted the observation both covertly and overtly. While in the
main briefing room, the aircraft parking areas, and the crisis and disaster control center,
the researcher conducted the observation covertly to ensure insulation from the biases of
being noticed as a researcher, as well as to capture as many as possible potential hazards
and risks. Once the observation was conducted at the control tower, the researcher
informed the personnel involved with the air show traffic management and the flying
control committee (FCC) about the observation that would be carried out. No hesitation
or concerns were expressed; rather, everyone observed expressed their eagerness to
participate in this study.

Figure 19
Air Show Site, View From the Control Tower to the Show Center – Indoor Perspective
(Source: Author)
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Figure 20
Air Show Site, View From the Control Tower to the Show Center – Outdoor Perspective:
Smoke-Painting on Sky (Source: Author)

Show Center

Figure 21
Air Show Site, View From the Control Tower to the Show Center – Indoor Perspective:
Smoke-Painting on Sky (Source: Author)
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The researcher concentrated on observing any safety-related issues that occurred
throughout the event (see Figures 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26) in order to provide responses to
the study’s research questions. The main factors that were observed were related to air
show performers’ risk perception and tolerance, hazardous attitudes, and mindfulness
methods.

Figure 22
Researcher’s View From the Control Tower, Army Parachute Demonstration Team
(Source: Author)
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Figure 23
Researcher’s View From the Control Tower, 8-Ship Formation in a Right-Hand Turn
Using 90-Degrees Angle-of-Bank; Repositioning to Show Center (Source: Author)

Figure 24
Researcher’s View From the East Static Display, Head-on Crossover of Demonstration
Team’s Synchro-Pair (Source: Author)
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Figure 25
Researcher’s View From the Control Tower, Fast Jet Performing an Inverted Flypast
(Source: Author)

Figure 26
Researcher’s View From the East Static Display, Mixed Formation Flypast (Source:
Author)
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Mission items related to the execution of the air show performances were assessed
for each air show performer. Timetables, the ICAS risk assessment matrices, flight plans,
aircrew safety briefings, and weather reports were examined thoroughly to identify any
safety-related information applicable to the current study (see Appendix J).
Synopsis of the Field Notes
The air show is the country’s major aviation event and one of the largest in the
region. After a gap year in 2020, owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, this air show was
organized and conducted in 2021. Strict health measures were implemented, including
the mandatory wearing of masks at all venues and the requirement for all air show
performers and the general public to produce proof of vaccination or PCR testing.
The observation took place at the air show on September 3rd, 4th, and 5th, 2021.
The air show was held at an Air Force base on relatively flat terrain: It featured a single
runway of approximately 11,000 feet in length, two parallel taxiways, and four available
aprons for parking all participating aircraft, as well as two aprons for static displays of
helicopters and airplanes.
Additional administrative facilities included briefing rooms and halls, eateries, a
medical center, and crash and rescue equipment and vehicles. Additionally, the control
tower was located on the air show premises, providing complete control of the air traffic
via ground, display, and approach frequency for air show-related traffic ground
movements, display flying, arrivals, and departures.
The operational portion of the event comprised activities that ensured the air
displays were conducted safely. The flying control committee (FCC) was charged with
the responsibility of planning, briefing, monitoring, and controlling all ground and flying
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activities during the air show. The FCC was led by a flying display director, who
happened to be the current researcher and author of this paper, assisted by three flying
display director assistants, two of whom had extensive military operational experience
and the third of whom specialized in helicopter operations.
They were stationed in the control tower – abeam the show center – giving them a
bird’s eye view of the display area as well as of all ground movements and activities of
the participating aircraft. Additionally, the FCC was assisted by ATC personnel from the
local Air Force in several aspects of the event’s execution. Additionally, a ground
managing crew, comprised of two follow-me cars, supervised all ground activities
associated with the event, including aircraft start and taxi, public control, or any other
coordination required.
The event featured 15 air show performer entities (see Table 20). The air show
performers represented a range of experience and types of flying activity, including three
international military fast jet solos, two international aerobatic teams, a formation of two
international military fast jets that demonstrated closed circuits and flybys in front of the
public.
There were helicopters and fast jets from the three branches of the local armed
forces, namely the Air Force, Navy, and Army, which demonstrated tactical scenarios in
front of the public, and military parachutists. Additionally, the public was allowed to visit
two static display areas: One in the west, which included six helicopters from the local
Army and Navy, and another in the east, which featured military aircraft from numerous
Air Forces: Three fast jets and three modern military trainers.
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Table 20
Air Show Site Observation, Air Show Performers Participating
Participant

Aircraft

Type of
performance

Type

N

F-16 Fighting Falcon

2

S, F

Rafale Solo Display

Rafale

1

F

Patrouille de France

Alpha Jet

8

F

Hawk

6

F

F-15 Eagle

2

FP

Hellenic Army

CH-47 Chinook

1

S, P

Hellenic Army

OH-58 Kiowa, AH-64 Apache,
UH-1 Huey

5

S, F

Hellenic Navy

S-70 Aegean Hawk

1

S, F

Hellenic Air Force

P2002, CL-415

2

FP

Hellenic Air Force

F-4 Phantom, F-16 Fighting
Falcon, Mirage 2000, Super Puma

6

S, SF

Hellenic Air Force

Spitfire Mk.Vb/c

1

S, F

Hellenic Air Force

F-16 Fighting Falcon

1

F

Swift S-1

1

F

Airbus 320neo

1

FP

Remotely control aircraft

1

F

Royal Danish Air Force

Saudi Hawks
United States Air Force

Glider
Aegean Airlines
RC Kavala
S: Static display
P: Parachutist drop

F: Flying display
FP: Fly past
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SF: Show of force

Furthermore, four aprons were provided to accommodate the participant aircraft
(see Figure 27). Apron D, on the southeastern side of the show center, was dedicated to
five solo display jets, including the primary and spare jets; Apron A, on the southwest
side of the show center, was dedicated to an aerobatic team’s jets, as well as a firefighter
helicopter; and Apron B, on the west side of the show center, was dedicated to two attack
helicopters, as well as a warbird when was out of a covered hangar that was protected
overnight.
Last, on Apron C (see Figure 18), in the northwest corner of the show center, ten
fast jets from an aerobatic team, two fast jets for a solo display team, and a heavy support
aircraft from the same Air Force were parked. Additionally, a photo-ship was located
near the parking area, which conducted inflight photo join-up missions with several
participating aircraft prior to, during, and after the air show.
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Figure 27
Air Show Site, Airport Layout with Aircraft Parking Locations (Credit: Jeppesen)

The event was organized by a private firm that specializes in large-scale social
activities, with the agreement of the local Armed Forces and Air Force and with the
support of the local authorities, including the Ministries of Defense, Development,
Interior, and Tourism as well as the Regional Municipality. Moreover, the event was
sponsored by a number of partners, most of whom were associated with the country’s
aerospace industry.
Due to the size of the event and the risk of an incident or accident occurring
during the air show, it was necessary to involve all national crash and rescue
organizations. The police, fire brigade, general directorate of protecting civilians,
ambulances, and hospitals, as well as the local Civil Aviation Authority, provided not
only assistance but also their expertise in preparing and effectively planning the event.
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Twenty thousand people attended the event over the weekend, reaching the
capacity set by the Ministry of Health’s COVID-19 standards. Vaccination was required
in four distinct zones to achieve social segregation and optimal health protection.
Between the two static exhibition sections, the crowd area was placed south of the
southern taxiway and included facilities such as eateries, retail stores, and restrooms.
Observation Data Analysis
The qualitative phase of the research began with an observation at a European air
show during the first weekend of September 2021. While transitioning from observer to
air boss and vice versa (Creswell & Creswell, 2018, p. 189), the researcher looked at
operational variables that contributed to risk and hazards for air show performers and air
show bosses. The researcher observed numerous aspects of inherent risks and hazards at
the event’s principal working venues, including the main briefing room, the aircraft
parking areas, the control tower, and the crisis and disaster control center.
It is critical that this observation be conducted in the natural setting of the air
show performers, with little or no influence on their behavior or risk assessment process.
This method of conducting field research in the air show community was deemed novel,
and a variety of data types were collected, including field notes, photographs, videos,
preflight aircrew safety briefings, weather data, and risk assessment matrices.
Due to the fact that this type of actual observation has never been conducted in
the air show community, the findings indicated that these observation notes might imply
various major and valuable conclusions, comments, and recommendations via the
triangulation approach.
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Moreover, the current air show observation demonstrated how the air show
industry could be prepared for potential risks prior to and during the event, not just from
the air show performers’ standpoint but also from the organizers’, air bosses’, and
aviation authorities’ perspective.
Nonetheless, this is the first time this type of observation has been conducted for
academic research purposes and displays a practical application of resilience engineering,
as defined by Hollnagel (2006), in such a distinct segment of the aviation industry as the
air show community.
Air show performers observed during both the preparation and execution phases
of the event displayed a high level of adaptability to a dynamically changing flying
environment. For example, constantly changing weather conditions, changes in daylight
hours and sun angles, and changes in takeoff and display times due to delays caused by
other operational considerations, such as runway inspection for foreign object damage,
were among the factors that affected the normal flow of air show performers’ display.
Nevertheless, the air show performers’ extensive operational expertise enabled
them to be resilient and so ensure the event’s safety. This extensive operating experience
substantiates Hollnagel’s (2006) assertion that safety is not a matter of luck but rather a
result of resilience.
Research Question 3, Field Notes.
What forms of mindfulness strategies do air show performers employ preflight?
Numerous mindfulness practices were observed at the air show site during the
observation period. The first phase of observation began with the aircrew safety briefing
in the main briefing room at the start of the rehearsal day. Each day of the air show, an
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aircrew safety briefing session was held, which included a review of existing rules and
regulations, weather updates for the period of the air show, and an overview of all air
traffic control procedures from takeoff through landing.
Furthermore, the most recent update to the air show timeline was examined in
detail, while the air boss provided time for the air show performers to address any
concerns about their performance. Overall, the aircrew safety briefing had set the tone for
everyone involved, resolving any misunderstandings and initiating the process of
reminding everyone of their upcoming performance.
Additionally, the air boss organized additional individual air show safety briefings
as part of the event’s fatigue risk management plan. More specifically, the air boss
prepared later briefing hours for air show performers who were scheduled to perform
during the air show’s later part in an effort to allow them enough time to rest before their
performance.
Having their safety officer at the control tower throughout their performance, who
was in direct radio communication, in a discrete frequency, with the display pilot or the
demonstration team commander during the demonstration, was a key approach
implemented by all military demonstration teams.
It was indicated as a method that adds an extra layer of safety and mindfulness to
the display, preventing any air traffic control-induced distraction. Furthermore, the safety
observer communicated with their team’s air show performers in their native language to
avoid any misunderstandings caused by the language barrier when communicating with
the local air traffic controllers.
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Furthermore, all air show performers respected the withdrawal from social media
prior to displaying. Air show performers have adhered to the “sacred 60-minute” rule
(ICAS, 2012) prior to their flight, avoiding becoming distracted by social media use.
Research Question 4, Field Notes.
How do air show performers perceive and tolerate risk preflight?
During the planning phase, air show performers had identified and addressed all
expected risks. However, the majority of air show performers perceived wind direction as
a significant hazard preflight that could affect their display flow, as well as their
adherence with the display lines.
Nonetheless, the COVID-19 rules and regulations that took place and affected the
event in various ways presented an intriguing highlight in the researcher’s air show site
observation. Masks, social distancing, and avoiding using objects that had not been
sanitized, such as papers and pencils, during the briefing had a considerable impact on the
air show’s organizers and flying control committee.
During the planning and implementation of the event, the potential of COVID-19
viral transmission was a significant consideration. As a result, one of the innovative ways
to reduce the risk of a pandemic was to use QR codes, electronic timetables, electronic
distribution of the display order, electronic signature of briefing attendance, and, last but
not least, video calls using apps like Zoom or WhatsApp to replace physical briefings for
air show performers. These ways of avoiding viral infection and decreasing virus
dissemination during an event like an air show serve as a case study, not only for the air
show industry but also for similar activities like music concerts and car racing during a
pandemic.
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Research Question 5, Field Notes.
How do air show performers perceive and tolerate risk inflight?
Both demonstration team leaders noticed winds aloft as a hazard during the
rehearsal day. To accept the additional risk, they provided extra buffers to the display
lines to assure the safe execution of their display profile.
Research Question 6, Field Notes.
What are the most common hazardous attitudes observed among air show
performers?
An impromptu flying by air show performers with a civilian background was
observed. Because of their considerable experience in demonstrating their aircraft or the
performance characteristics of the aircraft exhibited, such an attitude represented a
combination of antiauthority and macho attitude.
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Semi-Structured Interviews and Focus Group
Then the semi-structured interviews took place remotely with the use of Zoom.
All necessary interview protocols for asking questions and recording replies were devised
and applied (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Maxwell, 2012). During one interview session,
to minimize any potential language barrier, a facilitator who spoke English and Spanish
fluently assisted the researcher in interpreting questions posed to the interviewee and
responses provided by the interviewee.
The demographics of the respondents are displayed in Table 21, while the
duration of the sessions lasted on average 1 hr 39 min.

Table 21
Semi-Structured Interviews, Respondents’ Demographics
Background

Air show flying

Role

Continent

experience
Military

Civilian

4
a

8

< 10

> = 10

Air

Air show

years

years

boss

performer

4

8

2a

12a

Africa

America

1

5

Asia Europe

0

Oceania

5

1

Respondents with parallel experience as air bosses and air show performers.

All interviews were audio-recorded and then transcribed. An initial evaluation of
the transcripts was conducted by the researcher to check for accuracy by reading the
transcript while the recording was played. To ensure trustworthiness, member checking
on the transcript was completed by sending a copy of the transcript to each participant for
evaluation and acceptance as genuine representations of their responses to interview
questions.
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A focus group session, which included eight air show performers (n = 8), was
conducted remotely through the use of Zoom and lasted approximately 1 hr and 30 min.
The session was audio-recorded, and field notes were taken. Next, a transcript was
created, which was forwarded to the group’s participants for review and validation. The
demographics of the focus group respondents are displayed in Table 22.

Table 22
Focus Group, Respondents’ Demographics
Background

Air show flying

Role

Continent

experience
Military

8

Civilian

0

< 10

> = 10

Air

Air show

years

years

boss

performer

8

0

0

8

Africa

America

0

0

Asia Europe

0

Oceania

8

0

In terms of qualitative data coding and theming, categorization methodologies
were utilized to analyze the collected data, as suggested by Maxwell (2012), and all the
transcripts and field/reflective notes were manually organized using a deductive approach
in NVivo 12 into codes, and concept-driven themes related to risk factors, mindfulness,
hazardous attitudes, and resilient safety culture in the international air show community.
Additionally, NVivo’s auto coding and word cloud (see Appendix G) features were
utilized to reveal other codes that the researcher had not identified inductively. These
topics were then evaluated to ascertain trends in the responses of the participants.
The coding process yielded 15 themes (see Table 23). The number of files and
references per code can be found in Appendix H. The outcomes of interview questions,
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observation, and air show-related literature were reviewed during the data triangulation
analysis (see Figure 28 and Appendix I, Table 29). Nevertheless, the triangulation
analysis attempted to spotlight the answers to the qualitative questions, recognizing that
they cannot all be discovered within the time constraints of this project.
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Table 23
Themes List
Deductive concepts
Risk perception and tolerance

Sub-themes/codes
Financial risk
Level of air show display flying risk
Risk management
Unexpected situation
Zero-tolerance
5 Ms

Hazardous attitudes

Concealed hazardous attitudes
FAA recommended hazardous attitudes

Mindfulness

Consistency
Exogenous factors control
Preshow preparation
Visualization

Resilient safety culture

Continuous enhancements
Culture
Ownership
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Figure 28
Triangulation Analysis, Qualitative Data

SemiStructured
Interviews
and Focus
Group

Document
Analysis of
Air Show
Data

Air Show
Observation

The semi-structured interviews and focus group examined air show performers’
perspectives on four primary areas: Existing hazardous attitudes, risk perception and
tolerance, mindfulness strategies, and the overall perception of resilient safety culture in
the air show community.
Finally, as suggested by Creswell and Creswell (2018), to ensure consistency and
reduce researcher-induced bias, an independent audit of interview transcripts was
conducted by an air show SME with extensive experience in air show operations as a
pilot in a military fast jet demonstration team. The SME was also a native English
speaker.
Ten different excerpts that highlighted key deductive concepts/themes from the
transcripts for the semi-structured interviews were presented to the SME, who was asked
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to generate codes and assign themes based on experiences as an SME. The SME assigned
a similar coding to eight out of ten of the excerpts as the researcher. Consistency analysis
of this type delivers an 80 percent reliability to the resulting themes.
In the end, to strengthen interrater consistency even further, all themes initially
emergent from the analysis by the researcher were presented to the auditor, who
compared them to what was emergent during the audit. These results suggest a good level
of match and consistency between the two analyses. Details of the audit are shown in
Appendix I, Table 30.
Risk Perception and Tolerance, Themes
In the semi-structured interviews and the focus group, the first set of questions
focused on risk perception and risk tolerance. The themes under the risk perception and
risk tolerance areas of study were the financial risk, the level of air show display flying
risk, an unexpected situation, zero-tolerance, risk management, and the 5Ms, i.e., the
human, the machine, the medium, the management, and the mission.
The questions aimed to assess interviewees’ general perceptions of the most
significant risks that adversely impact air show displays, as well as the types of risk they
were willing to accept when flying in an air show. Figure 29 shows theme maps for the
risk perception and tolerance area of focus.
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Figure 29
Risk Perception and Risk Tolerance, Themes Map

Financial Risk. The financial risk was reported as a covert risk that affects all
levels of management of aerial events and all categories of air show performers, whether
civilian or military. According to the interviewees, financial constraints mainly affect
aircraft maintenance and training, as well as the currency of a display pilot. Moreover,
insufficient financial resources have an impact on all levels of operation and have been
identified as a contributory factor in aviation accidents and incidents (Aalberg et al.,
2020; Causse et al., 2011; ICAO, 1993, 2018; Stolzer & Goglia, 2016).
Some participants in both semi-structured interviews and focus-group sessions
identified a lack of financial resources and sometimes competition for scarce financial
resources as a potential hazard to air show safety. They intimated that inadequate
financial resources could put an operational strain on air show performers and event
organizers, with severe consequences for flying safety since it could affect the hiring of
more safety observers. Figure 30 provides a coding map for the financial risk theme.
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The competition for scarce financial resources between operational logistics such
as fuel and lubricants as compared to safety controls such as collision avoidance
technology is put under strain in such situations. A quote by an interviewee highlights the
critical role of financial resources in the air show industry: “Money is the main danger
element.”
According to another interviewee, financial pressures could also be experienced at
the personal level of the air show performers, and a quote highlights the point:
And one more time, the problem is that several air forces or more in the civilian
world sometimes you do not have enough resources to do the proper training to do
enough training, and it can be a risk.
While for another interviewee, the financial risk can be related to air show events
themselves:
The air show organizer was financially in trouble when they had to run the air
show, and they did not want to refund tickets. Other organizers that I know would
not have allowed flying on that day, but they allowed the flying, and there was
one pilot in particular who went up and flew in conditions that they should not
have been flying.
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Figure 30
Financial Risk Theme, Coding Map

Level of Air Show Display Flying Risk. All interviewees acknowledged the
increased risk involved in low-altitude air show flying. Several factors can influence the
performance of air show performers, and a plethora of mishaps are possible.
Simultaneously, unanticipated problems may arise that necessitate a high level of skills,
experience, and training to address. One interviewee mentioned the significant amount of
risk, particularly in fast jet formation flying, by noting: “That dynamic flying in itself is a
higher risk level. Based on you are head-to-head 300 knots each, and we are trying to
make a pass around in a close distance.”
While another interviewee discussed the balance between risk and reward and the
potential implications: “There is too much risk. The reputational and the financial
damage of not doing it safely and having an outcome where it can come back on the pilot
or back on the organizer, it is just not worth it.”
Some interviewees noted that even though the focus on safety in the air show
community has been huge in the past years, it was unfortunate that fatal accidents still
happen, and people lose their lives every year. An interviewee with extensive air show
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experience suggested that the high level of risk involved in air show flying required the
appropriate and relevant level of professionalism and risk management from all levels of
management, starting from aviation authorities to air show organizers, air bosses, and the
air show performers themselves.
Unexpected Situation. During the analysis of the data collected in the semistructured interviews and focus group session, unexpected situations emerged as a theme
and are highlighted in Figure 31. Numerous problems may arise during an air show
performance that might cause distractions or situations where great talent, high
knowledge, extreme professionalism, and, in the end, pure luck can save the day.

Figure 31
Unexpected Situation Theme, Coding Map

There were alternate views from respondents regarding unexpected traffic in the
air show airspace. It was very interesting to note that a member of a fast jet military
demonstration team claimed, “I am not usually concerned too much about other aircraft
in the airspace—that is usually very well sanitized and very well monitored. That is not
usually a concern.”
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This was not the shared view of a civilian air show performer flying a propeller
aircraft who stated, “I am very worried about unexpected traffic, which sometimes poses
a threat on less organized air shows.”
Respondents noted that traffic in the air show airspace could pose a substantial
hazard and result in a high risk for a potential midair collision (MAC), and there was a
need for adequate planning before the air show with the introduction of restricted
operating airspace that prohibits any aircraft from entering without permission.
Several factors could have influenced these two responses, but the researcher
determined that the level of complexity of the air show profile was a critical component
that influenced these two interviewees’ responses. As a result, when military
demonstration teams visit air show venues, they expect high levels of ATC sanitization to
assure the safety of their display. They usually fly in large and well-organized air
exhibitions.
On the contrary, for air show performers flying solo propeller aircraft, it is
expected that they may have less stringent requirements in the air show airspace; thus,
they may operate in less structured air show events, with limited airspace sanitization
capabilities, i.e., operating off an airfield under the support of a remote ATC agency.
It was also intriguing what an interviewee reported regarding luck. The quote
from this interviewee highlights the point: “Everybody needs a little bit of luck. Let us
call it luck, but you cannot control your whole life sometimes.” In the air show
community, luck is still regarded as a survival factor; however, air bosses and air show
performers should leave nothing to fortune, as another interviewee highlighted.
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Proper risk management and risk anticipation could help the air show industry to
enhance the current levels of safety. Unexpected events may occur; nevertheless, the best
way to proceed forward is to reduce the number of unexpected events by sharing lessons
learned and making the unexpected the usual, as suggested during the semi-structured
interview sessions by a civilian air show performer.
Zero-Tolerance. The theme of zero-tolerance represented the red lines that the air
show community is unwilling to accept, as per the interviewees (see Figure 32). The
codes that comprised the zero-tolerance theme are related to the systems perspective
approach in aviation organizations, as suggested by Harris (2011), i.e., the human, the
machine, the mission, and the management.

Figure 32
Zero-Tolerance Theme, Coding Map

The majority of the interviewees agreed that they were unwilling to accept any
risk within their control. One interviewee made a representative statement:
I am not happy to accept any risk specifically for a display more than just a
normal flight; because there is no reason to die, not for money, not for glory, not
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to entertain the spectators is no reason to die. So, our professionalism is to
mitigate and limit as much as we can the risk.
The preceding phrase emphasized the air show performers’ comprehension and
acknowledgment of the high-risk environment in which they operate without being
prepared to jeopardize the flight safety of an air show by taking any risks. Regardless of
their air show expertise or how long they have been active in the air show industry, air
show performers should accept no unintentional risk that could harm their display profile,
as per an interviewee with extensive air show flying experience. Furthermore, an air
show performer with military fast jet experience highlighted that there is no risk to
accepting that it is worth the lives of the crowd watching the display.
Then, another interviewee reported the importance of management in the air show
industry to adopt a zero-tolerance mentality in specific cases such as the following:
People could, even if they did not hurt themselves physically, they could hurt
themselves in the pocket because the system will not tolerate a persistent rule
breaker, and that is a good thing. I mean, if someone is a persistent rule breaker,
most flying display directors - air bosses - will say he may be a very spectacular
pilot, and it is a lovely airplane, but I do not want him in my air show because he
sets a bad example.
Zero-tolerance necessitates a commitment from leaders to inspire members of the air
show community to strive for excellence and safety (Galloway, 2012). Particularly air
bosses, who supervise and engage with air show participants on a daily basis, should be
formulating pragmatic policies and ensure accountability for safety among air show
participants. As per an interviewee with civilian air show flying experience, any type of
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rulebreakers are identified by air bosses, and via word of mouth, they will gain a negative
reputation and be excluded from the air show community, losing their jobs and not being
rehired.
Another interviewee indicated that in their country, there is zero-tolerance for any
unsafe physiological condition and at-risk behaviors of a display pilot, not only by the
event organizers but also by the air show performers’ fraternity. This interviewee stated:
Most of the pilots know each other, all the organizers know each other, and so if it
has found that there is a particular pilot that is turning up tired, maybe stayed at
the bar too long last night, they will not get invited back-it’s as simple as that. We
do not want that sort of stuff; we cannot afford to have that sort of pilot there.
The preceding statement emphasizes the air show community’s recognition of zerotolerance for flying while fatigued or under the influence of alcohol and other controlled
substances/medications. Furthermore, the air show community is aware of the demanding
tasks related to performing low-level aerobatics; thus, a pilot must maintain their
complete focus and preparation. According to a civilian air show performer, any
deviation from the policy prohibiting flying while fatigued or under the influence of
alcohol and other controlled substances/medications could result in an incident or
accident during an air show, causing a terrible domino effect throughout the international
air show industry.
Operational Risk Management. Operational risk management was identified as
a theme during the analysis of the semi-structured interviews and focus group (see
Figure 33). Interviewees discussed hazard and risk identification and tolerance processes
during the air show preparation, planning, and execution. Risks reported were further
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broken down into expected and unexpected: Expected risks included bird strikes, engine
failure, and change of flying routine, while unexpected risks were related to the human
factor, structural damage, unrecoverable out of control, and the control of the crowd after
an accident.

Figure 33
Operational Risk Management Theme, Codes, and Subcodes Map

Interviewees mentioned numerous expected risks, that included operational risks
during flight operations. Yet, the most common risks reported were associated with an
engine failure and the potential for a bird strike. These points from the interviewees
suggest that it is essential for air show pilots to have knowledge about potential hazards
and associated risks during their display. Therefore, air show performers should be
mentally and technically prepared to react quickly and effectively in the event of
operational mishaps or abnormal situations during their display without jeopardizing the
safety of both their spectators and themselves.
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It is the unidentified hazards and their associated risk that was of most concern to
interviewees, and the following statement by an experienced air show performer
underscores the role of hazards associated with the human element: “One has to accept
there is a fair amount of risk anyway because it is the human element that always
introduces the unexpected into it.”
Another unanticipated risk was related to the hazards associated with crowd
control during an accident. An interviewee with vast experience both as an air show
performer and air boss mentioned that:
On some of the bigger events that occurred, very often, you expect the crowd to
behave in a particular fashion, i.e., if there is a big ball of flame, you would think
they turn around and run away from it. These days, because everyone wants to get
it on their cameras, there is a danger that they will rush towards it to try and see
what is going on. Some of them may well be trying to help but generally
speaking, they can get in the way of the crash and rescue personnel.
Observed behaviors and reactions during and after an air show accident by both
participants and audiences attending an air show event may be challenging to predict, yet
proactive consideration and risk assessments that provide prospective emergency
management strategies during such events should be considered by air bosses and air
show organizers.
It was interesting that the majority of interviewees suggested some forms of risk
assessment matrix as a strategy for detecting hazards and risks before an air show. In
particular, an interviewee who is currently a member of a military demonstration team
stated that: “All the above issues have to be written in a document called the risk matrix,
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including all the identified risks and the people or the rank that have to sign and accept
the risk for performing an air show.”
In contrast, a civilian air show performer stated that:
My risk matrix is looking if my airplane is in pretty good shape. I do try and get
good people to do the annual, so I get my airplane looked at pretty well every
year. I am pretty conservative with the engine life, so when it is time to do the
engine, it is time to do it; even if it hurts to spend money, I do not defer
maintenance on my airplane.
The findings suggest that risk assessment processes differ between the military and
civilian air show performers even though both advocate for some form of preperformance
hazard identification and risk assessment considering the complexity of their display and
their organization’s decision-making process. The feedback from the interviews and
focus group suggests that within military organizations, the decision to participate in an
air show is not only made by the display pilot but includes a higher chain of authority.
The hierarchy for decision-making may involve the unit commander up to the level of the
Wing Commander or even higher if the circumstances require such approvals.
In a civilian air show organization, however, the decision to participate in an air
show and the perception of the risks and hazards rests with the individual air show
performer or their demonstration team’s decision-making policies. In the case of a solo
aircraft, or individualized air show performance by members of the team, decisionmaking can be very localized. An interviewee shared an interesting opinion regarding the
value of a risk matrix during the planning of an air show, especially for civilian air show
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performers, saying, “In Europe nowadays, we have to make a written risk assessment that
I think it is not smart; anyone can fill it out for you, just to fill it out. It is not right.”
This statement demonstrates that formal and effective risk assessment processes
in the air show community should go beyond “pencil whipping and ticking boxes.”
Practical training in using risk assessment matrices could enable air show performers to
understand its value and try to utilize it and not see it as a piece of paper that will be filled
in and given to the air boss, only to fulfill the requirement from the air show event
organizer.
Risk assessment processes by air show performers should reflect their unique
appreciation of operational risk and must help in recognition of unacceptable risks during
air show activities. The risk mitigation code, along with other subcodes, is included in the
second section of the risk management theme.
Interviewees described techniques for mitigating expected and unexpected
hazards in an air show by taking a proactive approach during display profile design by
including safety buffers that could allow for errors during the display. More specifically,
interviewees suggested as a common practice that they add altitude pads in the design of
vertical aerobatic maneuvers to ensure a safe recovery from the dive in case of an
unexpected event, such as an engine failure. Also, formation aerobatics for newly
inducted air show performers are initially practiced in wider separation until a
satisfactory level of experience has been gained.
To anticipate the unexpected, it was suggested by several interviewees that the
display pilots could employ standard operating procedures with explicit go-no-go criteria
and contracts, what-ifs, and contingency planning. The leader of a military demonstration
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team presented an example of integrated contingency planning in standard operational
procedures, stating:
When we fly, it has to be a search and rescue (SAR) helicopter at the air show site
if a pilot has an accident to take him to the nearest hospital immediately. (…) So,
in our procedures, it is mandatory to have a helicopter parked at the air show site
or flying within a radius of 10 miles, both for practice and the actual air show.
Furthermore, flight training was emphasized as an essential part of instilling risk
assessment skills, as well as quick reaction abilities in the event that an unexpected risk
was present during their display. A military air show performer, in particular, reported
that in order to prepare for an unintentional out-of-control condition, they attended, on an
annual basis, an upset prevention recovery training (UPRT) program: “Once a year, you
have to go to upset prevention recovery training.”
Finally, the importance of the air show safety briefing as a risk mitigator measure
was emphasized by the interviewees. One air show performer mentioned that:
If there are other hazards that you can identify but cannot do anything about at the
time, all you can do is make sure that during your briefings, you highlight the
risks and make sure that the people who are going to respond have been prepared.
Air show safety briefings may be the final line of defense for both the air boss and the air
show performer in identifying dangers and resolving them immediately prior to stepping
out to the airplanes. As stated by an interviewee, the relevance of the air show safety
briefing is crucial as it sets the tone not only for the performers but also for the
emergency responders such as crash/rescue/firefighting teams and first aid/medical teams
to react effectively and expeditiously in the event of an incident or accident.
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The results suggest that risk assessment and mitigation do not end with the filling
of the risk assessment matrix and clearance from one’s superiors or after the air show
safety briefing. Risk assessment and mitigation are dynamic activities that air show
performers must engage in during their flight in the hostile low-level aerobatic
environment. One interviewee made an intriguing comment from an interviewee for a
dynamic, real-time, and last-minute risk assessment and mitigation approach: “If I get in
that situation, I will test the clouds myself before I fly, especially if I am first.”
This statement demonstrates the rigorous risk assessment and decision-making
abilities required of an air show performer to fly safely and efficiently in front of a
public. This type of proactive safety practice should be encouraged in the daily display
profile routine during air shows.
Air show pilots can also have safety margins and buffers, which may exceed
required standards as part of their profiles and maneuvers. Nevertheless, air show pilots
should accept the risk that is tolerable for the scope and complexity of a profile and
enables them to react skillfully, correctly, and expeditiously to both anticipated and
unanticipated threats while engaged in aerobatics, as recommended by Barker (2020a).
5Ms. Some of the interviewees identified the air show industry as a sociotechnical system that encompasses a tight coupling of social and technical factors related
to the human and its environment with implications for optimal performance, as
suggested by Reason (2000) and Dekker (2014). Some of the themes mentioned by the
interviewees related to human factors, the aircraft, the environmental conditions, the
display profile itself, and the air show management by event organizers and air bosses.
To encapsulate the safety risk associated with these socio-technical factors, the five-M
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model suggested by Harris (2011) was used as a guide to set the views of these
respondents into perspective. Figure 34 illustrates the theme and sub-themes.

Figure 34
5Ms Theme Map

5 Ms
huMan

Machine

Management

Medium

Mission

Human. Interviewees mentioned physiological and psychological risks related to
the human factor (see Figure 35). Fatigue, G-induced loss of consciousness (G-LOC),
sickness, and lack of skills were identified as physiological risks to the performance of a
display pilot, as mentioned by the following interviewee:
When acting as either a ground controller or a ringmaster, I need to ensure that the
pilots are not fatigued; probably, that is the biggest latent risk. The more
experienced pilots are aware of it, but the less experienced air show pilots work
up to the air show, and then the air show weekend itself is very tiring and very
fatiguing. If the air show has been on Friday afternoon or maybe Saturday, by the
time you get to Sunday, they can be quite fatigued, and they may not recognize
the fatigue aspects, and that is where the mistakes happen.
Fatigue is a latent hazard that progressively builds up during the air show weekend, with
significant adverse safety risk implications for the pilot’s mental and cognitive
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performance. An experienced civil air show pilot opined how symptoms of fatigue such
as inadequate body hydration, low blood sugar, loss of mental focus and situational
awareness, and reduced G-tolerance could adversely affect a pilot’s performance and
increase the risk of errors and lead to adverse safety events.

Figure 35
5Ms Theme, Human Codes, and Subcodes Map

Another sub-theme was the issue with dexterity in terms of handling and technical
skills on the part of the performer, which could be affected by physiological factors. The
interviewees highlighted that lack of air show performing experiences, lack of
proficiency in aircraft handling, inadequate planning and preparation, and inadequate
currency/recency in air show profiles as factors in this sub-theme. The following quote
from an air show performer emphasizes the difference between currency and recency
requirements:
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That is another point which is—the difference between currency and recency; you
can maintain currency legally by flying every 30 days or whatever. But to be
recently air show experienced, you need to fly the display you intend to do within
a week, certainly.
The findings suggest that it is vital for an air show performer to arrive completely
prepared and up-to-date with recent training that will showcase not only their outstanding
flying abilities but also the aircraft’s performance and level of maintenance.
Additionally, interviewees discussed approaches for pilots to tolerate risks
associated with physiological issues through the use of fatigue risk management
techniques and appropriate training that could improve the pilots’ G-tolerance. A member
of a military display team revealed a method applied for reducing fatigue risk: “How do
we get around that? I think a lot of it just comes down to experience, kind of mentoring
from the senior pilots, keeping an eye on the junior pilots.” This finding suggests the vital
role of mentoring new air show performers by their teammates as a critical management
strategy for imparting knowledge about controlling and minimizing fatigue during the
performance season.
However, an additional difficulty that performers mentioned was the cumulative
fatigue that developed throughout the air show weekend, as noted by an air show
performer with airline experience:
For me, what helped was that because I was an international pilot, I have
developed means to cope with sleep deprivation and methods to sleep. I would
never leave my house without an eye mask to darken any light coming through
the shutters. I can sleep with very high-quality earplugs, which take care of the
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noise factor. Using little things like that that came through from the airline’s
international operations helped me not to be as tired of the air show flying.
These are risk management techniques that could be applied to the air show
community from another sector of aviation expertise, such as commercial flight
operations. Best practices for risk tolerance and management, such as methods to cope
with sleep deprivation, including high-quality earplugs to control the noise, and the use of
eyeshades to darken any light coming into the bedroom, may be transferred from other
areas of expertise or the aviation industry, and all of these best practices could be shared
with the rest of the air show industry.
The ICAO (2011, 2016) has identified fatigue as a risk to safety. Fatigue
management refers to the methods by which aviation service providers and operational
personnel address the safety implications of fatigue. The fatigue risk management system
(FRMS) has been offered to aviation service providers and operational employees as an
effective technique for addressing the safety implications of fatigue (ICAO, 2016).
Nevertheless, the interview and focus-group findings suggested that currently, there were
no documented fatigue risk mitigation systems or rules on FRMS specific to the
international air show industry. One interviewee highlighted the regulatory state for
fatigue management in their country:
There are no set rules for private operations; it is up to the individual pilot. We do
not have anything in written any regulatory requirements that the display pilot has
to be rested for 12 hours and must sleep, for example, in a quiet room with
blackout curtains. There is nothing like that similar to the airline industry.
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The findings suggest that fatigue risk management may be the responsibility of
individual air show pilots. From an organizer perspective, there need to be some
improvements in providing conducive accommodation that ensures adequate and good
quality sleep, which is essential in fatigue risk management.
An air show performer also highlighted the importance of synchronizing air show
schedules to prevent interference with the circadian rhythms of the display pilots since
inappropriate timings for briefings and other preplanning activities can disrupt rest
periods and increase fatigue risk.
Interestingly, interviewees suggested that pertinent operational display
information and the time for the display are typically provided to them in advance to
enable them to adjust their schedule and a good rest before the air show becomes the
individual responsibility of each display pilot. An interviewee expressed it succinctly:
“But for all performers, that is one air show after another; one weekend after another; you
have to pace yourself. It is a marathon, not a sprint.” Another interviewee noted that
despite the period of intense flying, planning, and preparation associated with the air
shows, air show performers must guarantee their fitness to fly by staying sufficiently
rested and safe.
Psychological risks associated with the human element of the 5M theme, as
indicated by interviewees, focused primarily on emotional risks, distractions, and an air
show performer’s confidence level. According to one interviewee, overconfidence was
the primary risk factor for getting involved in a dangerous situation. However, another
interviewee emphasized the need for maintaining a healthy degree of confidence and
stated that:
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It is a thin line; it is kind of like fighter aviation where you have to be confident
you have to walk into the room thinking you are the best pilot in the room at all
times, but you can do so while staying humble.
An air show performer with military background intimated that it is vital for a
display pilot to be reasonably confident in their aircraft handling skills and the
capabilities of the airplane prior to flying. The interviewee further stated that a balance of
healthy risk appreciation and self-awareness is necessary to minimize overconfidence and
to ensure a safe and focused display throughout the air show.
Several interviewees emphasized air show performers’ vulnerability to
distractions and offered suggestions for mitigating distractions. An interviewee noted that
distractions and interruptions during the display might disrupt the air show performer’s
mental flow and divert their attention away from the critical requirements of flying an
accurate and precise display profile in the aggressive and high threat low-level aerobatic
environment.
Radio chatter on the display frequency, weather-related factors, the crowd, and
family issues related to an air show performer that could affect their psychological
stability and distract them from concentrating on the core task of flying a display were
issues reported by several interviewees. An example of a family-induced distraction is
captured in this statement by an interviewee: “Once, I was flying with a family problem
which I had to take some risk—it was not a funny time—and to get this out of my mind
was not easy.”
Another air show performer stated that family issues affect anyone, and an air
show performer cannot be untouched by such an upheaval. The interviewee further stated
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that family, financial, or marital problems could upset the emotional stability of an air
show performer, especially when that distraction happens before a display flight.
There was a consensus among interviewees that emotional hazards were inherent
with air show participation. They stated that risk associated with emotional states of
anxiety, indecision, loss of situational awareness, stress, and social desirability could not
be discounted and had been experienced by all. One of the interviewees stated that
anxiety was a natural sensation to one’s level of operational experience, especially among
novices in the air show community. The following statement highlights that point:
I think that any pilot who is starting his display career, whatever his aviation
background and experience is, will face some anxious attitude about doing his
first displays. It is a little bit like the ‘red flag syndrome’ that if you survive your
first five war missions, you feel comfortable with them from an emotional point
of view, and your chance to survive is much higher.
An air show performer stated that as display pilots participate in more air show
displays, the more confident they become, and their awareness of operational hazards
associated with air shows increases. They also develop better emotional stability required
for this form of high-risk flight operations.
Most interviewees reported risks related to their feeling of pressure induced by the
time factor. Due to the tight time schedules planned for an air show, every display pilot
has their designated time slot with a small margin for a delay so that there is a value for
money for the crowd attending the event, as stated by an interviewee with air boss and air
show flying experience.
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The air boss prepares the schedule with an accuracy of a minute from the start to
taxi, takeoff, and landing to accommodate all the participants in the air show with a strict
and tight sequence. Especially in the big air shows, the time pressure is significant, as
mentioned by an interviewee: “So, if you had some complex airspace structure, with very
strict timing, in international air shows like Paris Airshow or Farnborough, 30 seconds or
one minute late, then the following day, you will not fly.”
As another air show performer noted, this type of operation and planning by the
air bosses places pressure on the pilot to maintain their time, causing them to push their
mental and physical limitations by rushing through display profiles and tasks, which
increases the potential for errors.
Psychologically-induced pressures in the air show community are sometimes
amplified by external pressures, and the statement by one air show performer reinforced
that point:
You are stressed by external pressures, which should not exist because the way to
limit risk is to standardize the performance as much as possible. Try and train the
necessary number of displays and sorties. And finally, feel comfortable with
everything that will happen according to your training.
Therefore, training in mindfulness and meticulous preflight planning was suggested to
enable an air show performer to cope better under psychological pressures related to
unexpected circumstances.
One interviewee, who is also a member of the flight control committee for a local
air show, stated that:
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What we do not want is that they feel pressured to meet that time; therefore, we
give them plenty of notice that the program does not change. If someone drops
out, it becomes a vacant slot, we leave that slot open, and there is nobody in the
sky—that is okay. But what we do not want is to try and bring someone forward
and then put them under time pressure to get ready when they are not prepared.
This suggests that air show organizers should exercise extreme caution during the
briefing to ensure that pilots are provided with necessary flight planning resources and
adequate time for preparation to reduce the feeling of being rushed before an air show
display. This point was reinforced by another air show performer, who added that a
sufficient buffer in the timing should be provided to mitigate the risk created by the air
show performer’s timeline.
The concept of self-preservation was highlighted by some of the interviewees. An
interviewee who has extensive experience both as an air show performer and as an air
boss in big international air shows stated that: “The pilot’s motivation for safety is one of
self-preservation, not just self-preservation in terms of making sure his life is not at risk,
but also protecting his income in some cases.”
This concept was buttressed by another air show performer who intimated that air
show performers should always consider self-preservation, so they do not overstretch
their safety limits and endanger their life and their career, which has implications on their
financial well-being. The interviewee further stated that :
Self-preservation of air show performers is also self-preservation for the air show
industry as a whole, and no risk is acceptable when it jeopardizes the aviation
industry in general and the air show community in particular, ruining the
163

reputation of not only the pilot who may be exposed to an incident or accident but
also thousands of people who work in the air show business and earn a living
from it.
Machine. The majority of interviewees highlighted a potential risk associated
with an aircraft malfunction, such as an engine failure or a structural failure during an air
show (see Figure 36). One interviewee stated, “The maintenance side of an aircraft is
taken care of, but the severity of the outcome of one mechanical engine failure is quite
very high.” Another interviewee noted that even if an aircraft is well-maintained, air
show performers should remain cautious of a potential engine malfunction that could lead
to a flameout landing.
Figure 36
5Ms Theme, Machine Codes, and Subcodes Map

In the air show community, there are some operational risks associated with the
flying of warbirds which are vintage airplanes that are no longer in production (Barker,
2020a). One of the notable hazards is the age of these aircraft and the risk associated with
164

maintaining and flying such vintage machines. An interviewee with extensive warbird
display experience said, “I was concerned about the age of the jets. When I was flying, it
was many years later, but I was worried about the maintenance of the machines. So, that
was a risk I accepted and dealt with.” Another vintage aircraft pilot supported the earlier
view by intimating that pilots need to be aware of the risks associated with flying an aged
airplane, and they should adapt flight display profiles that do not exceed the airplane’s
operational limits. Another pilot noted the need for extra vigilance when flying such
vintage aircraft since they are more prone to an engine-related emergency.
Interviewees also suggested that air show performers, particularly warbird flyers,
are more concerned about the possibility of flight control-related emergencies during
displays. According to an interviewee, there is a difference in risk perception between
engine failure and flight control failure and stated that:
If an engine fails, at least you can control the airplane, at least you can steer it
somewhere, and hopefully, you will live and not hurt anybody on the ground (…)
if you have no controls, you are out; you got no chance.
Management. Management of risks in an air show rests mainly with the air boss
(see Figure 37); nonetheless, the event organizer is accountable for the organization and
conduct of the aviation event, especially in the U.S. (FAA, 2020a). The air boss was
frequently cited by interviewees for air show tactical management, and the following
statements identify the air boss’s role:
One of the biggest problems for safety in the air show world is air bosses. There is
a notion that air bosses are there for people’s safety and that they are in control
and things like that. And air bosses are there; they ran away and joined the circus
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with us. But they want to get rehired, and air bosses are the least confrontational
group at an air show; they are the least likely people to stick up for pilots; usually,
there is one that, in particular, just will not have anything to do with that. But all
in all, air bosses are in a position where they could weed out a lot of that pressure,
and they do not. So, if you want to have a hidden risk in the air show business, it
is that there is a notion that air bosses make air shows better and safer. In general,
they are just there to serve their own needs.

Figure 37
5Ms Theme, Management Codes, and Subcodes Map

The air boss’s responsibility in promoting safety and minimizing operational
pressures on air show performers was also highlighted by another interviewee: “That is a
standard thing in the briefing; they always say, ‘Do not do anything new or different, do
the same thing you have been doing.’” Another experienced civilian air show performer
summed up the role of the air boss by affirming that air bosses carry the primary
responsibility for the safe execution of an air show, and as such only well-trained,
technically competent, and qualified individuals should be maintaining such a role.
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Medium. The medium theme was undergirded by the codes of the physical
medium and the societal medium, as per Harris (2011). The physical medium discussed
by the interviewees was related to the air show site complexity, the air show site airspace,
obstacles in the vicinity of the area, and the possibility of hitting them (see Figure 38).
Various environmental factors were also addressed, including marginal weather
conditions such as a low cloud ceiling, strong winds, and a high-density altitude; the
sun’s position in the sky; and bird and drone strikes. Moreover, several interviewees
identified that social facilitation bias had a significant effect on air show performers.

Figure 38
5Ms Theme, Medium Codes, and Subcodes Map

According to one interviewee with a single-engine jet aircraft air show
experience, bird strikes are a primary concern during displays:
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The most significant concern, just due to our airframe that we are flying in the
shows, bird strikes would always be a huge consideration that we will be
monitoring as far as bird activity around the airfield and the air show site.
This statement highlights the limitations of the single-engine airplane’s performance in
air shows and the higher risk of an engine failure due to a bird strike.
A concern comparable to a bird strike risk is unauthorized unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV) or drones violating the air show’s airspace. An interviewee reported their
experience with drones in the air show vicinity: “A lot of drone activity around air shows
has spiked significantly last few years. We had to postpone shows because the drone will
be flying, and they will have to try to track down whoever was on the ground.”
According to the same interviewee, those small-sized hazards flying near the air show
box may pose significant threats to air show performers, particularly single-engine jet
display teams.
According to numerous interviewees, the primary environmental risk is
performing at high-density altitudes (DA). Under these conditions, the engine
performance and flying characteristics of the aircraft drastically degrade, resulting in
decreased performance, sluggish controls, a wider turning radius, and longer display
duration. The leader of a jet demonstration team explained:
If you have a high temperature and you want to take a little more energy- you just
cannot do that. And it is pressing you to shorten your initial altitude, your
sequence, and then finally, you do not feel comfortable. (...) Density altitude is
important for the pilot, but it should also be considered by the display director for
the timing. If you want to do the same thing, the same rhythm, same performance,
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same display above standard, it is just impossible. Because the same maneuver at
the same indicated airspeed will take you more time because the increase of
temperature by 10 degrees is a 30% increase in the turning radius, and that is
basic.
Another interviewee discussed the impact of high-density altitude on human
performance:
People tend to die at high-density altitude shows more than they do at low
[density altitude] shows, proportionally. It affects the pilot: I can tell my G
tolerance; your body works harder; they talk about hydration, but your heart
works harder, everything works harder. And so, you are just not as strong when
you go to a high DA [density altitude] place; that is certainly a factor.
The same air show performer mentioned the following mitigation strategies when
preparing for a high DA air show:
I try and fly one high-density altitude show every year. It is good to go; get ready
for it, and then what is nice is for about 6 weeks afterward, you are flying great.
You go down to a normal place, and the airplanes perform great. It takes a long
time to get used to nice performance again, but density altitude is a big problem.
Another air show performer stated that density altitude had been observed as a
significant operational issue and suggested that with proper planning and preparation, a
pilot may foresee the negative impact on their performance and change their display
profile as needed.
Flying over water has also been noted as a potential environmental hazard by
several air show performers interviewed. According to one of the interviewees:
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I fly higher over water anyway, so then you get something like that, and I will fly
another 100 feet higher. (...) [Flying over] water is very difficult because it looks
the same for a long, long, long time, and then all of a sudden, you are close; it is
really weird. So, you have to give it a lot of respect.
The same interviewee experienced the same effects while flying over water in the
late afternoon with a low sun-angle, as described below:
We did a show, and it was later in the afternoon, around six o’clock, right this
time of year. It was beautiful, blue sky and a very pretty day, and it was late in the
afternoon, so there was no wind, so there was good light. So, everything is good.
Then I got in, and I did my first maneuver in the vertical, and I turned around, and
when I turned around, the smokes just hung in there—it was not even moving.
But in your mind, it settles, it moves down, and I am looking down, and it just
looks like a hole. It does not look like anything because the water is dark because
it is dark enough; it was late, this close to sunset. So, I just pushed hard to be
away above the smoke and then did not do any more outside maneuvering and
gave it another little bit more altitude. Because it is different all the time, that is a
tough one.
In terms of the medium’s social risks, it was suggested by interviewees that social
facilitation bias had a significant effect on air show performers. Specifically, an
interviewee stated, “I do not fly differently when I am in front of people. Everybody else
seems to try harder.”
Other strategies that are used by the interviewee to minimize the risk associated
with social facilitation bias are highlighted below:
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I had good training. I do not fly differently in front of people, and everybody else
I know does, so I am not really affected by the size of the crowd. When my mom
was alive, if she came to an air show, I had to move it up 50 feet, but that is about
it; that is the only concession I would make for people in the crowd.
According to an experienced air show performer, sometimes the relationship
between air show performers and event organizers may introduce latent tendencies to
encourage performers to take unacceptable risks in order to keep the air show
exhilarating and their jobs secure in the future. This statement highlights the point:
You got to do unwise stuff to satisfy the event organizers. And that is, to me, that
is the biggest financial implication: that you will do stuff because you want to
please the people that are writing your checks, or they do not write a check again.
Another air show performer stated that air show facilitation might implicitly have
a coercive effect on novices’ pilots who wish to retain their jobs and remain in the air
show industry, as well as experienced pilots who wish to impress event organizers, who
may be personal friends.
Mission. The mission involved during an air show performance is multifaceted.
Several factors and codes were revealed by interviewees related to the mission during an
air show (see Figure 39). A risk mentioned by an experienced air show performer who
was leading a jet demonstrational team was related to ferry flights:
The most dangerous situation that I have ever faced was on ferry flights, not
during displays. When you fly a display, normally, you have restricted airspace;
you have acceptable weather. There are some rules for this, and if you are below
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the weather conditions, you should not fly. Then, you know exactly what you
have to do, and if you are properly trained, things should happen normally.
Another air show performer who was flying as a wingman in a propeller-powered aircraft
demonstration team added:
Flying the Pitts because it is not instrument flying rated; it is just an engine with
wings. So, any IF [Instrument Flying] threat is a major threat, and you know, four
aircraft, trying to make a flight of one and a half hours with that distance to cross
was quite a thing to manage.
Ferry flights are often not seen as hazardous as they are not part of the display mission
itself; nonetheless, various unexpected and unanticipated things may occur, as the same
interviewee stated.
Figure 39
5Ms Theme, Mission Codes, and Subcodes Map

Several interviewees then stated that there was a risk of colliding with the ground
or any object on the ground. One interviewee mentioned, “You cannot hurt yourself in an
airplane until you hit something.” A fast jet solo display pilot stated:
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The most important risk during the display is to hit the ground unintentionally. To
mitigate that risk, I want to know the display sight and the surroundings,
obstacles, altitudes of the buildings, and so on, to make sure that we can keep the
margin in height above the ground.
The complexity of the display was another risk mentioned by several air show
performers. It is interesting what was mentioned by a demo team leader: “I do not want to
have maneuvers that need high skill to be executed because I cannot guarantee that I or
any member of my Team is fit in every display.” Regarding the intricacy of the air show
profile, the same air show performer stated the following:
The risk perception is also the sophistication of the way you set up your display;
because if you set up something which is too complex, we are back to what we
said before, which is that if you need 100% of your skills, and resources and
capability to do a display the day you do not feel comfortable then when there are
some distractions for any kind of reason, maybe you will not manage to do
properly what you intend to do. So, let us consider that if you have to establish
your display at a level of skill that requires about 80, or a maximum of 90% of
your capabilities, then 99% you will kill yourself one day.
Regardless of being in a demonstration team or flying solo, performers should adjust their
profile according to their experience and flying skills so that they always keep a safety
margin during the execution of their display, as mentioned by another experienced air
show performer.
Complex missions, such as circling the jumpers and flying in dissimilar-aircraft
formations, may potentially create risks, as numerous interviewees indicated.
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Additionally, downline rolls were noted to pose an additional risk to the display profile,
which could result in a fatal accident, as the following interviewee mentioned:
It looked almost like it was a done deal that he was going to try this maneuver or
maneuvers, and as it was, he just went on a 45-downline doing this deep stalled
rolling maneuver, and he just did not have the space to come out, he actually
autorotated the other direction as well, so he was never going to make it.
These assertions corroborate Barker’s (2020a) report that downline rolls are one of the
maneuvers that air show performers should use extreme caution when putting in their
display profile.
Several risks were mentioned by interviewees during formation flying, including
the team leader’s capabilities, considerations for the wingman, and the aerobatic
maneuvers flown during a formation display. Yet, the most prevailing risk during
formation flying, as argued by the majority of the air show performers who were
members of a display team, was the MAC. An interviewee who was a member of a
civilian piston-powered demonstration team said: “The risk that I was concerned about is
the midair collision risk. (...) Midair collisions can occur when things do not happen as
planned because the routine has changed.”
All team members have a critical role when flying in formation. A member of a
civilian piston-powered demonstration team reported another hazard that could lead to a
midair collision: “The additional risk would be that the person I am flying with makes a
mistake that is big enough to have a collision.”
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The importance of teamwork and acknowledgment of the contracts amongst the
team members was highlighted by an interviewee who was also running the duties of a
flying display director:
We have had occasions where flying formations have not been constituted
formations; we have had guys forming up in the wrong order. On one occasion,
we had an aircraft touch another airplane because they both went for the number
two slot. One was an ex-Navy guy, and the other guy was a civilian, and each
thought the number two slot was on the other side.
Flying a display with other airplanes in close vicinity while maneuvering and executing
aerobatics multiplies all the risks related to an air show performance, as mentioned by
another interviewee.
Lastly, another risk that could be accepted is the added risk of flying with a
passenger during a display, as reported by a military air show performer. The interviewee
referred to the fact that:
Some other risks that we will accept with the Team on practice shows, for
example, during the air show season, are incentive rides to other air show acts and
personnel as well as any fellow military pilots that are at the air show; we use it as
a recruiting tool for the Team as well.
However, the same interviewee reported that this type of flight is only performed during
the practice days to minimize the risk; during the actual display days, no passenger is
allowed to be carried in the airplane, as per their regulations.
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Hazardous Attitudes, Themes
In the semi-structured interviews and the focus group, a set of questions focused
on hazardous attitudes. The themes revealed were the FAA-related hazardous attitudes
and the concealed hazardous attitudes (see Figure 40).
Figure 40
Hazardous Attitudes, Themes Map

The FAA Recommended Hazardous Attitudes. During the semi-structured
interviews and focus group, interviewees reported all FAA recommended attitudes as
well as the combination of all attitudes, except resignation, connected to air show
performers (see Figure 41). One interviewee recalled a display pilot with a mix of
hazardous attitudes, as stated below:
This guy had this macho attitude, combined with invulnerability, combined with
antiauthority, where he was told, “do not do anything funny.” Instead, he was
doing maneuvers that it was hard to understand that were possible in a full-size
aircraft. He was doing them in his model aircraft; he was also a national RC
model champion. So, he really could fly well, but he was trying to use that in a
full-size aircraft, deep alpha-stalls, and stuff, for what reason? Those spectators
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would not have appreciated what he was doing, and he messed it up, and he paid
with his life. Horrible situation.
Unfortunately, as the interviewee mentioned, this air show performer had a fatal accident.
Figure 41
FAA Recommended Hazardous Attitudes Theme, Codes Map

According to interviewees, the most dangerous attitude was invulnerability,
followed by the macho attitude, impulsivity, and finally, antiauthority. An interviewee
made an interesting observation about the invulnerability of air show performers,
“Anytime people say, ‘it is going to work, we will take care, it is going to work,’ it is just
an unprofessional and unsafe attitude.”
Numerous interviewees linked this invulnerable mindset to complacency, and one
interviewee recounted:
Sadly, in the last five years or so, particularly in my country, most of the accidents
and incidents have been by very experienced pilots, and that is the bit that worries
me now. It could be because of complacency—they have flown the same airplane,
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same routine, 24 times this season, so they just get in the airplane, and off they go,
and they either forget to check, or they use the wrong height.
According to the same interviewee, this type of attitude could result in air show
performers exceeding their limitations: “But you do get these pilots who determinedly fly
down to the limit because he can, and they are the guys I worry about.” Another
interviewee with military fast jet display experience reported a form of complacency as
under-stimulation for the display pilots who are towards the end of their season; in this
case, they might become complacent and allow themselves to put their guard down and
make mistakes.
Lastly, pushing the limits increases the already high risk in the performance of air
show performers, leaving no margin for error, as mentioned by another interviewee.
Regarding the macho attitude, an interviewee recounted an instance of an air show
performer who exhibited this type of behavior but tragically died in an accident, as
described below:
He had that machismo, and he was sort of always out to prove something. He
pushed an inverted maneuver too hard, well below where I thought or given the
conditions of the day, as it was a very windy day. I was surprised that they
allowed him to fly that day; it was that windy. And he pushed an inverted
maneuver too low, and he recovered within feet of hitting the ground.
Almost half of the interviewees described the overconfident pilot as having a macho
attitude, as indicated by one interviewee: “The ones that worry me are the overconfident
ones, and sometimes overconfidence betrays itself in all sorts of ways.”
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Two interviewees revealed an overestimation of skills and capabilities as a
component of an overconfident attitude, the following statement stood out:
Over the years, yes, I have, and I have had some very nose-to-nose discussions
with one or two of them. And the sad thing is that one of them subsequently went
off and committed an error, and it was not an aerobatic error; that was the stupid
thing about it. He elected to fly a display and then went to another field, did a low
break, pulled up for a showy landing and made a complete mess of it, and put the
airplane into the ground. I can only conclude that he just thought he was better
than he was, and that was a shame.
Regarding the antiauthority attitude, a military solo display pilot reported that:
I think the most dangerous display pilots are with the rogue behavior—the guy
not willing to keep the rules. The guy who thinks the rules are only for the other
guys and that they are better. I think if you imagine that you are better than all the
other ones and that the rules are only for the other pilots, then I think you are
dangerous.
Additionally, a civilian air show performer alluded to a tendency against authority that
existed a few years ago:
There were guys that would say it is my right to die, and that was common in the
air show business not that long ago, 15 years ago. And then there were 10 or 12
guys dying in air shows every year. Now, it is kind of surprising when it happens
because you do not get to say “It is my right to die” anymore and have people go,
“Yeah, that is right.”
Then another interviewee, who is also an air boss at a large air show, stated that:
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Some pilots seem to make a deliberate attempt to fly exactly to the regulation or
even a little bit low if they can; they are the guys I like to keep a very strong eye
on, and there are one or two of them around the place that we know of, and the
flying control committees are aware of these guys and watch very carefully, and
we will take the guy to one side and just warn him.
The same interviewee emphasized the critical role of both the flying control
committee (FCC) and the air boss in establishing regulations and ensuring that they are
followed without variation by air show performers.
Concealed Hazardous Attitudes. Along with the FAA’s hazardous attitudes,
interviewees highlighted several types of behaviors that the researcher classified as
concealed. Concealed hazardous attitudes encompass the attitude types of deficient,
distracted, egocentric, and unorganized (see Figure 42).

Figure 42
Concealed Hazardous Attitudes Theme, Codes, and Subcodes Map

Air show performers who lack discipline, experience, financial resources,
preparation, and training may pose a hazard not just to themselves but also to the air
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show community. The most frequently mentioned deficiency of an air show performer, as
revealed by interviewees, is the limited aerobatic flying skills. An interviewee with
substantial national and international air show expertise reported a case of an air show
performer with problematic aerobatic flying skills:
You could see how insecure the whole thing was. He was a very nice guy, not a
showoff. He loved it, but he was not able to do it. He did not have the manual
skills and the understanding of what he did.
Another interviewee stated, “The most dangerous is the guy who does not have the
proper skill or the proper training.”
Having solid flying skills, as indicated below by an interviewee with military and
civilian air show experience, is a precondition for the survival skills required of an air
show performer: “People could say, ‘He did not have the skill’; I think that he had the
skill, and I think all of us that have survived so far have the skill.”
An egocentric attitude refers to someone who is primarily concerned with
themselves and disregards the greater benefit of the air show industry, as stated by an air
show performer. Nevertheless, more than half of the interviewees reported that showing
off was dangerous behavior. A military display pilot discussed this:
I think the most dangerous air show pilots are the ones that are flying for other
pilots. If they are trying to show off, they are not doing it for the crowd or
themselves, but they are doing it to show how they can handle the airplane, and I
think that kind of attitude is probably the most dangerous where you are trying to
fly for other people. Of course, when we are doing a demonstration, we are flying

181

for the crowd, but their entertainment value is our lowest priority; their safety is
our top priority, the team’s, and then our safety.
Another interviewee supported the assertion that some air show performers might
be seeking fame by attempting a dangerous maneuver, such as in this example:
But one should not say, “Okay, this is a risky maneuver, but I am going to do it
because I am going to be famous”; this is the most unwise thing we could have if
we want to stay in business for the long term….If people think that they are stars
in the business and want to take power and rule the system, this arrogance is not
according to our rules.
Another interviewee felt that air show flying is all about presenting the aircraft and not
the pilot, as mentioned below:
You are here to fly your display, present your aircraft, present the way you can
control the aircraft, and control the flight paths in every situation. It is not about
showing your skills as a pilot to show that you are the best; you are not here to
prove that you are the best one; you are here to show your aircraft.
Then another interviewee brought up the fact that pilots with a show-off attitude might
also want to impress their friends and family, as indicated below:
Showing off is how people die. Usually, it is at their mom’s barbecue, at the lake
house, not that much at air shows. So, accidents that are doing aerobatics are not
at the home field and not in the wavered airspace at a box but usually at
somebody’s party.
Another interviewee noted that new air show performers might be more prone to
show off their abilities in front of the public: “The newer pilots in the air show they think
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they have to go out to impress, but it is not about that; it is not about trying to impress.” A
civilian interviewee noted that an air show performer’s aviation training experience might
affect their attitude, as discussed below:
It is kind of a sense of not being humble; having an attitude of some sort is. But
then look at the military pilots. A lot of the military guys have a very inflated
sense of themselves, especially the Navy pilots, that are part of their culture is to
be like huge egos. I have seen a couple of Blue Angel pilots either killed
themselves or got fired quickly because they had such an inflated sense of ego.
So, the military recognizes that too. It is also subtle.
Another concealed attitude was stated by interviewees to be related to distraction,
either emotional or induced by family or other personal issues. A civilian air show
performer shared a personal story about overcoming marital difficulties:
Also, people who have a lot going on. Personally, the closest I have ever come to
having an accident was when I was going through a divorce. I was not focused,
and emotionally I was upset. I probably should have stood down and not flown.
Another interviewee reported that the presence of friends and family at the air show site
could cause a distraction to the air show performers:
The day that a fellow air show performer died, he was angry because he had a big
confrontation about how his wife and very young son were being treated in the
hangar at this air show. And he was agitated when he got in his airplane; was that
causal? I do not know, probably not. But, your family and friends, you are better
off without them in an air show. Also, other fellow air show performers, when
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their girlfriend or wife and kids are present at an air show, they were different—
they were not getting ready in the same way.
Emotional issues that result in distractions could significantly affect the mental focus of
air show performers deteriorating the safe conduct of the display, as mentioned by
another air show performer.
Ultimately, the concealed hazardous attitudes described by interviewees were
associated with unorganized attitudes (Nelson, 2007), such as a pilot being sloppy or
carrying themself in an unprofessional manner. An air show performer reported the
following:
We all recognize them; we are like, that guy is going to be next because he does
not have the right attitude, his plane is a mess, it is not even clean. He jumps onto
the plane; he still got a pen in his pocket, and I know some of those people right
now that I worry about because it is mostly mental. Sometimes it is the attitude;
sometimes it is the way they carry themselves; sometimes they are just messy,
they are not neat, they always look kind of sloppy, and they are always late
getting to their plane. And those people are the ones that we say are going to be
next. So, you do see that even now.
The same interviewee, who has vast experience performing at air shows, discussed an air
show performer who exhibited this type of unorganized attitude and tragically died in a
fatal accident, as mentioned below:
He had this little surfer dude going, and I thought in the back of my mind I
thought there is something it does not fit with air show pilots; it is not what you
want to see around air shows and airplanes. It is cool, it is okay to go surfing, but
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you do not have that attitude when renting an airplane. Sure enough, next year, it
takes a kid up, crashes, and dies, and I never forgot that.
These types of behaviors are insidious and are hard to identify, yet they could have fatal
results, as noted by another interviewee.
Mindfulness, Themes
In the semi-structured interviews and the focus group, a set of questions focused
on mindfulness. Visualization, exogenous factor control, preshow preparation, and
consistency were the themes associated with the mindfulness area of the current study
that emerged during the theming process (see Figure 43).

Figure 43
Mindfulness, Themes Map

Visualization. Mission briefing, flight debriefing, chair-flying, and staying
focused before the display via a variety of methods, including a video review, were all
mentioned by interviewees as ways to practice mindfulness through visualization (see
Figure 44).
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Figure 44
Visualization Theme, Codes, and Subcodes Map

The value and necessity of a preflight briefing were emphasized by the majority
of interviewees, whether they were members of a demonstration team or solo display
pilots. With the following statement, a team leader emphasized the importance of the
briefing:
As a team, the brief will be the generalization or the focus time before a flight.
Our brief will generally be about an hour and a half prior to our air show time or
the smoke on time, for example.
The length and style of the briefing differ based on the team and their culture, according
to the same respondent:
With a team, this briefing moment is very important. It is interesting because this
varies depending on the team’s culture. One team’s briefing will last one-hour
minimum, and it is very long, and they review so many things. (...) Another team
is doing their briefing very easily: They brief in the jet number five on the ramp,
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and it is a quick briefing, with the leader who gives the air show’s specifics, such
as obstacles, antennas, weather, and he goes through the routine and the radio
calls. But it is probably something like 10 minutes, (...) and that is the way I also
did it: Ten minutes on the essential points on the air show site.
However, briefings are essential not only for teams but also for the solo display
pilot, as mentioned by an interviewee below who has been flying a fast jet solo display
profile for more than three years: “I would go through our standard briefing just as a
routine, although I know I am just flying at my home base. Just make the standard
briefing and go through the numbers from takeoff, landing, emergencies, and so on.”
Another interviewee, who was an air show performer and currently holds an FDD
position, expressed concern over civilian solo air show performers’ self-briefing. More
specifically, it was noted that:
One of the things that worries me is the guys who do not leave themselves enough
time to fully self-brief. Sometimes we get particularly on the civilian circuit, less
the military because it is regulated differently, but on the civilian circuit, you will
get a guy, particularly if he has got a very popular airplane; he might get two
shows in a day. And then he has got to fly from his home base to the first show.
Do the show, land, turn the airplane around, get airborne, and fly to the next
place.
According to that same interviewee, flying successive air shows over the weekend may
not provide enough time for an air show performer to prepare for a display, and not selfbriefing may result in them losing crucial information about the air show venue they are
planning to fly.
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Furthermore, when it came to the primary means for air show performers to
concentrate and focus before a performance, the majority of interviewees reported that
they used chair-flying techniques to prepare for their performance mentally. The
following statement by a civilian solo air show performer supported the notion when
mentioned:
That is how I prepare, and I just go away, and I am chair-flying the sequence a
number of times; I just walk up and down and go through my sequence so that I
am very clear about the into the wind and out of wind turns; which way the
maneuvers are going to be based upon whether it is on the crowd or off-crowd;
which way I need to turn to stay on the display lines.
Other air show performers, particularly demonstration teams, reported that they prefer to
stand and walk their routines, as stated by a demonstration team leader:
During the formation part of the air show, we walk together with the maneuvers
that we will practice in the air with movements of hands and walking around in a
room, repeating exactly what we will do in the air show.
Another approach for visualizing the display before or after an air show has been
identified as analyzing flight videos captured by onboard or ground cameras. According
to an interviewee with extensive civilian air show experience:
What I would do then, by then, the GoPro video was starting to become quite
common. I am an avid videographer, so I take a lot of videos, and I would watch
previous displays to focus on just getting that view that you would have in the
cockpit and just running through the imagination, that kind of sensations, and
things to see and where to look.
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One military demonstration team leader highlighted the usage of video review,
particularly with new team members, to familiarize them with the risky activity they
would be doing shortly by stating that:
We have video recordings of all the incidents and accidents that the team had in
the past, so the new pilots can see what could happen to them. So, this is the first
shock, and they realize that “what I will do in the next five or 10 years, it is
dangerous, and I have to take the advice that my instructor.” (...) So, every
briefing, every video, everything that he saw in this time is a part of preparation.
Finally, another air show performer revealed that they employ affirmations before
entering the aircraft as part of their mental preparation: “When I walk up to my airplane, I
will say, ‘Let us have today not be the day.’ So, I acknowledge the risk before, as part of
a preflight.”
Exogenous Factor Control. After interviewees acknowledged that continuous
distractions and external pressures could impact their mental performance, the theme of
exogenous factor control was developed (see Figure 45). The strategies air show
performers use to manage distractions are based on learning from previous aerobatic
competition experiences, staying focused on their task, seeking self-isolation, following
the “sacred 30 or 60-minute” rule (ICAS, 2012) by avoiding interaction with the crowd at
least 30 to 60 min before the display, adhering to the standards, and adhering to realistic
training, according to interviewees.
When considering the control of exogenous forces, one interviewee noted that: “It
is very important for me to have a 30-minute bubble before flying, depending on the
pilot, you do not need more.”
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Before the display, the same interviewee stressed the need to avoid any interaction with
the crowd prior to the display, and this was supported by the majority of the interviewees:
“It is very important that you do not go through the spectators on your way from the big
room to your jets because if you have people starting to ask for autographs, you just
worry and lose your concentration.”
Military demonstration teams use different methods to guarantee that performers
are not distracted before their display, such as delegating this job to public affairs
personnel. A member of a military demonstration team reported that:
As a Team, we have a public affairs officer that flies around with us, and his or
her job is specifically to safeguard the Team from any of those air show
distractions like autographs. In between that critical time, from the time we brief
to the time we take off, there is nothing organized, nothing scheduled for us for
that time.
On the issue of distractions, another interviewee made a clear observation: “Distractions
are the second most dangerous; failure to recognize that distraction is number one.”
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Figure 45
Exogenous Factor Control Theme, Codes, and Subcodes Map

As described below, an air show performer stated that competitive aerobatics
flying expertise was used to improve their ability to control distraction:
But I learned all this in competition flying because in competition everybody is
very careful to leave you alone. (...) I got really nervous; I did not get nervous at
an air show, but flying in a box for competition, I was always nervous, and I had
to learn all these tricks and mental how to manage my head game in competition
flying. So, I was able to take that over to air show flying.
As one interviewee noted, sterile spaces in the air show venue for air show performers are
used in various countries to avoid crowd-induced distractions and pressures:
The FAA does not allow a lot of people behind the fence where planes are. That is
great because I only want people that I know: My crew or people that are friends.
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[People] that they understand. So, there are only a few people that you want there.
You do not want any distraction.
In response to the time restrictions that air show performers face, several
interviewees stated that they follow a strict schedule on air show days. According to one
of the air show performers interviewed:
I schedule everything around my showtime. Suppose I have to sign autographs up
in the main area or the tent. In that case, I will do that early or plan to do it after I
fly, depending on what time I fly, but all those preparations are done in advance.
Distractions can lead to breakdowns of the display sequence, as mentioned during the
focus group session. An air show performer with a fast jet solo display background
observed, “If there is any hesitation about something, there is no hesitation; just go for
the safer option.”
The rest of the participants in the focus group showed consensus on this statement.
According to several interviewees, air bosses should do their utmost to ensure that
participants have enough time buffer and that no unnecessary constraints are placed on
them. According to one air show performer with vast experience as an air boss:
We do make sure that there is plenty of time between the planned slot and the
briefing. We leave him time enough in the program if he is flying more than once
to adequately prepare from one display to another or to just be by himself if that is
what he wants to do, just to tune himself up. We encourage them to go out to the
airplane early because there is no public on the flight line; all he has got to do is
walk around his airplane, think about what he is going to do, and then jump in and
go.
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Preshow Preparation. By categorizing the interviewees’ responses when
describing the essential mental and physiological preparation prior to an air show, the
preshow preparation theme emerged (see Figure 46). According to a military interviewee,
this preparation takes several days before the air display, as mentioned below:
The mental preparation, from my point of view, starts already several days before
the air show when you prepare yourself for the display when you prepare your
footprint on the surroundings, where you prepare the axes, the maps, and so on so
that you think about everything, and you are not surprised by something you have
not anticipated.
Another civilian air show performer added to the above statement by noting, “It starts
before an air show, it starts at home, and it starts when you prepare your stuff, get your
boxing supplies ready, and your ribbon cut balls: All of that is part of the mental
preparation.”
Figure 46
Preshow Preparation Theme, Codes, and Subcodes Map
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For some of the interviewees, it was essential having their airplane’s flight worthy before
the display: “Then my airplane is always ready to go, so I left it ready to go, which is
important to me to walk up to an airplane that’s ready.”
According to numerous interviewees, mentally preparing for the current wind and
weather conditions at the air show site helped them develop their profile and think about
their routine properly: “Then I prepare mindfully for the wind, which will be expected,
and I also prepare for the wind that might be different.” This was especially important
because the wind direction is essential for many air show performers, as reported below
by an interviewee:
When I go to bed at night before the show, I think about what to do; I look at the
weather. Especially as an air boss, you look at the weather and figure out what the
wind is going to be doing. I fly the same way every time; no matter how the winds
are going, it is always the same way. But the ribbon cut is wind-dependent.
The wind direction may modify the routine sequence for some air show performers, while
others may keep the same sequence regardless of the wind, although display activities
such as ribbon cutting are wind-dependent, according to two air show performers.
Finally, in terms of preshow preparation, the majority of the interviewees noted
the need to be in good physiological conditions on air show days. Ensuring adequate and
proper nutrition, which is vital, was mentioned by an experienced air show performer,
while ensuring quality sleep was suggested by another interviewee as a prerequisite for
optimal physiological condition.
Consistency. The consistency theme was based on statements referring to air
show performers’ mindful state (see Figure 47). Consistency codes included being
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methodical in conducting activities, repetition and practice, and maintaining an unbiased
opinion to criticism. According to one interviewee, “The concentration routine is key:
Briefing, strapping in, starting up the engine, taxiing, and fly.”
In another interview, consistency was highlighted by an interviewee who noted, “I
take some relaxed time, and then I go on my preparation for the flight. This preparation
sequence is always the same, always the same.” One approach that air show performers
employ to maintain consistency during preparation and flying is the usage of checklists,
confirmed by one interviewee: “I know a well-decorated air show performer that he uses
checklists; that is how he does it.” Then, another interviewee reported, “I would always
fly to a show with a personal checklist of items that I would need.”

Figure 47
Consistency Theme, Codes, and Subcodes Map
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Resetting is a safety technique that an air show performer reported as the last
defense for mitigating the risk of skipping a checklist step, even if they learned from
making a mistake: “Flow goes along with that and resetting. One time, I lost that smoke
cap because I did not reset.” The importance of consistent and realistic practice was then
highlighted by two civilian air show performers, as described below:
[In] every air show practice, I practice like an air show. So, I will do the same
things in an air show that I do when I practice, and as I said, I practice a lot. If I
did not practice very much, it would be different.
Then the second interviewee added, “But there is really only one way to do it correctly.
You practice, and you learn from your mistakes, especially when you are up high.” It
takes time and experience to develop consistency, but by repetition and by continuously
striving for excellence, one may stay vigilant throughout their career, as mentioned by an
interviewee, “I fly a sequence that’s either almost the same or exactly the same as the
sequence that I flew—since the first year I had my airplane—so it is part of my DNA.”
Resilient Safety Culture, Themes
In the semi-structured interviews and the focus group, the last set of questions
focused on resilient safety culture. The themes explored under the resilient safety culture
area of study were culture, ownership, and continuous enhancements (see Figure 48).
Due to the fact that the interviews covered a wide range of topics related to safety culture
and resilient safety culture, significant coding, memoing, and analysis were used to
narrow the number of themes in this area.
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Figure 48
Resilient Safety Culture, Themes Map

Culture. The theme of culture emerged as one of the themes during the interview
analysis (see Figure 49). The interviewees cited a variety of cultures linked to air show
operations; nonetheless, the three main types of culture codes covered in the cultural
theme were safety culture, excellence culture, disciplined culture, and the need for a
cultural transformation.

Figure 49
Culture Theme, Codes, and Subcodes Map
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The existing safety culture was described as robust by the majority of
interviewees. According to one interviewee from North America, “I think it is robust if I
can put it in one word. Here in North America, I feel it is a very robust culture.”
Another interviewee with an extensive civilian background in air shows mentioned:
I would say that the safety culture is much stronger than it used to be that air
shows are safer than they used to be. And I do not think that if you just separate
the bottom third, it is not that much less entertaining of a product.
The last statement illustrates that in recent years, changes have occurred in the air show
community, and numerous countries have established a safety culture. However, various
countries might have different approaches to sustaining a proactive safety culture. A
European air show performer reported that:
The existing safety culture varies extremely, from Germany to Romania,
Hungary, Greece, France. In some places, it is almost nonexisting, everybody is
doing what they want, and in some places, I think it is almost perfect. The
solution for a pilot is that you define your margin before, and then if there are
different margins in the safety culture at one place, you can adapt to their laws.
Another air show performer with substantial civilian air show experience corroborated
the opinions of the previous air show performer by stating that national culture influences
overall safety culture:
I think that it is very much a question of culture. The most interesting people are
the Latin culture: the Spanish, the Italians. Italians are very clear, and when you
see the way a military demonstration team is flying, they know the international
rules, but they do not seem to stick to the rules. They consider that they have a
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specific culture, which is not according to the rules. In Italy, nobody is sticking to
the rules. (...) I think where there is a great maturity in the air show attitude is in
England. I very rarely saw unacceptable things in England. (...) In the US, you
had very few performers: You have, in fact, guys that you see very often.
Otherwise, most of the time, the guys with even warbirds just do flybys, they do
not do full displays, and they do not try aerobatics. So, you have a limited number
of performers, and those guys are very disciplined. Sometimes what they do,
especially the night shows, can be at a high altitude. But they fly in a standard
way, in a standard manner, by the rules.
One interviewee described an inherent institutional culture that prevailed in the air
show community some years ago:
There was an antiauthority culture, a subculture that was a part of it that people
could participate in. There was that you get more notoriety if you behave in an
unsafe way; frankly, if you do not die, it might be a better air show. If you are
flying recklessly and you have managed not to die, then to most people, that is a
more interesting thing.
The same interviewee also acknowledged a different approach to mentoring new air show
performers from past years, adding, “People are interested in that [mentoring new pilots],
where they were not really interested in before, which was a type of approach ‘New guy;
great, welcome, try not to hit the ground.’”
Three other components of safety culture explored among interviewees were
based on Reason’s (1997) reporting culture, learning culture, and informed culture.
According to the majority of interviewees, the current reporting culture in the air show
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community is built on peer-to-peer interactions and the resolution of safety concerns due
to the relatively small and tight-knit size of the air show community. An interviewee
from Africa stated, “The community was just too small, and if you ever had a bad
attitude, you get worked out relatively quickly there.”
Another interviewee from Australia reported that:
I think that there are not that many of those pilots, particularly in my country, and
the reason is that we all know each other very well, (...) we have got a very small
community anyway, so most of us know each other.
Existing formal reporting systems in the international air show community also
differ by country. According to a North American interviewee, “There is no formal way;
it is always, if you see something, you say something.” While another air show performer
from Europe reported, “[UK] CAA points the responsibility of air show safety to the
flight safety committee, display director, and pilots.” At the same time, another air show
performer from Africa stated that:
There is not a laid down safety system on paper with forms and processes there to
follow, no. If the safety director red-cards an event because somebody made a
mistake and went too low or breached the rules, intentionally or unintentionally, a
red card is given, or the instruction to land is given, and then, of course, there
would be a fight about it, maybe or maybe not depending on if the guy accepts it.
But the feedback is instantaneous; the feedback is known by the whole fraternity;
if someone screws up, then everyone knows about it. So, this information is
floating in a melting pot that’s communal, but it is not on paper anyway.
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The same interviewee then discussed the advantages and disadvantages of having an
anonymous reporting system:
I would like to see an airline-style documentary anonymous reporting system, but
the implementation there would be quite a challenge because of the very varied
backgrounds, activities, types of aircraft, and flying. It is quite a challenge. While
maybe in an airline, the aircraft types are limited, everyone has the same goal; it is
the same company. At an air show, it is different companies, different teams, it is
very scattered, it is very fragmented, so it makes that kind of thing quite difficult.
Is it possible? Absolutely. I just do not want to give a display pilot more
paperwork to fill in. There is so much to do already.
Then, another air show performer with decades of experience as both a pilot and a
flying display director emphasized the importance of institutional memory and
experience transference in the air show community. This statement highlights the point:
I am coming to the end of my career not just as a pilot but as a display organizer
as well. And one of the legacies I might be able to leave is the thought of better
transmissivity of experience and encouraging that exchange of experiences and
ideas such that we carry things forward. I have had a great deal of fun out of my
flying and a great deal of fun out of my display life, and anybody has the
opportunity to do it or to be encouraged to have a go.
This experience could be passed on in a range of methods, but numerous
interviewees emphasized the value of their instructor not just during training but also
during the mentoring process throughout the first years of their display pilot career.
According to one interviewee:
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That was a huge tip I got from my original ACE (…); my ACE sent me this paper,
and it has the process to go through to get to that level of what is a professional air
show pilot.
Another interviewee stated that additional ways of disseminating knowledge, such as
those listed below, could be employed in the future: “There are educational tracks that
should be made available online to people that can refer if they want to be an air show
pilot.”
In terms of informed culture, two air show performers with substantial experience
in the air show industry agreed on the importance of communication and information
exchange among all stakeholders in the air show community. According to the first
interviewee:
The most important thing to safety culture is that you can communicate with each
other. The best safety advice comes from another performer in the air show that
comes up to you and says, “You know you want to move that up, or your snap
rolls are too low, or that looked really good, but you might want to think about
this.” And so, you get the experienced pilots helping the less experienced pilots
and so on.
While the second interviewee reported that:
First probably is communication; being able to talk to each other, to meet each
other, and that is typically what EAC is designed for and useful. I think
workshops at the convention can be even better than those self-presentations and
what some of the guys are doing because it is not interactive enough. I think that
workshops are more interactive, and people have to explain their problems to each
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of the parties: Regulators, organizers, performers, and even sponsors; so we
understand better each other, the problems, and the challenges of each other. That
is why communication and education are probably a way to improve the situation.
Then an interviewee who is under training to become a fast jet display pilot expressed
their appreciation of having safety workshops where air show performers can talk about
safety and share their experiences.
Interviewees also stated that there seems to be a culture of excellence prevalent in
the current air show community, which is manifested by operators with high standards.
According to one interviewee:
The system I come from was quite of a high standard. In general, what I have seen
clearly are the individuals I have flown with, the organizers I have flown under,
and the team members that I have flown with are of the highest caliber- an
incredible thing to have experienced.
Another interviewee stated that there is a continuing effort to increase standards within
the air show community, as highlighted below: “So, there is a little bit higher bar now
than there was before some years.” They added that one reason that might have affected
the reduction of accidents for the last couple of years in the air show community in their
country is, “It is way safer now than it was: Airplanes are better, there is less tolerance
for average pilots, the ACEs are held up to a standard—a lot of the ACEs that were
terrible are gone.”
Another air show performer stated that it is not only the air show performers who
have changed their minds about operational risk and the culture of excellence but also
display evaluators and ACEs who have embraced this culture of excellence and have
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raised the authorization standards by increasing the stringency requirements when giving
display authorizations to pilots to protect not only the pilots or the air show industry but
also to save the lives of those who enjoy watching air shows.
The interviewees then discussed the importance of encouraging excellence within
the air show community. One interviewee highlighted the importance of sharing all the
good practices and promoting safety and excellence across the air show performers,
organizers, and air bosses: “I think it is really important to look at what people are doing
good and why things are going well.” Another interviewee with extensive expertise in air
displays and air races over the last three decades stated:
What you seek is a positive way to move on it, not always to show the negative
side, but the positive side, how to behave in the right way. With always pointing
the negative side, this has been tried out, and we are actually at a standstill. But
we might improve it if we go to the positive way with a good example, then the
behavior could change slowly.
Another interviewee then added to that notion by stating, “There is a positive
reinforcement of something done well, or you made the right decision. I am sick of
negative stuff. I think it just reinforces the things to do better.”
Additionally, an interviewee with vast experience in air show flying emphasized
the need for a transition in the mentality of air show performers from a safety culture to a
culture of excellence, as well as the reinforcement of positive practices, as stated below:
That is maybe not a culture of safety; it is a culture of excellence and that you can
go to an air show. You can put a sticker, a patch on your flight suit that says we
are a culture of excellence.
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Numerous interviewees emphasized the importance of developing a culture of
professional culture. More specifically, several interviewees raised the issue of
normalization of deviance and its possible impact on flight safety. One of the
interviewees commented:
You need to build a culture of discipline, and you need to build a discipline within
the community that they do not accept variation; they do not accept the
normalization of deviance. You cannot have that; it has got to be stamped out as
‘if there is any deviation, will you start progressing beyond what would be
accepted? Then it is over and done with; you need to hit it until knocked off,’ so it
is about managing that.
Another interviewee noted the implications of normalization of deviance: “We are letting
this guy slide when we should not have, and he killed people at an air show; he flew into
people.” Then an experienced air show performer addressed the importance of following
the rules and implementing a zero-tolerance policy not just by air show performers but
also by air bosses. An air show performer noted the need for change in the existing safety
culture of the air show community by stating, “What has to be done is to change the
culture inside the people with constant work, not with paper; it does not work with
paper.” Another respondent added that the way to change is to adopt a “flag behavior,” as
mentioned below:
We have to change. What we need, I call it “Flag behavior.” It is like the old
times with a flag falling into an instrument, but now this “Flag” has to be in the
brain. This flag has to come and say, you do something I do not like – something
is wrong with it. This is a culture I would like to go to – that would be my aim if I
205

had changed something. Also in myself, I always tried to use this flag and advised
myself, “Oops, something wrong, one notchback – first, look what is happening.”
Some people do not have it; they think that “It is an air show now where
everybody wants to be lower.” It is human, but we have to make it clear in our
brains and change our behavior patterns.
Ownership. The ownership issue emerged through the interviewee’s discussion
of the air show community’s existing safety culture (see Figure 50). The ownership
theme provided a better understanding of the critical need for the accountability required
of air show performers, air show organizers, and the senior leadership within the entire
air show community.

Figure 50
Ownership Theme, Codes, and Subcodes Map

According to interviewees, air show performers require a type of personality that
enables professionalism and resilience throughout their careers in the air show
community. Several interviewees indicated professional discipline as the most desirable
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air show performer’s personality trait. An interviewee with extensive experience as both
an air show performer and an air boss noted:
In my country, pilots that have grown up in the military or been in the airlines
which have had structure around the way that they go flying and how they prepare
themselves to go fly, are generally the ones I had the least concern about on an air
show weekend because I know that they have structure, and they have discipline
in the way in which they prepare themselves and how they fly.
Another desirable personality trait highlighted by an interviewee was humility which can
be critical for safety-critical stand-downs to be made despite the mission-oriented urge to
proceed when the risk is highly intolerable. This statement highlights the point:
All the pilots from Blue Angels, the Thunderbirds, Snowbirds, and many display
pilots I know were very simple, humble, kind people to deal with, and I think it is
very much a matter of quality.
Then, as part of the professionalism demanded of air show performers, they must be
receptive to constructive criticism, as a civilian air show performer described:
Everything is criticized. There are like 100 things that the competition pilot gets
marked for, and he knows this before. So, to be critiqued and to fly correctly is
just like DNA. I think that is the way for a pilot to grow.
The desirable personality trait of resilience was highlighted as part of the
interviews. According to an interviewee with substantial military demonstration team
flying experience, air show performers must learn to anticipate and respond to the
unexpected, as stated below:
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A couple of years ago, I had an accident, but I always thought that something like
that could happen to me. So, I always say to other pilots that if they think that
they are exceptional ones, they should always think that they will make some
mistake, which is normal.
The ability of air show performers to adapt to unexpected situations is critical, as reported
by another air show performer.
The interviewees shared their opinions on the existing leadership in the air show
community, including the roles of air bosses, air show councils, and aviation authorities,
as well as the personal responsibility that everyone bears. According to an interviewee,
an air boss must exhibit certain traits to foster a safety culture and the effective
performance of an air show, as outlined below:
I feel that the starting point for that at every air show is the air boss. So, if the air
boss has a strict way of managing that show, the show goes smoothly. If he is
confident, if he has a good plan, if the schedule is well thought out, if he is good
at controlling the acts and keeping everything ticking along, and having a high
capacity, high-level situational awareness to know what is happening around the
show, they go on clockwork, and it works out really well…they will set the tone
for that weekend.
Another interviewee with extensive experience flying in air shows stated that
certain air bosses’ behavior toward air show performers needed to be addressed:
We go to briefings every week, every air show, and they are the same thing. If
you see the same old thing, it is like, in a way, they talk down to the performer a
lot, “Okay, do not do anything stupid.” They are always saying stuff like; do I
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really need this guy to tell me not to do anything stupid. Is it really going to make
a difference on Saturday morning? If I had not figured that out before I got here,
then I am in deep trouble. They should not be talking to me like this, and that is
somebody who has never flown an airplane down low or done aerobatics, an air
traffic controller, let us say; that is great, but do not tell me not to do anything
stupid, “Do not do nothing dumb,” is how they treat it, and they yell at you if you
ask a question, they get mad, it is terrible.
The interviewees also discussed the importance of air show councils, particularly
the EAC and ICAS. One European interviewee stated that:
What EAC should be able to promote is not to be a regulator but to educate
people; I think it is very important. Education, education, education, education
(…) it is not EAC’s role to train the guys but educate them to point out the safe
attitudes for pilots, display directors, as well as all the regulators.
A North American air show performer emphasized the essential role that ICAS played in
creating the ACE system for granting display licenses to air show performers by noting
that:
The people involved in ICAS started saying this [high accident rate] is bad for
business. Furthermore, the ACE committee got a little tougher, and it started to
get a little bit better, and then a couple of people that were notorious for being
scary died.
Additionally, the same interviewee acknowledged ICAS’s philanthropic role.
Nonetheless, one of the most crucial functions of air show councils is to organize
their annual convention, which provides significant benefits to air show performers and
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offers an opportunity for them to network and share experiences, as one experienced air
show performer highlighted.
Another interviewee stated that air show councils could do more to promote a
safety culture within the air show community by stating, “But you cannot just come out
once a year at a convention and say we are going to have a safety culture; there has to be
a lot more.”
Numerous interviewees emphasized the aviation authorities’ role in facilitating
the air show community, particularly in terms of display permit rules and processes.
According to a performer at a European air show, “If you consider the UK, Switzerland,
all Scandinavian countries, even Netherlands, there is a display authorization process.
This means that you need an evaluator to authorize you to fly a specific display.” This
was buttressed by another air show performer who added that: “The Americans try a little
bit by the ACE system with the evaluators, but often the evaluator himself is too good, or
he gives his buddy a low-level waiver.”
The same issue concerning the ACE system in North America was also brought to
the attention of several other air show performers, both Americans and people from other
countries. One air show performer from the United States claimed similar behavior from
now-defunct ACEs, “It was friends, good old boys kind of network. It was friends
ACEing friends, and that was prevalent.”
Interviewees also highlighted the critical role and function of leadership in
aviation authorities, both civilian and military, in selecting air show pilots. An air show
performer with military demo team experience, when discussing pilot’s selection criteria,
stated:
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Using our selection criteria to make sure that we are picking the top performers in
the communities that come to us. We mitigate it based on our entry requirements;
usually, one needs to have a fighter or ejection seat background. A lot of our
pilots now for the Team will come from an instructional background; so that is
one way that will mitigate that just by the selection criteria of making sure that
people have at least the most amount of high performance, high speed, ejection
seat time as possible as we can.
An interviewee with a civilian background also stated, “Talking about safety culture and
procedure starts with the recruitment of the pilots, then with the training, the good living,
sleeping conditions, and lastly, how you set up a display.”
In terms of the need for personal responsibility and leadership skills as enduring
attributes for air show performers, there seems to be a consensus among interviewees.
According to one interviewee, “Unfortunately, it comes down to the individual pilots to
execute on the day. The air show fraternity can only do so much, but it is an incredibly
high-risk environment.” Likewise, another interviewee emphasized the significance of
recognizing the potential threat of not performing safely during an air show by adding,
“The reputational and the financial damage of not doing it safely and having an outcome
where it can come back on the pilot or back on the organizer, it is just not worth it.”
It is noteworthy that the majority of interviewees confirmed that all air show
community stakeholders share duty and accountability for establishing an effective safety
culture in the air show community. According to one North American air show
performer:
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These shows over here are very structured. There is a tremendous amount of
security; it is very regimented. It is not a flying circus; everything is always
overstructured, but in the interest of the air show and the safety of the people is
very structured. So, the hot ramp is a sterile area, and everything is thought about,
how fuel trucks are going in, where they are going in. So, I think it is pretty good.
In addition, the same air show performer stated that regardless of the size of the air show,
air shows in their country follow standardized safety requirements.
Continuous Enhancements. During the interview coding process, the themes of
continuous enhancements were explored as a component of safety culture (see Figure
51). According to Hollnagel (2010), continual improvement of safety is part of a robust,
resilient safety culture.

Figure 51
Continuous Enhancements Theme, Codes, and Subcodes Map
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Several interviewees agreed that air show performers should enhance their flying
abilities as well as their behavior. A few interviewees indicated that air show performers
should consider including altitude margins to improve their flying, as one interviewee put
it:
No one talks about [altitude] margins now. We forced the conversation now, sort
of like a buzzword that everybody is accepting, but no one talked about margins
until about five years ago. And so, you got minimums, but that is your minimum
not to die. What is your margin for an air show so that you do not even think
about it, and a lot of people do not have those.
Another interviewee added, commenting:
Just because you are clear to 100 feet or 250 feet for rolling maneuvers – it does
not mean to say you have to fly at that height; it is the basic rule below which you
must not come. So why fly at it because any minor distraction could put you
underneath that height. So, it is always best to leave a little bit of a cushion. But
you do get these pilots who determinedly fly down to the limit because they can,
and they are the guys I worry about.
Another interviewee noted that air show performers should constantly consider creating
margins for error so that they can react if any distraction or unforeseen event happens
during their demonstration in the high threat low-level aerobatic environment.
Individual air show performers’ performance enhancement should be centered on
monitoring ego, according to some interviewees. A characteristic statement by one
interviewee was, “You cannot have so many pilots—with individual goals and individual
egos—egos are checked at the door.”
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At the organizational level, several interviewees cited the four pillars of the safety
management system (FAA, 2020b) as a way to improve the international air show
community further. Several interviewees expressed concern about the safety policy and
objectives component of an SMS, pointing out that overregulation exists in their nation’s
air show sectors. One interviewee with vast experience as an air show performer, air
boss, and part of their country’s regulatory team stated:
One of the offshoots, of course, of regulating or overregulating is the paperwork
that’s demanded each and every show, and pilots and paperwork do not mix well.
The danger about insisting on minutiae in the paperwork is that the guys will
gloss over it.
Then another air show performer added, “What we are doing now is just filling out more
papers and more papers, and they think it would make it better. It does not work with
paper. It has to be here [brain] and here [heart].”
At the organizational level, interviewees suggested that the air show community
might learn from other high-risk aviation activities such as Red Bull air races, as
mentioned in several interviews. One interviewee emphasized the level of safety attained
in this specific type of air race: “Almost 100 [Red Bull air] races without an accident; it is
quite an achievement. There were hairy situations, but luckily no one died.”
Then, another interviewee who has vast expertise in aerobatic competition and air
show flying noted that rigorous restrictions applied in aerobatic competitions had
improved the operational safety records. An air show performer with substantial aerobatic
competition experience explained, “In competitions, you get criticism for everything you
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do. You have to take a lot of it. Every flight is critiqued, and all other pilots are watching
you; it is very difficult.”
Another organization that was not tied to the aviation sector but rather to
motorsports, notably Formula 1 racing, was identified by an air show performer who
highlighted Formula 1’s remarkable safety records, pointing out:
When you see today’s Formula 1, which is by definition a dangerous business,
they managed to achieve an unbelievable level of safety. We saw that they use
new safety technologies, such as the halo [safety device] that they have included
on the cockpits and how they stay safe. (...) Today, they managed to get a secure
record, which is quite high if you consider the level of risk or potential risk their
activity has.
In summary, the interviewee suggested that the air show community could learn from and
emulate Formula 1’s successful safety record advancements to enhance the driver’s
protection through the use of modern technology such as the halo system (Rosalie &
Malone, 2018). Another rule regulated by Formula 1, which may be valuable to
enhancing the air show performers’ safety, is driver protection equipment, such as fireresistant coveralls and crash-resistant helmets (Mellor, 2002).
Documentary Analysis
As part of the overall research objective of data triangulation, a comprehensive
documentary analysis was performed, as suggested by Maxwell (2012). On top of the
documents analyzed in the literature review chapter, the material analyzed included
numerous international air show rules and regulations, both from civilian and military
organizations, presentations, and newsletters from the ICAS and the EAC.
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Factual Air Show Data
A descriptive analysis of documentary data of air show safety events compiled by
Barker (2003, 2020b) was conducted to provide context to the state of safety within the
air show industry. The findings suggest a total of 1,380 accidents and incidents were
recorded over the 111-year period from 1908 to 2019, which included 4,337 casualties.
The fatalities and injuries sustained during air show events are depicted in Figure 52. The
findings suggest a worrisome trend in the excessive number of spectators, passengers,
and nonparticipants killed or injured.
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Figure 52
Air Show Casualties, 1908 to 2019
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Air Show Accident and Incident Causal Factors
According to air show accident data compiled by Barker (2020a), the primary
causal factors of air show accidents and incidents were the human factor, the machine,
and then the medium. The respective involvement in accidents and incidents was 69% (n
= 949) for humans, while the machine contributed 24% (n = 325), and the medium in 7%
(n = 104) of the accidents and incidents (see Appendix K, Figure 76).
Human. The human factor contributed to air show accidents and incidents in such
a way that caused an aerial vehicle to a flight into terrain (FIT), loss of control (LOC),
midair collision (MAC), or a flight into an object (FIO). Pilot error has contributed to
accidents and incidents due to negligence, poor oversight, noncompliance with standard
operating procedures, or not operating the aircraft under the manufacturer’s instructions.
In addition, the pilot’s incapacitation during display flying may arise from either a
specific medical condition or from G-induced loss of consciousness (G-LOC). The
human contribution to accidents and incidents is shown in Appendix K, Figure 77.
Machine. Machine, comprising both mechanical and structural failure,
contributed to accidents and incidents to a total of 24% (n = 325; see Appendix K, Figure
78 and Figure 79).
Medium. One hundred four (n = 104) accidents and incidents occurred due to the
medium factor at air shows worldwide over the period 1908 to 2019, resulting in 204
casualties. Bird strikes imposed the most significant risk at 28% (n = 28; see Appendix K,
Figure 80).
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Air Show Accidents and Incidents by Event Categories
Accidents and incidents occurred in 73% (n = 1,005) of cases during the actual
event, compared to 27% (n = 375) during practices or rehearsals (see Appendix K, Figure
81).
Display Profile Maneuvering
More than 20 different maneuvers contributed to an accident or incident in an
accident database compiled by Barker (2003, 2020b). The distribution of aerobatic
maneuvers with a high propensity to trigger air show accidents or incidents with fatal
outcomes were the roll, the loop, the spin, the barrel roll, the Spilt S, and the Cuban 8
(see Figure 53).

219

Figure 53
Air Show Accidents and Incidents, Aerobatic Maneuvers

Qualitative Research Questions
Answers to the qualitative research questions are provided below based on the
validation process of the acquired qualitative data from air show observation, semistructured interviews, focus group, documentary analysis, and factual air show data.
Research Question 3
What forms of mindfulness strategies do air show performers employ preflight?
As revealed by the themes that emerged from the qualitative data analysis,
mindfulness strategies employed preflight started days before the air show. To achieve
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the consistency specified by the interviewees, preshow preparation for the required
mission planning and practice is essential.
The most profound and common method for air show performers was revealed to
be the visualization of the display flight, which began during the air show safety briefing,
was followed by the self-briefing or team briefing, and was then concluded by a chairflying or walkthrough of the display in an isolated area away from the crowd and the
media.
Numerous mindfulness practices are used throughout the air show performers’
flying training. The majority of military organizations provide simulator training to
display pilots to mentally prepare them for normal and abnormal flight scenarios.
Additionally, it was reported that a typical practice among both civilian and military air
show performers is for beginner pilots to fly in the back seat to appreciate the presence of
the crowd throughout the air show, gaining experience and strengthening their emotional
resilience. This type of training provides air show performers with the essential abilities
to manage exogenous factors such as crowd distractions and pressures, as well as time
constraints imposed by event organizers during the demonstration. Isolation from the
crowd prior to the display was also critical for air show performers to maintain their
focus and awareness both before and during the demonstration.
Additionally, air show performers utilized several methods to mentally prepare
for an air show. First, to monitor their inflight performance, air show performers
reviewed videos of their recorded flights. Then, automatically filled-in grade sheets for
individual maneuvers were used by several military single-ship demonstration teams.
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Research Question 4
How do air show performers perceive and tolerate risk preflight?
The findings suggested that as part of preflight, air show performers conduct a
thorough risk assessment of the human factor, the aircraft they are flying, display
management, and risks related to the physical and societal medium they are operating at,
as well as the mission profile they perform themselves.
Results suggest that air show performers should accept the risks that are tolerable
based on their training, experiences, and contextual complexities such as weather during
displays to ensure the safety of themselves, audiences, and the industry. It is critical that
the entire air show industry functions as a system to assist air show performers in
identifying unanticipated threats during their demonstration by providing standardized
risk assessment matrices for displays to air bosses and encouraging voluntary safety
reporting of identified or anticipated threats to aviation authorities or air show councils.
These risk assessment matrices, either on paper or by utilizing a personal
checklist, can help to detect threats related to physiological, psychological, and display
execution. Other proactive risk mitigation measures, such as the adoption of preflight
safety buffers, namely the FAA’s (2016) IMSAFE strategy, by air show performers are
strongly encouraged whenever their fitness for flight is in doubt.
The use of safety observers on the ground is highly recommended, especially for
military operators. The duties of safety observers are similar to those of a wingman in
that they provide mutual support by keeping an eye on the air show performer’s airspace,
having extra eyes on the ground, and performing an additional cross-check to verify that
they fly an exact display while entering their energy gates safely.
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The responsibility and accountability for flying display-related safety risks were
discussed, and differences between the military and civilian performers were intuitive. In
terms of the military, generally, risk tolerability and approval for higher levels of risk for
any display followed an authority hierarchy. The final decision to accept any escalated
form of risk associated with the air show is approved by a senior officer or a supervisor in
the next higher chain of command. On the contrary, risk acceptance for civilian air show
performers lies on the individual air show performer or each member of the team in case
of a formation flying activity.
Research Question 5
How do air show performers perceive and tolerate risk inflight?
In summary, the interviewees suggested that air show performers concentrate on
their display and keep on their flow as soon as they are airborne, avoiding anticipated
threats or adequately prepared to deal with the challenges associated with such threats. In
the air, the primary threats faced are distraction or disruption that may derail them from
their display flow, such as unplanned traffic entering the display area, which can lead to
immediate cessation of displays in line with safety,
If there is any aircraft malfunction during their display, air show performers
prioritize personal and audience safety by landing as soon as practicable at the nearest
suitable airfield. Threats and associated risk of the medium (environmental) factor, like
density altitude, are normally identified and mitigated through meticulous preflight
preparation and rehearsal at the air show site. That allows show performers to develop the
necessary flow and capabilities to anticipate variations in both human and aircraft
performance.
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Another inflight threat with significant risk consideration was identified as
changes in the cloud base, especially when adverse weather was approaching the air show
site. For air show performers, one means of coping with such a threat is a preflight
commitment to a low cloud base show, which allows them to maintain clearance from the
clouds while remaining in visual meteorological conditions. Then the wind was identified
as another risk factor, especially if it created turbulence in the air show site, that mainly
affected air show performers executing formation aerobatics. Some of the mitigation
strategies for these environmental threats and associated risks were to widen up the
formation and raise the minimum altitude for the display or move their display line
further away from the crowd.
Overwater display was perceived as having a considerable risk for air show
performers due to the effects on the pilot’s visual and depth perception. Again, this threat
and risk associated with it are typically identified during the planning phase before the air
show, and if it became a factor during the actual flight, air show performers would raise
their minimum display altitude to prevent any potential risk for a CFIT.
The crowd at the air show could be a distraction for air show performers,
particularly those with little expertise flying in air shows. A strategy for air show
performers to cope with the presence of a crowd while in flight is to stay focused on the
mission flow and avoid looking at the crowd during the display.
Risks related to the display’s execution and the maneuvers to be practiced are
already identified and mitigated with repetitive and correct practices before the air show.
Furthermore, in most countries, performers must define a specific profile routine to
regulators and the air boss on the day of the demonstration and adhere to that profile
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during their flying. Adhering to their schedule and avoiding any impromptu or unplanned
maneuvers inflight might be a method to accept the risk associated with the maneuvers
and the display profile.
Research Question 6
What are the most common hazardous attitudes observed among air show
performers?
Generally, there seems to be an agreement among most respondents that
currently, the number of air show performers with demonstrable hazardous attitudes
seems to be dwindling as compared to previous years. However, there are occasional
incidents and accidents that suggest that these attitudes were contributory factors. These
hazardous attitudes suggested by FAA, such as invulnerability, impulsivity, machismo,
and antiauthority, can still be identified among some performers and the data suggest that
invulnerability seems more prominent among performers. Interestingly, minimal mention
was made about the identification of resignation among air show performers.
Concealed hazardous attitudes, differentiated from those suggested by the FAA,
were also suggested by research participants. Ego as an attitude was highlighted, and
egocentric air show performers were characterized as ones who looked out for only
themselves, were apt to show off to their peers, family, and friends, and put at risk the
rest of the air show community.
Interviewees suggested that deficient technical knowledge and “stick-rudder”
skills imperiled the operational environment for both individual air show operators and
the entire community. Some of these deficient air show performers include those who
lack air show operational experiences, professional discipline, flying skills, and
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preparation before the flight. The findings also suggest that air show performers that
lacked financial resources, could accept significant risks and dangerously conduct flight
displays.
Distraction during air show performances was identified and discussed. This is the
air show performer who becomes easily distracted by emotional and family issues, the
crowd, social media and is not focused on being a safe and efficient air show performer.
Being unorganized was a concealed attitude for air show performers. Individuals
who are not methodically organized in their preparation and execution of the display,
behaving, and flying sloppy could be dangerous personalities in the air show community.
Efforts should be made by all stakeholders in the air show community to identify
and adopt mitigation strategies that will minimize the adverse effects of these listed
hazardous attitudes. Some of the effective efforts include mentoring by show instructors
and evaluators, recurrent or continuous education programs for air show performers, and
informal hangar sessions facilitated by peers. That can bring nonconforming air show
operators up to the required standards of the international air show community, or if they
do not transform, remove them from membership of the air show community.
Research Question 7
How does air show performers’ operational experience influence their perception
of resilient safety culture?
Regardless of their operational experience in the air show community, the
sustenance of resilient safety culture could be a key to high-reliability continuous
enhancement of safety in the air show industry. The interviewees intimated that the
higher the experience and exposure of an air show performer, the higher their
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expectations in terms of safety from the air show community. Experienced air show
performers expect high standards from the rest of the display pilots and the management
of air shows, specifically from the air bosses.
Highly experienced air show performers have built-in resilience skills that help
them anticipate the unexpected and manage any distractions and interruptions before and
during the display. Paradoxically, some of these highly experienced pilots, especially
those who fly solo twice or three times per day in air shows, could end up being
complacent and conduct hazardous display profiles that could harm themselves and the
entire air show community.
Inexperienced air show performers could sometimes overestimate their skills and
capabilities, which is an intrinsic threat with safety risk (Dunning, 2011), and in the strive
to ensure a culture of excellence and resilience, it is these novices air show performers
must be mentored by more experienced and safety-conscious display performers.
Experienced, respected, and safety-conscious mentors should be willing to share their
experiences and learning outcomes accrued over the years in the air show display
business with others to engender the transfer and retention of organizational knowledge.
Irrespective of the level of air show flying experience, the findings suggested that
most air show performers are inclined to accept and embrace a resilient safety culture that
emphasizes best practices across the international air show community. It will be
expedient for the more experienced air show performers with leadership or supervisory
roles such as instructors, mentors, subject matter experts, and evaluators to spearhead the
culture of proactive and resilient safety in the air show community.
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Data Triangulation Using Correlation Heatmaps
The first research question focuses on the strength of relationships between
resilient safety culture, safety risk parameters, and mindfulness in the international air
show community. The five qualitative research questions focused on air show
performers’ mindfulness strategies, risk perceptions and tolerance pre and inflight,
observed hazardous attitudes, and perceptions within a resilient safety culture.
A correlation heatmap (see Figure 54) visualized the comprehensive association
of the research variables that were derived after the quantitative and qualitative data had
been triangulated into a mixed data set, generating acceptable and relevant inferences in
mixed-methods studies (Younas et al., 2021). The 30 correlations between the research
variables were displayed as a matrix of color tiles, where each tile represented a
correlation derived by the quantitative (Quant), qualitative (Qual.), and final mixed result
(Mix.) resulted after the data triangulation/synthesis (Heyvaert et al., 2011; Younas et al.,
2021).
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Figure 54
Correlation Heatmap: Joint Display of Findings for Research Variables, Total
Triangulated Association, Pre-Data Analysis
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To ensure the correlation heatmap was intuitive to the reader, vivid colors were
selected, as suggested by Wilke (2019). Light grey color represented that there was no
correlation among a set of two variables; red color represented a negative correlation
among a set of two variables; green color represented a positive correlation among a set
of two variables.
The correlation heatmap shown in Figure 55 depicts the comprehensive
association of the research variables that were derived after the quantitative and
qualitative data had been triangulated into a mixed data set.
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Figure 55
Correlation Heatmap: Joint Display of Findings for Research Variables, Total
Triangulated Association
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Every research variable is discussed here as a combination of data from the two
different types of research questions: Quantitative (Research Question 1) and qualitative
(Research Questions 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7).
Risk Perception
The quantitative findings show that risk perception had no significant predictive
relationship with resilient safety culture. Moreover, the quantitative results indicate a
moderate positive correlation between risk perception and risk tolerance, hazardous
attitudes, and mindfulness. Thus, when respondents’ risk perception increases, they
become more risk-averse, and their hazardous behaviors gradually increase. This finding
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could be the result of complacency introduced by overconfidence in past outstanding
performances (Dekker & Woods, 2010).
The qualitative findings, on the other hand, reveal that air show performers’ risk
perception has a negative relationship with risk tolerance and hazardous attitudes. The
findings support previous research that found a negative relationship between risk
perceptions and higher risk-taking behaviors (Drinkwater & Molesworth, 2010; Ji et
al., 2011; Joseph & Reddy, 2013; You et al., 2013).
Furthermore, the qualitative findings reveal a favorable association between risk
perception, mindfulness, and resilient safety culture, confirming the observation that
insufficient risk assessment can lead to poor decision-making, culminating in
catastrophic aircraft accidents (AAIB, 2017).
Risk Tolerance
The quantitative findings show that risk tolerance had a significant predictive
relationship with mindfulness among respondents. Moreover, the quantitative results
indicate a significant positive correlation between risk tolerance and hazardous attitudes,
as well as risk perception.
The qualitative findings, on the other hand, reveal a negative relationship between
risk tolerance, mindfulness, and resilient safety culture among the interviewees. In
addition, risk tolerance is positively connected to hazardous attitudes, contradicting
Hunter’s (2002) claim that there is no substantial relationship between risk tolerance and
aviation incidents related to hazardous attitudes.
Even though there has been a strong focus on safety in the air show community in
the past years, unfortunately, fatal accidents still happen, and people lose their lives every
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year (Barker, 2020a). The high level of risk involved in air show flying requires an
appropriate and relevant level of professionalism and risk management at all levels of
administration, from the aviation authorities to the air show organizers, air bosses, and
ultimately the air show performers themselves. As suggested by several interviewees, in
line with the literature (Barker, 2020a; Chen & Chen, 2014; Schopf et al., 2021), air
bosses have the main responsibility to demonstrate effective leadership in managing risks
during the planning and execution phase of an aerial event, eliminating the likelihood and
severity of any potential risks, while minimizing or zeroing the adverse effects to the
public and to the air show industry itself.
Hazardous Attitudes
The quantitative findings show that hazardous attitudes have a significant
predictive relationship with resilient safety culture among respondents. Also, mindfulness
as a mediator improves the total effect of hazardous attitudes on resilient safety culture.
Lastly, the quantitative results indicate a significant positive correlation between
hazardous attitudes and both risk perception and tolerance, as well as mindfulness.
The qualitative findings reveal that the hazardous attitudes of air show performers
are associated with a negative relationship with risk perception, mindfulness, and resilient
safety culture, confirming previous research that suggests that hazardous attitudes
contribute to poor pilot decision-making (Hunter, 2005; Ji et al., 2011).
Furthermore, hazardous attitudes are found to be positively related to risk
tolerance, confirming the findings of Martinussen and Hunter (2018), who state that
hazardous attitudes are one of the numerous psychological constructs identified as a
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potential factor influencing decision-making and impacting the likelihood of being
involved in an accident.
The results reveal that display pilots may behave dangerously without any prior
signs of hazardous attitudes, which supports Papadakis’ (2008) suggestion that display
pilots may act unsafely due to latent factors without any earlier signals of hazardous
attitudes. Moreover, the findings of the interviews reveal hazardous attitudes that may
explain the differences in attitudes among air show performers and highlight endogenous
personality traits, such as egotism.
Mindfulness
The quantitative findings show that mindfulness has significant predictive power
for risk perception, risk tolerance, resilient safety culture, and hazardous attitudes among
respondents. Also, mindfulness as a mediator improves the total effect of hazardous
attitudes, risk perception, and risk tolerance on resilient safety culture.
The qualitative findings indicate that the mindfulness of air show performers is
negatively associated with risk tolerance and hazardous attitudes. Additionally,
mindfulness is associated with more favorable risk perception and resilient safety culture.
Mindfulness strategies may aid air show performers in decreasing their risk
tolerance, which is consistent with the suggestion of Meland et al. (2015) that the effects
of mindfulness training on elite individuals working in high-performance environments
demonstrate a more resilient safety culture and a greater appreciation for lower levels of
risk.
Additionally, the findings corroborate previous research indicating that
mindfulness promotes effective decision-making (Gautam & Mathur, 2018) and has a
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negative correlation with pilot anxiety (Li et al., 2020). Additionally, the primary
methods for improving mindfulness mentioned by interviewees corroborate the literature,
which suggests that air show performers mentally prepare for their performance by using
visualization techniques and adhering to the “30-minute bubble” rule (Barker, 2020a) or
the “sacred 60-minute” policy (Hollowell, 2012). Nonetheless, each air show performer
stated that they employ their unique methods of mindfulness that are tailored to their own
needs.
Furthermore, interviewees reported that they mentally prepare for their flying
display by establishing go-no-go weather criteria, energy gates, and decision-making
nodes in case of an emergency. These methods concur with Martinussen and Hunter’s
(2018, p. 305) suggestion that another generalized approach to improving aeronautical
decision making would be to create packages of predetermined decisions for various
situations that may be encountered; these packages would include specific triggers for
action.
Resilient Safety Culture
The quantitative findings show that resilient safety culture has a significant
predictive relationship with hazardous attitudes and mindfulness and a non-significant
predictive relationship with risk perception among respondents. Also, mindfulness as a
mediator significantly improved the total effect of hazardous attitudes on resilient safety
culture.
The qualitative findings indicate that the resilient safety culture of air show
performers has a negative correlation with risk tolerance and hazardous attitudes.
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Additionally, resilient safety culture is associated with increased risk perception and
mindfulness.
The research findings suggest that the air show community may have the desired
attributes of resilient safety culture, as suggested earlier by Akselsson et al. (2009), by
emphasizing a learning culture and striving for resilience. The community has developed
and utilizes forward feed control such as training and effective standard operating
procedures to keep processes within safe limits. Moreover, the international air show
community strives for efficiency in safety management and the integration of safety as a
core business function. Finally, the findings suggest a mindful community that is
cognizant of the need for high reliability, in line with the recommendations of Weick and
Sutcliffe (2001, 2009).
Furthermore, the findings confirm that the air show industry is aware of cultural
gaps and works to settle them - it has a systematic approach to identifying and controlling
system vulnerabilities by applying effective risk management and controls. Furthermore,
the air show industry is actively emulating other HROs, such as space organizations
(Casler, 2014), in terms of safety culture development and risk management efficacy for
complex operations (ICAS, 2016). In addition, it emphasizes efficient change
management and designs for safety, and it employs a continuous improvement
philosophy (Adjekum & Fernandez-Tous, 2020b; Stolzer & Goglia, 2016; Teske &
Adjekum, 2022).
The findings also corroborate Hollnagel’s (2014) observation that even when
incidents do occur, the air show community’s resilient safety culture allows the
organization to adapt, recover, and operate efficiently within the margins of safety. Thus,
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enhancing a strong safety culture with a proactive resilient safety culture could assist an
organization not only in improving its safety performance but also recovering from an
upheaval (Shirali et al., 2016). Finally, the findings further support previous research
(Adjekum & Fernandez-Tous, 2020b; Heese et al., 2014; Hollnagel, 2014; Hollnagel et
al., 2011; Reason, 2016), which advocate for the importance of a resilient safety culture
in fostering an organizational safety culture that promotes safe practices.
Demographics Analysis
The second research question examined the relationships between resilient safety
culture, safety risk parameters, and mindfulness in the international air show community
using air show flying experience, military or civilian flying experience, age, educational
background, and marital status as demographic variables.
A correlation heatmap (Figure 56) visualized the comprehensive association of
the research variables with the demographic groups that were derived after the
quantitative and qualitative data had been triangulated into a mixed data set, generating
acceptable and relevant inferences in mixed-methods studies (Younas et al., 2021). The
75 correlations between the research variables with the demographic groups were
displayed as a matrix of color tiles, where each tile represented one correlation coefficient
derived by the quantitative (Quant), qualitative (Qual.), and final mixed result (Mix.)
resulted after the data triangulation/synthesis (Heyvaert et al., 2011; Younas et al., 2021).
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Figure 56
Correlation Heatmap: Joint Display of Findings for Research Variables With the
Demographic Groups, Total Triangulated Association, Pre-Data Analysis
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To ensure the correlation heatmap was intuitive to the reader, vivid colors were
selected, as suggested by Wilke (2019). Light grey color represented that there was no
correlation among a set of two variables; red color represented a negative correlation
among a set of two variables; green color represented a positive correlation among a set
of two variables.
After triangulating the quantitative and qualitative data into a mixed data set, a
correlation heatmap (see Figure 57) was created that depicts a comprehensive association
of the research variables with the demographic groups.
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Figure 57
Correlation Heatmap: Joint Display of Findings for Research Variables With the
Demographic Groups, Total Triangulated Association
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Air Show Flying Experience
The findings indicate that air show flying experience is positively correlated with
risk perception, mindfulness, and resilient safety culture, confirming previous research
indicating that experience, whether flying or performing other acts, has a definite positive
association with risk perception (Crundall et al., 2013; Ferraro et al., 2015; Joseph &
Reddy, 2013; Winter et al., 2019; You et al., 2013).
More specifically, the findings suggest that the more flying experience these
airshow pilots have, the more training they may have gained and the more understanding
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they could have of the airplane’s dynamics and energy management. A display pilot
performing their first air show has a limited understanding of unexpected risks; their risk
perception is entirely focused on the risks they have acquired through studying their
training manuals, via lessons learned shared by their mentors and instructors, and during
their limited exposure to low-level aerobatic environments.
These novice performers may still be unaware of additional hazards and risks that
have played a role in previous air show mishaps; as Bob Hoover (Barker, 2020b) stated,
“There are no new accidents, only new pilots causing old accidents.”
Therefore, continuous education via mentoring may help air show performers
compensate for their experience gaps, as suggested by ICAS (2018) and the UK CAA
(2022). Nonetheless, the findings indicate that air show flying experience is negatively
correlated with risk tolerance and hazardous attitudes, supporting Barker’s (2003, 2020a)
assertion that, in contrast to general aviation, air show performers’ flying experience is
not a guarantee of an uneventful flying display.
Additionally, several accident investigations have reported that highly
experienced air show performers, particularly when performing solo, may push
themselves and the aircraft to the limits, leaving no margin for error (AAIB, 2017;
NTSB, 2012).
Military or Civilian Flying Experience
This study’s findings reveal no significant relationship between military or
civilian background and risk perception, risk tolerance, hazardous attitudes, or
mindfulness. Nonetheless, the qualitative data reveal a favorable association between
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resilient safety cultures and air show performers with a military flying experience, owing
to the introduction of SMS programs, the size of the organizations, and the control
provided at all levels of risk management.
This finding may also be confirmed by Barker’s (2020a) statistical data, which
indicate a larger number of air show accidents between 2000 and 2020 involving civilian
air show performers (n = 354) as opposed to military air show performers (n = 169).
Substantial aviation experience is required for military display pilots. Among the
requirements are having previous experience in ejection seat or a fast jet, G-lab training,
upset recovery training, operational risk management, and crew resource management
courses, as well as significant aerobatic training over several years and in a variety of
aircraft types. On the contrary, the standards for becoming an air show performer for a
civilian pilot are less stringent.
Furthermore, military air show performers are part of structured organizations,
which are resourceful, and have integrated SMS programs. The majority of the military
organizations have already adopted safety management systems, with defined processes
for safety policies, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion.
Especially, operational risk assessment matrices, as a strategy for detecting hazards and
risks before an air show, have been implemented with clearly identified risks and levels
of accountability to accept risks before an air show.
Nevertheless, there is a dichotomy in the utility of safety risk matrices between
military and civilian air show performers. According to the majority of civilian air show
performers who participated in semi-structured interviews, risk assessment matrices do
not provide value to the air show performer because they are viewed as a means of a
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bureaucratic process. Given that the bulk of air show performers fly solo and are a oneperson organization responsible for everything from administration to display training
and aircraft maintenance, they may view an SMS or risk matrix as unnecessary
paperwork that distracts them from accomplishing their objective. However, given the
scalability of SMS, as recommended by the FAA (2020b), civilian air show performers
might select specific sections of an SMS and tailor them to their nature of operations,
ultimately enhancing the safety of their air displays.
Age
Age was positively associated with risk perception, mindfulness, and resilient
safety culture, according to the data analysis. However, the data indicate a negative
correlation between age and hazardous attitudes and risk tolerance, correlating with
previous research (Gibson et al., 2013; Hallahan et al., 2004), suggesting that age has an
inverse relationship with risk tolerance.
The older a pilot becomes, the more mature he or she becomes in most aspects of
life, and the more aware they become of the inherent daily risks they face, not just in
flying but in life in general. As a result, they may be willing to accept less risk.
However, physiological factors of age, for example, heart diseases, which are
addressed in medical certification for pilots (NTSB, 2012), could also affect air show
performers’ physiological state and overall risk assessment; yet the analysis of this risk
factor was beyond the scope of this study.
Educational Background
The findings establish a positive correlation between educational background and
risk perception, mindfulness, and resilient safety culture. Moreover, findings indicate a
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negative correlation between educational background and hazardous attitudes and risk
tolerance, corroborating Chionis and Karanikas’ (2018) argument that postgraduate
aviation professionals are less risk-averse than their colleagues with a bachelor’s degree
or less.
Air show performers with a master's degree or higher have been exposed to a
higher level of education and knowledge, which may contribute not only to a better
understanding of risk assessment processes and theoretical implications of safety but also
provides them with the analogous maturity to understand accountability against aviation
authorities, but most importantly, the air show community itself.
Nevertheless, this does not imply that air show performers with lower education
levels are not acceptable in the air community because they may be more risk-averse;
rather, pilots with lower educational backgrounds may require more attention from
regulators, mentors, and the rest of their peers to ensure that they have the appropriate
risk management skills.
Extra educational activities at air show conventions, such as workshops, seminars,
or webinars, as well as mentoring from more experienced display pilots, could help these
pilots with less educational background.
Marital Status
The findings suggest that marital status and specifically being married, correlates
positively with risk perception. By contrast, marital status negatively correlates with
hazardous attitudes, mindfulness, and risk tolerance, consistent with literature findings
(Hallahan et al., 2004; Aumeboonsuke & Caplanova, 2021) that indicate marital status as
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a key factor affecting risk tolerance scores. Finally, no association was discovered
between marital status and resilient safety culture.
Considering the correlation of marital status with risk factors, mindfulness, and
hazardous attitudes, emphasis should be placed on mental preparedness training
(Andersen et al., 2016) for air show performers whose marital status may be a factor
(Williams et al., 2010).
Consequently, lessons learned from air show performers who were preoccupied
with family concerns might be discussed during the annual ICAS and EAC air show
safety workshops, and mitigation methods could be provided. Also, based on the
findings, groups consisting of not married, i.e., single, air show performers, could be
created to provide support in lowering their risk tolerance and enhancing their risk
perception (Nosita et al., 2020).
Married pilots’ preoccupation with family issues may affect their mindfulness and
increase their risk tolerance. Even though married airshow performers may have a more
stable life than single performers, they may be preoccupied with issues involving family
members, finances, and other concerns that could distract them preflight. It's worth noting
that the ICAS risk assessment matrix (Appendix J, Figure 73) already includes as a risk
criterion for air show performers to report how many months until they're expecting a
child. This demonstrates that the air show community has already identified and
addressed family-related risk factors.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
A mixed-methods approach with integrated data triangulation was used to
assess the strength of relationships between operational risk factors, hazardous
attitude, and resilient safety culture when mediated by mindfulness in the
international air show community. The quantitative approach (n = 156) comprised an
anonymous online survey of the perceptions of respondents from the international air
show community.
The qualitative approach included semi-structured interviews (n = 12) with a
sample of SMEs in the air show community, a focus-group session (n = 8) with a
sample of air show performers, a field observation at an air show event, and a
documents analysis of historical air show safety events data.
After the collected data were triangulated, the findings suggested that resilient
safety culture is significantly correlated with risk perception and mindfulness;
mindfulness was strongly correlated to risk perception, meaning that the more
someone is present in the air show activity, the more they can perceive potential
risks.
Additionally, findings suggested that hazardous attitudes are strongly
correlated with risk tolerance for the air show performers, meaning that the more
someone is susceptible to a hazardous attitude, they are willing to tolerate higher risk
during the air show. Mindfulness significantly mediated the relationship between
hazardous attitudes, risk perception, risk tolerance, and resilient safety culture.
In terms of the demographic groups examined in the current study, it was
found that air show experience enhances risk perception, mindfulness, and the
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overall resilient safety culture. Military air show background was strongly correlated
with resilient safety culture perception, mindfulness, and a negative correlation to
hazardous attitudes.
The demographic variables age and educational background strongly
correlated with risk perception, mindfulness, and the overall resilient safety culture.
Lastly, being married had a positive correlation with risk perception and a negative
correlation with risk tolerance, mindfulness, and hazardous attitudes.
This study was conducted during a challenging period for the international air
show community due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The results of this study provided
a data-driven and validated measurement model to assess the relationships between
the study variables in the international air show community while adding to the
current paucity of literature about this sector of the aviation community.
Theoretical and practical implications from this study could shift the
paradigm of a resilient safety culture that promotes safety excellence, organizational
mindfulness, continuous improvements of safety, sharing of lessons learned, and
retention of knowledge.
The study findings provide effective tools for threat identifications and safety
risk controls during air show displays by facilitating an operational environment
where risk is reduced to a level that is low as practicable (ALARP), as suggested by
the ICAO’s safety management manual (ICAO, 2018).
Theoretical Implications
The findings of this study provide a novel theoretical foundation for assessing the
strength of relationships between risk perceptions, risk tolerance, hazardous attitudes,
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mindfulness, and resilient safety culture in the international air show community.
Furthermore, air bosses should play an essential role in promoting safety and ensuring
effective risk management.
Given their crucial position in advising the air show performers and managing the
entire air show, air bosses should pay special attention to promoting safety. Because
passive safety measures, such as people not following safety standards, have been
demonstrated to have negative impacts, a proactive approach to safety should be
considered (Olsen et al., 2021).
The findings recognize the significance of a resilient safety culture in the air show
community that supports excellence, best practices, and continuous enhancements. The
high degree of standards imposed in recent years demonstrates that a culture of
excellence might be adopted by the air show community, as safety appears to be assured.
The findings of this study can also be utilized as a theoretical baseline to assess
the study variables for other high-performance, high-risk activities, such as military
combat flying, aerial vehicle testing, and other high-performance activity participants
with a high level of risk and reward, such as Formula 1 drivers, MotoGP drivers, solo
climbers, and circus performers, could learn strategies to enhance their performance.
Lastly, findings from this study could provide a theoretical foundation to further
study the relationships between resilient safety culture, mindfulness strategies, risk
management, and operational performance among personnel involved in a task that
requires high reliability, such as surgeons, air-traffic operators, and nuclear plant
operators.
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Practical Implications
The study’s findings could serve as a basis and blueprint for new training
programs and could be implemented into the certification and currency courses for air
show performers and air bosses. First, as Hunter (2002, p. 21) suggests, risk recognition
training might be included in the training of air show performers in an attempt to improve
a pilot’s risk tolerance. Then, as Meland et al.(2015) recommended, mindfulness training
or briefings could be included in air show performers’ training, seminars, re-currencies,
or display assessments to foster a more robust, resilient safety culture and tolerance for
lower levels of risk.
Mindfulness training also could be beneficial for pilots and air bosses to control
their egos by completing self-reflection activities and recognizing that they are part of the
overall air show community, and as such, all their actions should be taken in respect to
the lives of others. Additionally, Gautam and Mathur’s (2020) recommendation to
incorporate ego resiliency training into pilot training might be applied similarly to air
show performers’ training to assist in predicting and reducing hazardous attitudes, such
as egocentric, impulsive, and macho attitudes.
Operating in a sterile and completely safe environment precludes the knowledge
and experience received when frequently exposed to unstable operating conditions
(Weick, 1987). Therefore, realistic training should simulate random perturbations during
the display pilot’s flight preparation.
Overall, air show performers and air bosses may require a more practical
approach to safety education, which may be achieved if more emphasis is placed on
personnel-centric safety education, as proposed by Klockner et al. (2021). Methods to
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promote best practices for safety and excellence include, but are not limited to,
workshops, webinars, safety surveys, anonymous reporting systems with the engagement
of aviation authorities, and air show councils.
The importance of air bosses was highlighted in the study’s findings. Air bosses
serve as risk management intermediaries in air shows, bridging the gap between the
regulators and the air show performers (see Figure 58). As such, they are held
accountable for the safe execution of an air show. Overall, air bosses set the tone of the
air show during the display safety briefing, and they must maintain the rhythm of the air
show choreography until the end of the event.

Figure 58
Levels of Risk Management in Air Shows
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Performer

• Air Boss

• Regulator
• Display Evaluator/
ACE
• Event Organizer
• ICAS, EAC

In addition, the air show community could use a “dynamic risk assessment,”
which might include physiological information, such as the air show performer’s heart
rate, as a stress signal supplied to the air boss. This form of bio-data could help the air
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boss detect any unusual stress that the pilot is experiencing and adjust for the risk of the
pilot’s incapacitation.
Marital status was identified as a factor impacting air show performers’ risk
tolerance. Therefore, during the yearly conventions of ICAS and EAC, as well as the
symposiums arranged by BADA and FSA for air show performers and air bosses, lessons
learned from air show performers who were preoccupied with family concerns might be
discussed, and then mitigation methods could be proposed.
Additionally, the ICAS risk assessment worksheet could be supplemented with
the air show performer’s marital status, with an appropriate weighting on the overall risk
score. Also, based on the findings, groups consisting of not married, i.e., single, air show
performers could be created to provide support in controlling their risk tolerance and
enhancing their risk perception.
Finally, a widely agreed-upon risk matrix might aid in the adoption of an air show
risk level (ASRL), an indicator that could be included in the pilots’ briefing and other
services involved in the event’s air operations. The air show risk level might be based on
the same principles as the pilots’ weather categories, i.e., VFR, SVFR, and IFR; it could
be used to make judgments on who is flying, what type of profile, and so on, depending
on the pilot’s experience, qualifications, and weather circumstances, i.e., wind, sun,
visibility, clouds, and density altitude. Such a widely recognized risk indicator may
benefit air show performers since it provides a centralized management technique to the
air boss, who has a holistic situational awareness of the air show’s execution.
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Limitations
The survey was designed to elicit individuals’ attitudes and beliefs, which makes
them more susceptible to response bias, self-serving bias, framing effects, response bias,
and social desirability bias (Grimm, 2010). It is believed that the responses accurately
reflect what these individuals thought at the time and place they provided them.
Additionally, researcher bias may have influenced the interpretation of the
findings due to the researcher’s active involvement in the air show community in a
variety of leadership roles. Therefore, to minimize the researcher-induced bias and
subjectivity, a semi-structured question format was used, and after completing the
qualitative data collection, an independent audit of codes and transcripts was done by an
air show SME and a doctoral advisory committee using selected portions of the interview
and focus group sessions transcripts. Member checking of codes and themes was also
used to minimize potential researcher’s biases in the findings.
Due to the study’s international focus on the air show community, language
barriers and national culture may have limited or skewed participant responses, given the
study’s enrollment of 22 different nationalities, the majority of which did not have
English as the first language. There is the possibility that some respondents may have
challenges with comprehending scale items that were in English but had a Qualtrics
option for rudimentary translation into other languages. Also, during an interview
session, a facilitator who spoke English and Spanish fluently assisted the researcher in
interpreting questions posed to the interviewee and responses provided by the
interviewee.
Iterative modification of the conceptual measurement model for this study was
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used to obtain a good fit for estimating the strengths of relationships between the
constructs, culminating in a final measurement model that adequately depicts the
constructs under consideration.
The concept of resilient safety culture is subjective and quantified through
the respondents’ perceptions. Neither the instrument nor the study made distinctions
between different levels of air show operational expertise or between different
countries, as the majority of international air shows follow common basic flight
safety guidelines.
Additionally, Charness et al. (2019) assert that risk attitude assessments are
unrelated to risk-taking in the field, doubting commonly used methodologies for
assessing actual risk preferences. Researchers conclude that, while the external validity
of risk attitude assessments is maintained in closely related contexts, it may be
jeopardized in more remote situations.
While the researcher identified a purposeful sample of respondents from the
international air show community, there were still difficulties with the survey’s unequal
sample sizes. This resulted in greater representations of respondents from the U.S and
U.K as compared to South Africa and the U.A.E.
The effect of national culture on perceptions when dealing with such an unequal
sample must be considered. It is worth noting that the researcher attempted to contact
several air show performers through various methods or in person, but the response rate
to emails or messages requesting participation in the online survey or semi-structured
interviews was weak.
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Moreover, it was impossible to elicit responses from respondents living in
countries with a negligible air show community. Therefore, the study’s scope was limited
to the countries and air show communities where respondents could participate.
Additionally, military demonstration teams and performers, in particular, were unable to
interact or were restricted from participating in this study due to the clearances required
from their military top hierarchy. Moreover, most of the air show performers in India and
the Far East were unable to participate in this study due to a lack of direct communication
with them by the researcher.
Additionally, the contemporaneous triangulation approach was confined to a
snapshot of resilient safety culture perceptions during the study period and may not
reflect the long-term trend. The dynamic nature of flight operations and the occurrence
of a safety-related event in real-time throughout the study period may have affected
respondents’ assessments.
Furthermore, the survey data reflect a specific snapshot of the air show
community’s status. Thus, the researcher postulated that because of the survey’s timing,
i.e., when the world is still coping with the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, there
may be a bias in air show performers’ perceptions of safety, which may distort
participants’ responses.
First, air shows have been operationally scaled back during the COVID-19
pandemic, with the majority of the large air shows being canceled or postponed during
the 2020 and 2021 display seasons while this study was being conducted. Air displays,
as well as other outdoor gatherings classified as mass gatherings, were restricted during
the COVID-19 pandemic by various government policies aimed at reducing the virus’s
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impact on health services and preserving lives (Flightline UK, 2020).
As a result, air show performers’ interest in flying activities such as airshows
may have been adversely affected, which can also have an impact on their safety
perceptions. It may also have resulted in the sense of detachment of some individual
airshow pilots from the air show community. Such a scenario can have an effect on
perceptions and invariably influence responses in this research.
According to some extant research, the COVID-19 pandemic’s social isolation
has had an effect on mental health, social participation, life satisfaction, and lifestyle
choices (Ammar et al., 2020, 2021). Air show performers and air bosses may have been
influenced by this upheaval as well, resulting in distancing themselves and declining to
participate in the study.
In addition, none of the interviewees were present in person due to COVID-19
travel constraints. In remote communication via online interviews, the inability to use
body language may have also kept respondents from connecting completely with the
researcher (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).
Lastly, some of the scales incorporated into the final survey instrument were
designed and validated using general aviation pilots. Even though the instrument items
were modified to capture perceptual trends and nuances of the air show community, it is
possible that such modifications may have limited survey participants’ clear
understanding of the items.
Recommendations for Future Study
This study has established a benchmark for assessing the relationships
between risk perceptions, risk tolerance, mindfulness, and resilient safety culture in
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the international air show community. Future research may be based on a
longitudinal study that will examine how the predictive capabilities of exogenous
variables such as risk perception, risk tolerance, and hazardous attitudes affect
resilient safety culture over time by sampling a cohort of international air show
performers who perform individually as well as those who perform as part of a
demonstration team.
Another possible area of study would be a comparative evaluation of air
show performers at various levels of experience to get insight into some trends and
predictive relationships between exogenous variables, safety behavior, and safetyrelated occurrences.
Additionally, a comparative examination of air show performers’ resilient
safety culture based on nationality can be conducted to gain insight into the strength
of relationships between exogenous variables studied in this research and resilient
safety culture. When analyzing the perceptions of air show performers from different
nations, a survey that employs photos instead of text to describe the scale items
could be used to limit any language barrier constraints (Leutner et al., 2017).
A study based on the methods applied by Saposnik and Johnston (2014) that
uses game concepts to assess risk tolerance, such as poker, may also be tested. This
type of research could benefit the annual training or recurrence of air show
performers and air bosses.
Based on the current study’s findings and suggested by Adjekum (2014), the
lack of SMS implementation in the majority of air show entities presents an
opportunity for formal adoption and implementation of SMS by various air show
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associations and event organizers to further improve the safety culture.
Then, as part of the continual development of the international air show
community’s resilient safety culture, a study could be conducted to investigate the
efficacy of automatically filled-in maneuver evaluation reports based on aerobatics
competition standard rules of critique (Commission Internationale de Voltige
Arienne, 2019), as a method used by air show performers to assess their inflight
performance and their resilient safety skills. Having measurable safety performance
indicators could raise pilots’ awareness and encourage them to strive for excellence.
Furthermore, a quasi-experiment that investigates the physiological effects of
high altitudes, accompanied by minimal oxygen saturation, provides valuable insight
into its effect on air show performers’ cognitive ability and decision-making skills
and become a performance indicator for resilience. A comparable investigation may
examine air show performers’ cognitive performance during low-level aerobatic
flight using biometrics such as heart rate variability (Luft et al., 2009).
Air show performers are exposed to distractions and interruptions during their
display. Another quasi-experiment could examine methods to monitor air show
pilot's visual attention during inflight distractions and interruptions (Loukopoulos et
al., 2001, 2016) with the use of sensors such as eye-tracking devices (Chen et al.,
2019; Ziv, 2016) and virtual reality (VR) flight simulation technology (Harris et al.,
2022).
Air show performers’ risk tolerance was found to be influenced by their
marital status. In order to further examine other marital status-related variables,
additional studies could be conducted to elucidate a relationship between parental
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status and risk tolerance of air show performers (Nosita et al., 2020).
Also, financial pressures were identified as a factor affecting the risk
tolerance and operational decision-making of air show performers. Thus, additional
research is recommended to elaborate on the relationship between financial pressures
and air show performers’ risk tolerance and decision making (Aalberg et al., 2020;
Causse et al., 2011).
Finally, future research could help the air show community collect further
data from scientific studies. Therefore, an ongoing effort is needed to promote flight
safety-related surveys administered in the air show community to enhance the
community’s resilient safety culture and foster an evidence-based learning culture.
Data-driven research on aviation safety, such as the current study, will enable
the air show leadership to make evidence-based decisions vital for continuous
monitoring and improvements of operational safety in the industry to meet the
desired benchmark of zero air show accident vision espoused by Des Barker.
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APPENDIX A. UND’s Institutional Review Board Approval
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APPENDIX B. Survey Instrument Outline
D–1. Age

o 18 - 24– (1)
o 25 - 34 (2)
o 35 - 44 (3)
o 45 - 54 (4)
o 55 - 64 (5)
o 65 or older `6)

D.2. Gender

o Male (1)
o Female (2)

D.3. Country of origin

o Canada (1)
o France (2)
o United Kingdom (3)
o United States (4)
o Other (Please specify) (5)

D.4. Marital status

o Single (1)
o Married (2)
o Widowed (3)
o Divorced (4)
o Separated (5)
o Registered partnership (6)
o Prefer not to answer (7)
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D.5. Educational background

o High School (1)
o Bachelor’s Degree (2)
o Master’s Degree (3)
o PhD or higher (4)

D.6. Current role in the air show community

o Air show performer (1)
o Air boss (2)
o Other (Please specify) (3)

D.7. Total air show flying experience

o < 1 year (1)
o 1-3 years (2)
o 4-6 years (3)
o 7-10 years (4)
o 10+ years (5)

D.8. Aerobatics background

o Civilian (1)
o Military (2)
o None (3)
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HA. Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about
yourself:

I am a display pilot due
entirely to my hard work and
ability.
(1)
I can learn any flying skill if I
put my mind to it.
(2)
I really hate being delayed on
the ground when I am ready
for the display.
(3)
I feel like yelling at people
who do not clear the display
box fast enough when I am
ready for my display.
(4)

Strongly
disagree
(1)

Somewhat
disagree
(2)

Neither
agree nor
disagree (3)

Somewhat
agree
(4)

Strongly
agree
(5)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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RSC. Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about
resilient safety culture in the air show community:
Strongly
disagree
(1)

Somewhat
disagree
(2)

Neither
agree nor
disagree
(3)

Somewhat
agree
(4)

Strongly
agree
(5)

Safety is recognized as being
everyone’s responsibility, not
just that of the air boss.
(1)

o

o

o

o

o

Policies are in place to reduce
potential sources of
nonoperational distraction
during air shows (ATC/flight
deck). (2)

o

o

o

o

o

Air show performers hardly
use training to recognize highrisk situations.
(3)

o

o

o

o

o

There are SOPs for recovery
from errors identified by air
show performers, which are
reinforced by training.
(4)

o

o

o

o

o
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RT. Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about
risk tolerance during an air show event:

With 4 miles of visibility and haze, a
demo team leader decides to do a high/
full show.
(1)
Low ceilings obscure the tops of the
mountains. As a display pilot pulls for a
loop, he finds himself suddenly in the
clouds. He keeps his heading and
backpressure on the stick and hopes for
the best.
(2)
While on a fly-past flight, a display
pilot notices that the weather is
deteriorating to the west. A line of
clouds is moving in his direction, but
he is still over 20 miles away. He
decides to cancel his flight and turns to
return to his home airfield about 25
miles east of his present position.
(3)
A demo pilot has enjoyed flying a
spectacular sunset show over the sea
with 25 miles of visibility, wind calm
conditions, and no wave waters. As he
pulls up for a barrel roll, at about 1,500
feet, he loses sight of the horizon, and
the sea water seems to be
indistinguishable from the sky. He
keeps the backpressure on the stick and
continues the maneuver.
(4)

Strongly
disagree
(1)

Somewhat
disagree
(2)

Neither
agree nor
disagree
(3)

Somewhat
agree
(4)

Strongly
agree
(5)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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RP. Please rate the level of risk present if you were to experience the situation tomorrow.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

(Low risk)
(1)

9
(High risk)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Fly a display over a large lake
or sea at 300 feet above ground
level.
(1)

o o o o o o oo o

Conduct a fly-past over a hilly
populated area at 3,000 above
ground level.
(2)

o o o o o o oo o

Fly a display over water at 500
feet above ground level.
(3)
Fly a display over water at
1,000 feet above ground level.
(4)

o o o o o o oo o
o o o o o o oo o
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MF. Please indicate how frequently or infrequently you currently have each experience:

It seems I am
flying my
display routine
“on autopilot”
without much
awareness of
what I am
doing.
(1)
I rush through
the maneuvers
without being
really attentive
to them.
(2)
I do tasks in the
cockpit
automatically,
without being
aware of what I
am doing.
(3)
I have trouble
staying focused
on my display
routine and am
easily
sidetracked.
(4)

Almost
always
(1)

Very
frequently
(2)

Somewhat
frequently
(3)

Somewhat
infrequently
(4)

Very
infrequently
(5)

Almost
never
(6)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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APPENDIX C. Survey Instrument Codebook
Code

Instrument

Scale

Construct

Item
number

-

(Demographics)

D1

What is your age?

D.2

D2

What is your gender?

D.3

D3

What is your country of origin?

D.4

D4

What is your marital status?

D.5

D5

What is your educational background?

D.6

D6

D.7

D7

D.8

D8

What is your current role in the air show
community?
What is your total air show flying experience in
years?
What is your aerobatics background, civilian or
military?

DEMOGRAPHIC DETAILS
D.1

-

PART 1. HAZARDOUS ATTITUDES
HA.1
HA.2

Hazardous
Attitude Scale
(Ji et al., 2011)

HA.3

1–5
(Strongly
DisagreeStrongly
Agree)

Hazardous
Attitudes

HA1
HA5
HA16

HA.4

HA17

PART 2. RESILIENT SAFETY CULTURE
RSC.1
RSC.2
RSC.3

Resilient
Safety Culture
(Adjekum &
FernandezTous, 2020b)

1–5
(Strongly
DisagreeStrongly
Agree)

Resilient Safety
Culture

RSC6
(Pra5R)
RSC7
(Pro4)

RSC.4
PART 3. RISK TOLERANCE
RT.1
Risk Tolerance
1–5
(Ji et al., 2011)
(Strongly
DisagreeRT.2
Strongly
Agree)

RSC1
(Pri3)
RSC3
(Pol5)

Risk Tolerance

RT3
RT7

RT.3

RT10

RT.4

RT15
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Question

I am a display pilot due entirely to my hard work and
ability.
I can learn any flying skill if I put my mind to it.
I really hate being delayed on the ground when I am
ready for the display.
I feel like yelling at people who do not clear the
display box fast enough when I am ready for my
display.
Safety is recognized as being everyone’s
responsibility, not just that of the air boss.
Policies are in place to reduce potential sources of
nonoperational distraction during air shows
(ATC/flight deck).
Air show performers hardly use training to recognize
high-risk situations.
There are SOPs for recovery from errors identified
by air show performers, which are reinforced by
training.
With 4 miles of visibility and haze, a demo team
leader decides to do a high/ full show.
Low ceilings obscure the tops of the mountains. As a
display pilot pulls for a loop, he finds himself
suddenly in the clouds. He keeps his heading and
backpressure on the stick and hopes for the best.
While on a fly-past flight, a display pilot notices that
the weather is deteriorating to the west. A line of
clouds is moving in his direction, but he is still over
20 miles away. He decides to cancel his flight and
turns to return to his home airfield about 25 miles
east of his present position.
A demo pilot has enjoyed flying a spectacular sunset
show over the sea with 25 miles of visibility, wind
calm conditions, and no wave waters. As he pulls up
for a barrel roll, at about 1,500 feet, he loses sight of
the horizon, and the sea water seems to be
indistinguishable from the sky. He keeps the

backpressure on the stick and continues the
maneuver.

PART 4. RISK PERCEPTION
Please rate the level of risk present in the situation if YOU were to experience the situation tomorrow. Responses are provided on
a scale from 1 (Low Risk) to 9 (High Risk).
RP.1
Flight Risk
1–9
Risk Perception
RP9
Fly a display over a large lake or sea at 300 feet
Perception
(Low Risk(Altitude above ground level.
Scale (FPRS)
High Risk)
Risk)
(Winter et al.
RP.2
RP10
Conduct a fly-past over a hilly populated area at
2019)
3,000 above ground level.
RP.3

RP11

RP.4

RP13

PART 5. MINDFULNESS
MF.1
MF.2
MF.3
MF.4

Mindful
Attention
Awareness
Scale (MAAS)
(Brown &
Ryan, 2003)

1–6
(Almost
AlwaysAlmost
Never)

Mindfulness

MF7
MF8
MF10
MF14
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Fly a display over water at 500 feet above ground
level.
Fly a display over water at 1,000 feet above ground
level.
It seems I am flying my display routine “on
autopilot” without much awareness of what I am
doing.
I rush through the maneuvers without being really
attentive to them.
I do tasks in the cockpit automatically, without
being aware of what I am doing.
I have trouble staying focused on my display
routine and am easily sidetracked.

APPENDIX D. Semi-Structured and Focus Group Interview Session Guide
Parts of the Interview
Introduction

Interview Questions
Hello, my name is Manolis Karachalios, and I am this study’s
primary investigator. Thank you so much for consenting to take
part in this interview. As stated in the invitation email, the
objective of this interview is to gather your perspectives on the
resilient safety culture within the air show community, as well
as how risk perception and mindfulness have influenced that
perspective.
This interview should last approximately one hour. Please be
aware that this session will be recorded and that
contemporaneous notes will be taken. Following the interview, I
will organize and transcribe your comments, which will be
categorized and themed for our research.

Part A

Part B

Part C

Please be aware that the researchers will make every effort to
guarantee that no personally identifying information about you,
such as your name, is unintentionally disclosed during the
session and is not utilized in our final report. All audio
recordings from this session will be deleted once the
transcription process has been completed and you have had the
opportunity to confirm the contents of the transcript that will be
sent to answer any questions you are concerned with. I want to
remind you once again that this interview will be audio recorded
for transcription reasons. Before we begin the interview, you
must also read and sign the informed consent statement
document.
Biographic Data (Taken for each participant)
Age:
Sex:
Status (Military/ Civilian/ Ex-Military, currently civilian):
Number of Years at the Air Show Community:
Role (Display Pilot/ Air Boss):
Risk Perception
1. What are the most significant risks you anticipate during a
flying display?
2. What kinds of risks are you willing to accept when flying in
an actual air show?
Hazardous Attitudes
3. Which types of display pilots do you think are the most
dangerous?
4. Have you ever seen a display pilot whose manner deviated
from the norm in the air show community?
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Part D

Part E

Part F

Mindfulness
5. What kinds of mental preparation techniques do you do
before a flight?
6. How do you manage the external pressures caused by the
public, your peers, or any other distractions during an air
show?
Resilient Safety Culture
7. In your own words, how would you describe the existing
safety culture in the air show community?
8. How do you believe a resilient safety culture can enhance
the overall safety operations for air show performers?
Close
9. Is there anything more you would like to say?
10. Have you got any questions for me?
Thank you for your time, and we will provide you with
the transcript for your approval before data analysis.
Goodbye.
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APPENDIX E. Goodness-of-Fit Tests With the Use of G*Power
Figure 59
G*Power Curves for Goodness-of-Fit Tests
critical χ² = 11.0705
0.15

0.1

0.05

β

0

α

Figure 60
χ² Tests - Goodness-of-Fit Tests: Contingency Table
Analysis:
Input:

Output:

A priori: Compute required sample size
Effect size w

= 0.5

Power (1-β err prob)

= 0.95

α err prob
Df

Noncentrality parameter λ
Critical χ²

Total sample size
Actual power

= 0.05
= 5

= 20.0000000
= 11.0704977
= 80

= 0.9523388
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APPENDIX F. ANOVA Tables
Table 24
ANOVA, Age
Variable
RT

RSC

RP

MF

HA

SS
Between groups

df

MS

2.24

4

.56

Within groups

52.14

95

.55

Total

54.38

99

.27

4

.07
.40

Between groups
Within groups

40.68

102

Total

40.95

106

Between groups

10.31

4

2.58

Within groups

277.05

99

2.80

Total

287.35

103

Between groups

5.21

4

1.30

Within groups

37.04

99

.37

Total

42.25

103

1.00

4

.25

Within groups

34.46

100

.35

Total

35.46

104

Between groups

270

F

Sig.

1.02

.40

.17

.95

.92

.46

3.48

.01

.73

.58

Table 25
ANOVA, Marital Status
Variable
RT

RSC

RP

MF

HA

df

MS

F

Sig.

6.24

5

1.25

2.316

.050

Within groups

52.27

97

.54

Total

58.51

102

2.39

6

.40

1.018

.42

Within groups

40.22

103

.39

Total

42.60

109

Between groups

23.72

5

4.74

1.761

.13

Within groups

269.33

100

2.69

Total

293.05

105
3.771

.01

.667

.68

SS
Between groups

Between groups

Between groups

6.72

5

1.34

Within groups

35.61

100

.36

Total

42.33

105

1.40

6

.23

Within groups

35.36

101

.35

Total

36.76

107

Between groups
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Table 26
ANOVA, Educational Background
Variable
RT

RSC

RP

MF

HA

SS

df

MS

F

Sig.

4.51

3

1.50

2.76

.05

Within groups

54.00

99

.55

Total

58.51

102

2.54

3

.85

2.24

.09

Within groups

40.06

106

.38

Total

42.60

109

Between groups

17.91

3

5.97

2.21

.09

Within groups

275.14

102

2.70

Total

293.05

105
3.36

.02

.40

.75

Between groups

Between groups

Between groups

3.81

3

1.27

Within groups

38.52

102

.38

Total

42.33

105

Between groups

.42

3

.14
.35

Within groups

36.34

104

Total

36.76

107
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Table 27
ANOVA, Air Show Flying Experience
Variable
RT

RSC

RP

MF

HA

SS
Between groups

df

MS

.82

4

.22

Within groups

57.69

98

.59

Total

58.51

102

1.02

4

.26

Within groups

41.58

105

.40

Total

42.60

109

Between groups

21.52

4

5.38

Within groups

271.53

101

2.69

Total

293.05

105

Between groups

Between groups

1.93

4

.48

Within groups

40.40

101

.40

Total

42.33

105

Between groups

.16

4

.04
.36

Within groups

36.59

103

Total

36.76

107
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Sig.

F
.35

.84

.65

.63

2.00

.10

1.21

.31

.11

.98

Table 28
ANOVA, Aerobatics Experience
Variable
RT

RSC

RP

MF

HA

df

MS

F

Sig.

1.72

1

1.72

3.06

.08

Within groups

56.79

101

.56

Total

58.51

102
1.12

.29

.03

.87

.79

.38

1.81

.18

SS
Between groups

Between groups

.44

1

.44
.39

Within groups

42.17

108

Total

42.60

109

.081

1

.08
2.82

Between groups
Within groups

292.97

104

Total

293.05

105

Between groups

.32

1

.32
.40

Within groups

42.01

104

Total

42.33

105

Between groups

.62

1

.62
.34

Within groups

36.14

106

Total

36.76

107
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APPENDIX G. Word Cloud
Figure 61
Word Cloud, Semi-Structured and Focus Group Interview Sessions
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APPENDIX H. Themes, Codes, References
Figure 62
Themes and Codes, Number of References in Qualitative Data, HA
Name
Hazardous Attitudes
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of discipline
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of discipline\Discipline control
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of discipline\Instill discipline
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of discipline\Use of checklist
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of experience
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of experience\New performer
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of experience\Regulatory-driven risks
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of financial resources
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of financial resources\Financial pressure
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of flying skills
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of flying skills\Inconsistent
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of flying skills\Inconsistent\Inconsistent flying
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of flying skills\Underconfident
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of preparation
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of preparation\Lack of mental preparation
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Deficient\Lack of training
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Distracted
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Distracted\Distracted from family issues
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Distracted\Hiring pressure
Egocentric
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Egoistic
Egocentric
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Egoistic\Arrogance
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Egoistic\Entitlements
Egocentric
Egocentric
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Egoistic\Glory
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Egoistic\Show-off
Egocentric
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Part timer
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Part timer\Hobbyist
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Part timer\Weekend warbird pilot
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Wrong attitude
Hazardous Attitudes\Concealed hazardous attitude\Wrong attitude\Dude look
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Anti-authority
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Impulsivity
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Impulsivity\Continuation bias
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Impulsivity\Ignorance
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Impulsivity\Immaturity
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Invulnerability
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Invulnerability\Complacency
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Invulnerability\Overconfident
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Invulnerability\Overconfident\Overestimation
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Invulnerability\Overconfident\Overmotivation
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Invulnerability\Pushing the limits
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Invulnerability\Risky display profile
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Machismo
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Machismo\Competitive
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Machismo\Parachute jumpers
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Mix of hazardous attitudes
Hazardous Attitudes\FAA reccomended hazardous attitudes\Resignation
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Files References
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
3
4
0
0
1
1
2
2
1
1
4
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
2
2
2
2
0
0
4
6
2
2
2
8
1
2
7
14
1
1
2
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
0
0
4
6
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
1
4
6
3
3
3
4
2
2
1
3
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
0
0

Figure 63
Themes and Codes, Number of References in Qualitative Data, MF
Name

Files References

Mindfulness
Mindfulness\Consistency
Mindfulness\Consistency\Checklist
Mindfulness\Consistency\Importance of Practice
Mindfulness\Consistency\Importance of Practice\Realistic practice
Mindfulness\Consistency\Methodical
Mindfulness\Consistency\Precision flying
Mindfulness\Consistency\Repetition
Mindfulness\Consistency\Resetting
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Distraction management
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Distraction management\Competition flying
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Distraction management\External pressure control
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Distraction management\Focus
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Distraction management\Training
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Self isolation
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Self isolation\30 minute rule
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Self isolation\60-minute rule
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Self isolation\Before takeoff
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Self isolation\Crowd distancing
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Self isolation\Relax
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Self isolation\Social events withdrawal
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Self isolation\Tranquil thinking
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Type of distractions
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Type of distractions\Air Boss-induced
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Type of distractions\Announcers
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Type of distractions\ATC-induced
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Type of distractions\Family
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Type of distractions\Fatigue
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Type of distractions\Phone calls
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Type of distractions\Public
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Type of distractions\Sel-induced pressure
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Distractions\Type of distractions\Social media
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Pressures
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Pressures\Social facilitation
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Pressures\Social facilitation\Sterile area
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Pressures\Time management
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Pressures\Time management\Time buffer
Mindfulness\Exogenous factors control\Pressures\Unbiased opinion of oneself
Mindfulness\Pre-show preparation
Mindfulness\Pre-show preparation\Contingency planning
Mindfulness\Pre-show preparation\Environmental conditions
Mindfulness\Pre-show preparation\Environmental conditions\Density altitude
Mindfulness\Pre-show preparation\Rest
Mindfulness\Visualization
Mindfulness\Visualization\Affirmations
Mindfulness\Visualization\Briefing
Mindfulness\Visualization\Briefing\Debriefing
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0
4
2
2
0
1
1
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1
0
4
6
1
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4
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Figure 64
Themes and Codes, Number of References in Qualitative Data, MF and RSC
Name

Files References

Mindfulness\Visualization\Briefing\Self-briefing
Mindfulness\Visualization\Chair flying
Mindfulness\Visualization\Concentration
Mindfulness\Visualization\Flow
Mindfulness\Visualization\Flow\Compartmentalization
Mindfulness\Visualization\Other high-performance activities
Mindfulness\Visualization\Pre-shot routine
Mindfulness\Visualization\Rehearsal
Mindfulness\Visualization\Video review
Mindfulness\Visualization\Walk through
Resilient Safety Culture
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Financial background
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Personality
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Personality\Calm
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Personality\Conservative mindset
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Personality\Discipline
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Personality\Fastidious
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Personality\Humble
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Personality\Passion
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Personality\Stable extrovert
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Personality\Well-mannered
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Personality\Willingness to listen
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Professional maturity
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Professional maturity\Judgement
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Professional maturity\Prepared
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Professional maturity\Procedures adherence
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Professional maturity\Standardised performance
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Professional maturity\Theoretical knowledge
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Resilience
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Resilience\Expect the unexpected
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Resilience\Resilience development
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Skills
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Skills\Competition aerobatics
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Skills\Competition aerobatics\Familirization to social anxiety
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Skills\Competition aerobatics\Openness to criticism
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Skills\Competition aerobatics\Precision
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Skills\Consistent
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Skills\Desire to fly well
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Skills\Desire to fly well\Self-competition
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Skills\Desire to fly well\Self-trust
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Skills\Energy management awareness
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Skills\Situational awareness
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Skills\Superior flying skills
Resilient Safety Culture\Air show performers\Skills\Training
Resilient Safety Culture\Attributes
Resilient Safety Culture\Attributes\Adaptable
Resilient Safety Culture\Attributes\Collaborative
Resilient Safety Culture\Attributes\Inherent
Resilient Safety Culture\Attributes\Robust
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Figure 65
Themes and Codes, Number of References in Qualitative Data, RSC
Name

Files References

Resilient Safety Culture\Attributes\Self-sustaining
Resilient Safety Culture\Attributes\Shared values
Resilient Safety Culture\Attributes\Shared values\Air show family
Resilient Safety Culture\Attributes\Shared values\Air show family\Family environment
Resilient Safety Culture\Attributes\Shared values\Pride
Resilient Safety Culture\Attributes\Shared values\Professionalism
Resilient Safety Culture\Attributes\Shared values\Trust
Resilient Safety Culture\Attributes\Shared values\Trust\Friendship
Resilient Safety Culture\Attributes\Structured air shows
Resilient Safety Culture\Attributes\Structured air shows\Size of air show
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Air race and Aerobatic competition paradigms
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Bifurcated
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Continuous improvement
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Ego management
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\HROs
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Indicators
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Margins
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Negative issues
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Negative issues\Competitiveness
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Negative issues\Deviation from safety culture
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Negative issues\Financial competition
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Negative issues\Implications
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Negative issues\Implications\Effect of accidents
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Negative issues\Implications\Inevitable accidents
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Negative issues\Insufficient safety culture
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Negative issues\Lack of common goals
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Negative issues\Low standards
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Negative issues\Mediocrity
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Negative issues\Micromanaging
Resilient Safety Culture\Continuous enhancements\Negative issues\Organizational hypocricy
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Change of culture
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Change of culture\Flag behavior
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Culture of discipline
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Culture of discipline\Normalization of deviance
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Excellence culture
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Excellence culture\Excellence
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Excellence culture\High standards
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Excellence culture\Positivism
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Informed culture
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Informed culture\Communication
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture\Coaching
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture\Dissemination of information
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture\Education
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture\Experience of tragedies
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture\Expert advice
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture\Feedback
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture\Group development

279

2
2
1
1
1
2
3
2
1
1
3
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
0
2
2
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
2
4
1
4
2
5
0
2
4
1
1
2
1
1
1
1

2
2
1
1
1
2
5
2
2
1
5
8
1
2
2
2
1
2
0
4
2
6
1
2
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
0
0
1
2
5
2
5
6
8
0
2
5
1
1
2
1
1
1
1

Figure 66
Themes and Codes, Number of References in Qualitative Data, RSC and RP
Name

Files References

Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture\Information flow
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture\Maturity to share information
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture\Mentoring
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture\Mentoring\Mentored by a Friend
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture\Mentoring\Professional mentor program
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture\Mentoring\Role of instructors
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture\Sharing lessons learned
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Learning culture\Transmissivity of experience
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\National culture
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Outdated culture
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Reporting culture
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Reporting culture\Constructive criticism
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Reporting culture\Peer reviewed community
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Reporting culture\Peer reviewed community\Small community
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Reporting culture\Reporting occurence
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Reporting culture\Reporting system
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Safety Culture
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Safety Culture\Safety Management System
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Safety Culture\Safety Management System\Risk assessment
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Safety Culture\Safety Management System\Safety barriers
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Safety Culture\Safety Management System\Safety motivation
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Safety Culture\Safety Management System\Safety policy
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Safety Culture\Safety Management System\Safety policy\Extra paperwork
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Safety Culture\Safety Management System\Safety policy\Ineffective
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Safety Culture\Safety Management System\Safety policy\Rules
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Safety Culture\Safety Management System\Safety promotion
Resilient Safety Culture\Culture\Safety Culture\Safety Management System\Safety records
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Air bosses
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Air bosses\Air boss network
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Air bosses\Dreaded Briefing
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Aviation authorities
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Aviation authorities\Display authorisation process
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Aviation authorities\Display authorisation process\ACE system
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Aviation authorities\Display authorisation process\ACE system\Fraternity ACEing
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Aviation authorities\Display authorisation process\Display approval
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Aviation authorities\Display authorisation process\Display pilot selection
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Aviation authorities\Display authorisation process\Evaluation card
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Aviation authorities\Display authorisation process\Retention Vs Recruitement
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Aviation authorities\Oversight
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Personal responsibility
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Role of Air Show Councils
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Role of Air Show Councils\ACEs
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Role of Air Show Councils\ACEs\ACE authorization
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Role of Air Show Councils\ACEs\Ace committee
Resilient Safety Culture\Leadership\Role of Air Show Councils\Role of conventions
Risk Perception
Risk Perception\Financial risk
Risk Perception\Financial risk\Budget restrictions
Risk Perception\Financial risk\Financial damage
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Figure 67
Themes and Codes, Number of References in Qualitative Data, RP
Name

Files References

Risk Perception\Financial risk\Financial pressures
Risk Perception\Financial risk\Financial problems
Risk Perception\Financial risk\Lack of Financial Resources
Risk Perception\Financial risk\Reputational risk
Risk Perception\Financial risk\Sponsorship
Risk Perception\HuMan
Risk Perception\HuMan\Confidense
Risk Perception\HuMan\Human error
Risk Perception\HuMan\Human error\Pilot error
Risk Perception\HuMan\Physiological risks
Risk Perception\HuMan\Physiological risks\Emotional risk
Risk Perception\HuMan\Physiological risks\Fatigue
Risk Perception\HuMan\Physiological risks\Fatigue\Fatigue risk management
Risk Perception\HuMan\Physiological risks\Fatigue\Latent stress
Risk Perception\HuMan\Physiological risks\G-LOC
Risk Perception\HuMan\Physiological risks\Sleep
Risk Perception\HuMan\Psychological risk
Risk Perception\HuMan\Psychological risk\Indecision
Risk Perception\HuMan\Psychological risk\Loss of Situational Awareness
Risk Perception\HuMan\Psychological risk\Overconfidense
Risk Perception\HuMan\Psychological risk\Social desirability
Risk Perception\HuMan\Seasoned performers
Risk Perception\HuMan\Seasoned performers\Nervousness
Risk Perception\HuMan\Skill risk
Risk Perception\HuMan\Skill risk\Continuity
Risk Perception\HuMan\Skill risk\Currency
Risk Perception\HuMan\Skill risk\Lack of air show experience
Risk Perception\HuMan\Skill risk\Lack of aircraft type experience
Risk Perception\HuMan\Skill risk\Lack of practice
Risk Perception\HuMan\Skill risk\Lack of preparedness
Risk Perception\HuMan\Unconcentrated flying
Risk Perception\Level of risk
Risk Perception\Machine
Risk Perception\Machine\Age of aircraft
Risk Perception\Machine\Aircraft Malfunction
Risk Perception\Machine\Aircraft Malfunction\Engine failure
Risk Perception\Machine\Aircraft Malfunction\Flight controls
Risk Perception\Machine\Aircraft Malfunction\Maintenance safety standards
Risk Perception\Machine\Aircraft Malfunction\Structural damage
Risk Perception\Machine\Aircraft turn-around
Risk Perception\Machine\Aircraft type
Risk Perception\Machine\Maximum gross weight to start a display
Risk Perception\Machine\Twin engine aircraft risks
Risk Perception\Management
Risk Perception\Management\Air bosses
Risk Perception\Management\Air show management
Risk Perception\Management\Poor event organization
Risk Perception\Medium
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Air show site
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Figure 68
Themes and Codes, Number of References in Qualitative Data, RP
Name

Files References

Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Air show site\Airshow box size
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Air show site\Airspace structure
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Air show site\Crowd control
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Bird strike
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Drones
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Environment
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Environment\Density altitude
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Environment\Over water display
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Environment\Sun position
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Environment\Weather
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Environment\Weather\Poor visibility
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Environment\Weather\Turbulence
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Environment\Weather\Visibility
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Environment\Weather\Winds
Risk Perception\Medium\Physical medium\Obstacles
Risk Perception\Medium\Societal medium
Risk Perception\Mission
Risk Perception\Mission\CFIT
Risk Perception\Mission\CFIT\Altitude factor
Risk Perception\Mission\CFIT\Hitting
Risk Perception\Mission\Circling the jumpers
Risk Perception\Mission\Display profile
Risk Perception\Mission\Display profile\Complexity of display
Risk Perception\Mission\Display profile\Display variation
Risk Perception\Mission\Display profile\Roll
Risk Perception\Mission\Display profile\Roll\Downline roll
Risk Perception\Mission\Ferry flight
Risk Perception\Mission\Formation flying
Risk Perception\Mission\Formation flying\Formation aerobatics
Risk Perception\Mission\Formation flying\Mid-air collision
Risk Perception\Mission\Formation flying\Team leader
Risk Perception\Mission\Formation flying\Team wingman
Risk Perception\Mission\Formation flying\Team-related risks
Risk Perception\Mission\Social obligations
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation\Distractions
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation\Distractions\Crowd facilitation
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation\Distractions\Environmental
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation\Distractions\Family issues
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation\Distractions\Family issues\Marital problems
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation\Distractions\GoPro Cameras
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation\Distractions\Radio chatter
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation\Distractions\Rushed
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation\Luck
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation\Pressures
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation\Pressures\Refueling between the shows
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation\Pressures\Regulatory-induced pressure
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation\Pressures\Time pressure
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation\Pressures\Time pressure\Time management
Risk Perception\Unexpected situation\Unexpected traffic
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Figure 69
Themes and Codes, Number of References in Qualitative Data, RT
Files References

Name

Risk Tolerance
Risk Tolerance\HuMan
Risk Tolerance\HuMan\Fatigue
Risk Tolerance\HuMan\G-tolerance
Risk Tolerance\HuMan\Physiological issues
Risk Tolerance\HuMan\Pilot Emotions
Risk Tolerance\HuMan\Self preservation
Risk Tolerance\HuMan\Team leader
Risk Tolerance\Machine
Risk Tolerance\Machine\Maintenance
Risk Tolerance\Machine\Maintenance\Mechanical issues
Risk Tolerance\Machine\System malfunction
Risk Tolerance\Management
Risk Tolerance\Management\Air bosses
Risk Tolerance\Management\Crash and rescue
Risk Tolerance\Management\Discrete frequency
Risk Tolerance\Management\Regulators
Risk Tolerance\Medium
Risk Tolerance\Medium\Air show facilitation
Risk Tolerance\Medium\Over water
Risk Tolerance\Medium\Overland displays
Risk Tolerance\Medium\Overwater display
Risk Tolerance\Medium\Restricted visibility
Risk Tolerance\Medium\Social engagement
Risk Tolerance\Medium\Social facilitation
Risk Tolerance\Medium\Weather
Risk Tolerance\Medium\Weather\Cloud ceiling
Risk Tolerance\Medium\Weather\High Density Altitude
Risk Tolerance\Medium\Weather\Winds
Risk Tolerance\Mission
Risk Tolerance\Mission\Circle the jumpers
Risk Tolerance\Mission\Competition flying
Risk Tolerance\Mission\Formation flying
Risk Tolerance\Mission\Incentive rides
Risk Tolerance\Risk management
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Judgement
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Knock it off
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Priorities
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Proactive risk management
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Risk matrix
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Risk mitigation
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Risk mitigation\Rehearsal
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Risk mitigation\Training as risk mitigator
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Risk mitigation\What-ifs
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Routine changes
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Routine changes\Change of display program or sequence
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Safety buffer
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Safety buffer\Margin for error
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Standard Operating Procedures
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Standard Operating Procedures\Contracts
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Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Standard Operating Procedures\Go-no go criteria
Risk Tolerance\Risk management\Sterile environment
Risk Tolerance\Zero tolerance
Risk Tolerance\Zero tolerance\Unexpected risk
Risk Tolerance\Zero tolerance\Unexpected risk\Bird strike
Risk Tolerance\Zero tolerance\Unexpected risk\Engine failure
Risk Tolerance\Zero tolerance\Unexpected risk\Structural damage
Risk Tolerance\Zero tolerance\Unnecessary risks
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APPENDIX I. Themes: Triangulation and Interrater Agreement
Table 29
Themes Identified in Qualitative Data Sources, Triangulation
Study area

Theme

Qualitative data source
Semistructured
interviews and
focus group

Observation

Air showrelated
documents

X

X

X

Unexpected situation

X

X

X

Zero-tolerance

X

X

X

5Ms

X

X

X

Concealed hazardous
attitudes
FAA recommended
hazardous attitudes
Consistency

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Exogenous factors
control
Preshow preparation

X

X

X

X

X

X

Visualization

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Risk perception Financial risk
and tolerance
Level of air show
display flying risk
Risk management

Hazardous
attitudes

Mindfulness

X
X

Resilient safety Continuous
culture
enhancements
Culture
Ownership
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Table 30
Themes Identified in Qualitative Data Sources, Interrater Agreement
Study area
Risk perception and
tolerance

Hazardous attitudes

Mindfulness

Theme

Level of interrater agreement

Financial risk

Excellent

Level of air show
display flying risk

Excellent

Risk management

Excellent

Unexpected situation

Excellent

Zero-tolerance

Excellent

5Ms

Excellent

Concealed hazardous
attitudes

Excellent

FAA recommended
hazardous attitudes

Excellent

Consistency

Excellent

Exogenous factors
control

Excellent

Preshow preparation

Excellent

Visualization

Excellent

Resilient safety culture Continuous
enhancements

Excellent

Culture

Excellent

Ownership

Excellent
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APPENDIX J. Air Show Site Observation Data
Figure 70
Air Show Site Observation Field Notes, Personal Notebook
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Figure 71
Air Show Site Observation, Example of Notes by ATC (In the Greek Language)
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Figure 72
Air Show Planning Material, Example of Timetable
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Figure 73
Air Show Planning Material, Example of Risk Assessment Worksheet
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Figure 74
Air Crew Safety Briefing, Example of Briefed Items
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Figure 75
Air Show Planning Material, Example of Upper Winds
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APPENDIX K. Factual Air Show Data Charts
Figure 76
Air Show Accident and Incidents, Contributory Factors
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Figure 77
Air Show Accident and Incidents, Human Factor

293

Figure 78
Air Show Accident and Incidents, Machine (Mechanical) Factor
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Figure 79
Air Show Accident and Incidents, Machine (Structural) Factor
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Figure 80
Air Show Accident and Incidents, Medium Factor

296

Figure 81
Air Show Accident and Incidents, Event Category
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